Three Essays on International Trade and Institutions. by Saad, Ihab F.
Three Essays on International Trade and
Institutions
by
Ihab F. Saad
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Political Science and Economics)
in The University of Michigan
2014
Doctoral Committee:
Associate Professor Andrei A. Levchenko, Co-chair
Professor Robert J. Franzese, Jr., Co-chair
Professor Alan V. Deardorff
Assistance Professor Kyle Handley
c© Ihab F. Saad 2014
All Rights Reserved
To my parents. To my sons; Majd and Khaled, and my daughter Salma. To the one
who without her this project could have not been accomplished, my wife Ahlam
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my special appreciation and thanks to my dissertation
committee for their continuous encouragement and invaluable comments and advices:
Andrei Levchenko (co-chair), Robert Franzese (co-chair), Alan Deardorff, and Kyle
Handley. The third essay of this dissertation is coauthored with Vanessa Alviarez
who I owe a special thanks.
A special thanks to Open Society Institute and AMIDEAST (West Bank) for the
generous fundings.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
CHAPTER
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. Trade and Technology Adoption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.1 Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.2 Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Closed Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.1 Technology Adoption in the Closed Economy . . . . 15
2.3.2 Equilibrium in the Closed Economy . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4 Open Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4.1 Technology Adoption in the Open Economy . . . . 23
2.4.2 Equilibrium in the Open Economy . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.5 Illustrative Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.5.1 Example One: Symmetric Countries and Linear Cost
of Technology Adoption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.5.2 Calibration and Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.5.3 Example Two: Symmetric countries, Strictly Con-
vex Cost of Technology Adoption and Fixed Cost of
Adjustment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.5.4 Example Three: Asymmetric Countries . . . . . . . 39
2.5.5 Comparative Statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
iv
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.7 Appendix A: Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.8 Appendix B: Examples and Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.8.1 Example One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.8.2 Example Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.8.3 Example Three: Asymmetric Countries . . . . . . . 62
2.9 Appendix C: The Distribution of Firm Sales in Zipf’s Law . . 62
III. Contracting Institutions and International Trade: The Polit-
ical Economy of Institutions in the Global Economy . . . . . 74
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.2.1 Note on Contracting Institutions . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.2.2 Preferences and Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.2.3 Production and Market Structure . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.3 Contracting Institutions, Trade Barriers, Trade Patterns and
Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.4 Firm-Preferences over Institutions in the Global Economy . . 92
3.4.1 Domestic Institutions reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.4.2 Trade Liberalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.4.3 Country Interdependence: Reforms in Trade Partner
Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.5 Pareto Distribution: Numerical Example . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.6 Political Economy of Endogenous Institutions . . . . . . . . . 102
3.6.1 Lobbying Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.6.2 Lobbying Firms and Endogenous Entry . . . . . . . 103
3.6.3 Timing and Political Equilibrium of the Lobbying
Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.6.4 Trade and the Relative Power of Special Interest Groups115
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.8 Appendix A: Incomplete Contracts and SSPE . . . . . . . . . 117
3.8.1 Shapley Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
3.9 Appendix B: Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
IV. Multinational Production and Intra-firm Trade . . . . . . . . 131
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.3 Stylized Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
4.4 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
4.4.1 Consumer Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
4.4.2 Production and Market Structure . . . . . . . . . . 148
4.4.3 Mode of Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
4.4.4 Partial Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
v
4.5 Parameterization, Functional Forms and Estimation . . . . . 156
4.5.1 Foreign affiliate’s sales: firm-level gravity . . . . . . 157
4.6 General Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
4.6.1 Aggregate Sales: Gravity Equations . . . . . . . . . 162
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
4.8 Appendix A: Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
4.9 Appendix B: Detail Derivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
2.1 Technology Adoption: Example One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.2 Firm Productivity Nκ in the Open and Closed Economies: Example
One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.3 Relative Productivity: Example One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.4 Firms Net Profits in the Open and Closed Economies: Example One 65
2.5 Example Two with φ = 1.25 and No Adjustment cost c = 0 . . . . . 66
2.6 Firms Productivity: Reduction in Variable Trade Costs τ from 1.3
to 1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.7 Trade Liberalization Impacts on a Firm’s Productivity: Variable
Trade Costs τ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.8 The Impact of Fixed Cost of Exporting on a Firms’ Productivity . . 69
2.9 Trade Liberalization Impacts on a Firm’s Productivity: Fixed Cost
of Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.10 Productivity Gap between an Exporter and a Nonexporter: Symmet-
ric Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.11 Exporter’s productivity: Symmetric Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.12 Nonexporter’s Productivity: Symmetric Countries . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.13 Productivity Gap between an Exporter and a Nonexporter: Asym-
metric Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.14 Nonexporter Productivity: Asymmetric Countries . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.1 Impact of Trade on the Political Equilibrium of Institutional Quality 79
3.2 Parameter Restriction: Incomplete Specialization . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.8 Political Economy Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.3 Net Aggregate Profits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
3.4 A Nonexporter’s Profits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
3.5 An exporter’s profits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
3.6 The Distributional Consequences of Inst. Reforms in the Global
Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
3.7 The Impact of Trade Partner Inst. on the Distributional Conse-
quences of Domestic Inst. Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
3.9 Equilibrium Institutional Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
3.10 Trade Partner’s Impact on Political Equilibrium Domestic Institutions130
vii
4.1 Profit from domestic sales, exports, FDI and intra-firm trade . . . . 159
4.2 Density of U.S Foreign Affiliate Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
4.3 Market Penetration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
4.4 Research and Development Share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
4.5 Density of Firms’ R&D shares for selected industries . . . . . . . . . 171
4.6 Density of Fimrs’ Producivity by R&D group . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
4.7 Distribution of Estimated MP Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
4.8 Distribution of Estimated MP Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
viii
LIST OF TABLES
Table
4.1 Gravity Equation of MP (country-sector level) . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
4.2 Gravity Equation of MP (country-sector level) . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
4.3 Gravity Equation of MP (country-sector level) . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
4.4 Gravity Equation of MP (country-sector level) . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
4.5 Gravity Equation of MP (country-sector level) . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
ix
CHAPTER I
Introduction
This dissertation consists three distinct but related essays. The first essay addresses
the effects of trade liberalization on firms’ productivity. I endogenize firms’ choices
of production technology in what would be a standard Melitz model otherwise. The
model is highly tractable and provides new insights about the relationship between
firms’ productivity and trade liberalization. Firms’ responses to trade liberalization
are heterogenous: exporters, on average, improve their level of technology adoption,
whereas nonexporters downgrade their level of technology adoption. The degree to
which exporters/nonexporters adjust their level of technology adoption depends on
domestic market size, export destination market size, trade impediments, whether
new exporter/nonexporter or old exporter/nonexporter, and model’s parameters. In
contrast to extant literature on endogenous production technology, the effects of trade
liberalization are not limited to a specific subset of producers (mainly new exporters),
but reach all existing firms. I also show that even with some firms adopting lower
levels of production technology, gains from trade are larger relative to the standard
Melitz’ model.
The evolution of domestic institutions in the global economy is the subject of
the second essay. Why does trade liberalization improve domestic institutions in
1
some countries but not others? I incorporate contractual frictions in a two-country
two-sector model of international trade with heterogeneous firms in which one sector
produces homogenous goods and the other produces differentiated goods. Only the
differentiated goods sector is subject to incomplete contracts. Countries are symmet-
ric except for contracting institutional quality. Institutional quality is a source of
comparative advantage: the country with better institutions exports the differenti-
ated goods on net. In the differentiated goods sector, exporters, on average, benefit
from domestic institutional reforms, whereas nonexporters’ profits fall as institutions
advance. The effect of institutional change on firms’ profits is magnified as trade
costs decline. To endogenize domestic institutions, I use the lobbying framework of
Grossman and Helpman (1994), where subsets of exporters and nonexporters relate
the group’s monetary contribution to the domestic institutional quality. Reduction
in trade costs deteriorates domestic contracting institutions if nonexporters are the
predominant political group, which is more likely in countries with low initial domes-
tic institutions. In addition, equilibrium domestic institutional quality is positively
affected by the trade partner’s institutional quality.
In the third essay (joint with Vanessa Alviarez ), we study intra-firm trade and
multinational production in the global economy. A salient empirical regularity of
multinational production (MP) is that foreign affiliate sales are decreasing in trade
costs. As a response, intra-firm trade, from parents to foreign affiliates, has been com-
bined with standard models of horizontal MP to generate complementarities between
trade and multinational activity that deliver gravity-style predictions for foreign af-
filiates’ sales. However, intra-firm trade is not common across foreign affiliates but
rather concentrated among a small set of large multinational firms (Ramondo et al.,
2014). In addition, we document that not only firms in the upper-tail of the firm’s
size distribution, which are more likely to conduct intra-firm transactions, are subject
to gravity forces; but also sales of relatively small foreign affiliates are significantly
2
affected by geographical barriers. Two puzzles emerge: (i) why intra-firm trade is
concentrated among the largest multinational firms? and (ii) what are the mecha-
nisms that drive affiliates’ sales in the lower tail of the distribution to obey gravity
forces, even in the absence of intra-firm trade? In this paper we deliver a framework
to explain theses two phenomenas. An affiliate’s marginal cost is affected by the
parent decision regarding the method of knowledge transfer. Exporting intermediate
inputs embodying knowledge to an affiliate is subject to the standard iceberg-type
trade costs and fixed costs of intra-firm trade. The costs of direct knowledge transfer
are also increasing with geographical barriers but rises less than the costs of export-
ing intermediate inputs. Because of the fixed costs of intra-firm trade, only the most
productive multinational firms choose to export to its affiliates. Moreover, the share
of imported intermediate inputs to the affiliate’s total costs is increasing with firm’s
productivity. We show that, in equilibrium and taking into account both the intensive
and the extensive margins, foreign affiliates’ sales for both the affiliates who import
and do not import from parents suffer from gravity forces.
3
CHAPTER II
Trade and Technology Adoption
2.1 Introduction
The characteristics of firms have played a major role in the recent trade literature.
On one hand, empirically, many studies show that exporters tend to be larger, more
productive, and pay higher wages (Bernard and Jensen, 1999, 2004). Theoretically,
Melitz (2003) has developed a new trade theory with heterogeneous firms and monop-
olistic competition where only the most productive firms choose to export.1 On the
other hand, several papers show that the decision to invest in productivity-enhancing
activities and the decision to export are in fact complements.2 That is, export market
participation induces firms to invest more in productivity-enhancing activities and,
1Bernard et al. (2003) also deliver a heterogeneous-firm model under perfect competition where
only the most productive firms export.
2For instance, Baldwin and Gu (2003, 2004, 2006) demonstrate that export participation for
Canadian manufacturing plants is associated with plants’ productivity growth. Van Biesebroeck
(2005) shows that entry into exporter market increases exporters productivity advantage in nine
African countries. De Loecker (2007) employs matched sampling techniques on Slovenian manufac-
turing firms operating between 1994–2000 to investigate the impact of export on a firm’s productiv-
ity. He finds that exports increase a firm’s productivity by 20 percent. Using a microlevel data for
firms in Taiwanese electronic industry to investigate the impact of export participation on a firm’s
productivity, Aw et al. (2007, 2011) confirm the complementarity between export participation and
R&D. Bustos (2011b) finds that, following a reduction in Brazilian tariffs, Argentinean exporters
upgrade technology production. Lileeva and Trefler (2010) demonstrate that Canadian plants that
were induced by the U.S. tariff cuts to export had higher adoption rates for advanced production
technology. More supporting evidences on the impact of exporting on firm’s productivity were also
found by Isgut and Fernandes (2007) and Park et al. (2010).
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hence, improves exporters’ productivity.3
On average, 20 percent of the firms export, whereas the majority of the firms serve
only the domestic market (Bernard and Jensen, 1999). How do nonexporters respond
to trade liberalization? Will nonexporters adapt their level of production technology
in response to reduction in trade impediments, or, conditional on surviving, will their
characteristics remain unchanged? Is the exit option documented in the literature
the only available tool for nonexporters? Does trade liberalization affect new ex-
porters and old exporters alike? Is it the decision to export that matters, or where
to export and how much to export when it comes to a firm’s choice of production
technology? Indeed, we have learned a great deal about firms’ characteristics and
how firms respond to trade liberalization, yet many aspects of the above questions
remain unanswered or partially answered. In this paper, I try to fill this gap and
provide a unified theoretical model that is applicable in addressing and answering
these questions.
Moreover, the paper is motivated by the modeling limitations in the existing liter-
ature. The existing literature that models the linkages between exporting and firms’
productivity is not as convincing as the self-selection modeling of productivity i.e.,
Melitz (2003). Most of the models impose binary choice of technology investment
(high and low) and limit the impact of trade liberalization on firms’ productivity
to a subset of firms (for instance, new exporters, firms in the third quartile of the
productivity distribution, and firms operating under low technology investment). Fur-
thermore, the direction of the impact is forced to flow from a low level of technology
investment to a high level of technology investment without addressing the possibility
of downgrading (Bustos, 2011b; Atkeson and Burstein, 2010; Melitz and Costantini,
2007; Lileeva and Trefler, 2010; Yeaple, 2005). Finally, the relationship between in-
3The literature has emphasized on two main channels that link export participation to firms’
productivity: (i) “learning- by- exporting” channel (Delgado et al., 2002), and (ii) market size
channel: innovation (R&D) and market size are complements (Bustos, 2011b; Lileeva and Trefler,
2010; Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012).
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vestment in technology-enhancing activities and firms’ productivity is exogenously
specified and lacks the necessary microfoundations.
I provide a tractable model in which the direction of the impact of trade liberaliza-
tion on firms’ productivity, in principle, can go any direction, and more importantly,
it reaches all surviving firms in the economy (nonexporters, new exporters, and old
exporters). In so doing, new insights and testable implications are born out of the
more flexible modeling: In response to reduction in variable trade cots, nonexporters
downgrade their level of technology investment whereas exporters upgrade their level
of technology investment. In other words, the gap between exporters’ productivity
and nonexporters’ productivity increases. Yet unlike the related theoretical papers,
the gap is widening not merely because of exporters adopting higher levels of tech-
nology but also because nonexporters downgrade the level of technology adopted.
Old exporters and new exporters upgrade their technology investment disproportion-
ately,4 with new exporters experiencing large increases in productivity whereas old
exporters productivity is almost unchanged. In response to reduction in fixed cost
of trade (export), old exporters slightly downgrade technology adopted whereas non-
exporters slightly adopt higher technology. New exporters, however, enjoy a sizable
growth of production technology adopted and thus higher productivity.
Consistent with De Loecker (2007)’s empirical findings, firms’ productivity re-
sponses to trade liberalization depend on domestic and export markets’ characteris-
tics. The larger the domestic market relative to the export market, the smaller the
impact of trade liberalization on firms’ decisions on production technology adoption.
Moreover, exporters’ productivity responses to trade are also positively associated
with the number of export market destinations.
The implication of heterogeneous firms’ productivity responses for the gains from
4Backus (2011) uses a quantile response model to show that changes in market size quasi–
proportionately affects all firms regardless of their productivity percentile.
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trade is important but understudied.5 Gains from international trade are magnified
by firms’ decisions to exit, export and invest in productivity-enhancing activities.6
To quantify the gains from international trade under the current framework, model’s
parameters are calibrated to match the stylized facts regarding firms’ characteristics
in the global economy. Relative to the counterfactual scenario in which firms’ pro-
ductivity is exogenous and invariant to trade costs, gains from trade openness are
50% to 100% higher even with some firms adopting lower level of technology in the
open economy.
In a standard monopolistically competitive economy with heterogeneous firms and
CES preferences, a firm chooses the number of intermediate inputs N and the amount
of intermediate input each supplier provides (each supplier produces one intermediate
input). The number of intermediate inputsN is our measure of production technology.
Firms with higherN have more specialized production units (Grossman and Helpman,
1991). As in (Acemoglu et al., 2007), a firm’s productivity is solely a function of
technology adopted N , that is, the number of intermediate inputs used in producing
the final good. Firms with higher N are more productive, and charge lower prices.
The adoption of technology N conveys costs. Using more intermediate inputs requires
sophisticated managerial skills and communication technology necessary to coordinate
between the specialized production units. The cost of adopting technology N is firm
specific where each firm learns its cost parameter after paying a sunk entry cost. The
cost parameter draw represents a firm’s ability to organize production process. Firms
5In fact, the implication of endogenous firms’ productivity for the gains from trade is almost
absent in the leading papers in this vein (e.g., Bustos, 2011b; Lileeva and Trefler, 2010). There are
two important exceptions here: Atkeson and Burstein (2010) find that in a general equilibrium model
where firms’ decisions to export and innovate depend on trade costs, the impact of the changes in
these decisions on welfare is largely offset by the firms’ entry decision. Similar to the finding of the
current paper, Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) estimate that endogenous firms’ productivity
responses to trade liberalization increase the gains from trade by 41 percent relative to standard
models.
6I also show that if there is no export fixed cost and hence all firms export, there will be no
impact of trade liberalization on firms’ investment in technology-enhancing activities (a result that
is consistent with Eaton and Kortum, 2001; Atkeson and Burstein, 2010).
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with lower cost draws are more efficient in organizing the process of the production
and tend to be more specialized (higher N).
A firm chooses the number of intermediate inputs and the amount of each interme-
diate input to maximize its profits given the isoelastic demand it faces. The optimal
production technology is increasing in the market size facing the firm and decreasing
in cost draw. Consequently, in the closed economy, firms’ technology, productivity,
price, and profits are differentiated only because of the firm-specific draw. That is,
the model is isomorphic to the Melitz model in the closed economy.
In an open economy, only the most productive firms choose to export due to the
fixed cost of export. Exporters sell to both markets (domestic and foreign), whereas
nonexporters only sell to the domestic market. Because a firm’s choice of production
technology depends on the market size facing the firm, trade liberalization magnifies
the productivity gap between the most productive firms (who become exporters) and
the least productive firms (nonexporters).
In addition, exporters choose a higher level of N relative to the autarky level since
exporters’ total sales to all destinations are larger than the autarky sales level.7 This
result resonates with the very old idea: profits/large markets enhance innovation.
The larger the market is, the higher the level of specialization. Nonexporters, how-
ever, reduce N in response to trade liberalization. Simply put, international trade
enhances competitiveness and lowers the aggregate price level via the entrance of
foreign firms and a self selection effect; in effect, nonexporters respond in what seems
counterintuitive at first look by lowering the level of N and charging higher prices. To
see this, notice that the effective market size facing nonexporters is smaller relative
to autarky; therefore, the resulting revenue from selling to the local market only is
not sufficient to maintain the autarky level of production technology. As a result,
7This has to be the case for the free entry condition to be satisfied in the open economy. In
contrast to the standard model with CES preferences, an exporter’s domestic sales might be higher
relative to autarky sales. Nevertheless, even with lower domestic sales after trade liberalization,
aggregate exporters’ sales are always higher than pretrade liberalization sales.
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nonexporters reduce their expenditures on productivity-enhancing activities, charge
higher prices, and target a smaller fraction of consumers.8
As in the standard trade model with monopolistic competition and CES prefer-
ences, the optimal price rule is to charge a constant markup over the marginal cost.
Nonetheless, the marginal cost of a firm in the current framework is endogenous to
export market participation. To be precise, a firm’s marginal cost depends on a firm’s
productivity, which, in turn, is determined by the production technology adopted by
a firm. In an open economy, firms decide simultaneously the level of production
technology and whether to export, sell only to domestic market, or exist. Conse-
quently, the production technology and the marginal cost are endogenous to export
participation. Moreover, a positive correlation between the domestic market sales
and the access to the export market is implied in the current model, as empirically
documented by Eaton et al. (2011) and Lileeva and Trefler (2010).
The impact of trade on nonexporters seems to contradict the extant literature,
where exposure to international markets increases the range of intermediate inputs
used in the production of final products by enhancing the process of input creation
and by facilitating the know-how technology spillover across borders/firms.9 The
current model is indeed silent about these important issues; instead, I focus on the
heterogeneous firms’ responses to the exposure to international trade where the cost
of the adoption of technology N and/or the creation of new intermediates are held
constant and unaffected by trade liberalization. Nevertheless, augmenting the model
with these issues would not alter the main result of the paper: International trade
affects firms’ productivity disproportionately in favor of the initially more productive
firms who become exporters in response to trade openness/liberalization.
This paper is related to recent literature on the impact of trade liberalization on
8I do not model marketing strategy here as in the study of Arkolakis (2010), but I leave this to
future work.
9Grossman and Helpman (1991) is the classic treatment of the impact of trade on the process
of innovation.
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R&D and innovation by firms. Bustos (2011b) shows that a reduction in Brazilian
tariffs induces Argentinean exporters to upgrade technology production, especially
the firms on the upper middle of the size distribution. Using microdata of Slovenian
manufacturing firms and controlling for exporting self-selection, De Loecker (2007)
affirms that the productivity gap between exporters and nonexporters increases over
time due to a “ learning-by-exporting” mechanism. Importantly, De Loecker (2007)
shows that the export market destination and the number of export destinations
do affect productivity gains from exporting. His finding of positive correlation be-
tween the productivity gains and the number of export destinations is consistent with
the model’s prediction in this paper. Aw et al. (2011) develop and estimate a dy-
namic, structural model of exporting and R&D investment using data for Taiwanese
manufacturing plants in the electronics products industry, where they confirm the
complementarity between exporting and productivity-enhancing investments. In line
with the current model, the return to exporting and R&D is increasing with initial
productivity; thus, more productive firms self-select into both activities. Neverthe-
less, they model exporting and R&D investments as a binary decision; as a result,
the model is unable to connect exporters’ productivity gains to export destinations’
characteristics and the possibility of downgrading.
The paper is also related to Lileeva and Trefler (2010), who find, by estimating
a heterogeneous response model using the Local Average Treatment Effect Estima-
tor (LATE), that Canadian plants that were induced by the U.S. tariff cuts to start
exporting or export more had higher adoption rates for advanced production tech-
nology and engaged more in productivity-enhancing activities. Atkeson and Burstein
(2010) and Melitz and Costantini (2007), in a dynamic environment, formalize the
impact of trade liberalization on the firm’s productivity and R&D investments. In a
different vein, Verhoogen (2008) provides a simple theoretical framework to describe
complementarity between exporting and product quality and uses Mexican data to
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empirically test the model’s prediction. In addition to the aforementioned modeling
issues, almost all of the papers above ignore the impact of trade liberalization on
nonexporters both theoretically and empirically.
As indirect empirical support of the current model prediction, Bustos (2011a)
finds that the least productive firms in Argentina downgrade skills in response to
Brazilian’ tariff reduction. Theoretically, Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) is the
most related paper to the current model. They show that an individual firm’s response
to trade openness is heterogenous depending on the firm’s initial size and, in the
case of exporters, on the export market size. Yet they deliver a decisive prediction
at the aggregate level: In response to trade openness, on average, exporters enjoy
higher productivity, whereas nonexporters’ productivity fall. A firm’s productivity is
positively linked to the number of managerial layers (internal organization), which is
a function of the market size faced by each firm. Because of the discrete nature of the
number of layers, firms might not be producing at the minimum efficient scale (MES);
therefore, the heterogenous responses to trade liberalization in their model stem from
the firm’s initial position relative to the MES. Overall, trade liberalization increases
exporters’ revenues and weakly increases the number of managerial layers and hence
exporters’ productivity. Nonexporters weakly decrease the number of managerial
layers, leading to lower productivity, on average.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the model.
Section 3 describes the technology adoption in the closed economy. Section 2.4 studies
a firm’s production technology choices in the open economy. Section 2.5 presents a
functional form for the cost function and solves for the model numerically. Section
6 concludes. All proofs and additional results can be found in Appendix 2.7 and
Appendix 2.8
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2.2 The Model
The world economy consists of two countries, D and F , where each country is endowed
with fixed amounts of agents, LD and LF . Labor is the only factor of production.
A representative agent in each country inelastically supplies one unit of labor. The
total labor force for each country is also LD and LF .
2.2.1 Preferences
A representative consumer in country i = D, F maximizes utility derived from the
consumption of goods from H + 1 sectors. Sector 0 provides a single homogenous
good. Sectors 1 . . . H are composites of differentiated goods. Each variety ω in sector
h = 1 . . . H, for all available varieties in the endogenous set Ωih (to be determined),
is produced by a unique producer who acts like a monopolist. A consumer’s utility
from the consumption of the homogenous good and the differentiated goods in country
i = D,F can be represented as follows:
U i = Qβ00
H∏
h=1
(ˆ
ω∈Ωih
qdh(ω)
εh−1
εh dω
)( εh
εh−1
)βh
(2.1)
βh=1...H ∈ (0, 1) is the fraction of a consumer’s income spent on varieties of sector h,
and β0 = 1−
∑H
h=1 βh is the fraction of income spent on the homogenous sector. q
d
h(ω)
denotes the consumption of variety ω in sector h, and Q0 represents the consumption
of the good in the homogenous sector. εh ∈ (1,∞) is the elasticity of substitution
between varieties in sector h.
2.2.2 Production
In the homogenous sector 0, there is a large number of price-taking firms producing
the same good Q0. The production of Q0 features a linear technology in the only
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factor of production L, where a units of labor are required to produce one unit of Q0.
Q0 =
1
ai
L0 i = D,F
The production of variety ω in sector h = 1 . . . H depends on the level of tech-
nology adopted by the firm. Firms that endogenously choose to use a high range
of intermediate inputs in the production process become more specialized and enjoy
higher productivity. Consequently, the production technology of the firm is denoted
by N ∈ R+, and for each j ∈ [0 , N ] , X(j) is the quantity of intermediate input
j. Given technology N , the production function of the firm is as follows (I suppress
country indicator i for notational simplicity):
qh(ω) = N
κ+1− 1
αh
(ˆ N
0
X(j)αhdj
) 1
αh
αh ∈ (0, 1), κ > 0 (2.2)
The function above is proposed by Benassy (1998) and used by Acemoglu et al.
(2007). αh determines the degree of complementarity between inputs. The elastic-
ity of substitution between inputs 1
1−αh is always greater than 1. Benassy (1998)
introduces N
κ+1− 1
αh in order to separate the elasticity of output with respect to the
level of technology from the elasticity of substitution between inputs. To illustrate
this point, suppose that X(j) = X ∀j ∈ [0, N ]; hence, qh(ω) = Nκ+1X. Indeed,
a firm’s productivity is not a function of αh, where productivity is defined as
q
NX
.
The parameter κ determines the elasticity of productivity with respect to N . As in
Acemoglu et al. (2007), there is a large number of profit maximizing suppliers, where
every intermediate input is produced by one supplier.10 It is worth noting that under
this setting the measure of technology N is also a measure of the suppliers hired by a
firm. The production technology of intermediate X(j)∀j ∈ [0, N ] is identical to the
10Suppliers are still acting as price takers because, potentially, a final good producer could choose
any supplier to produce that particular intermediate input.
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production technology in sector 0: X(j) = 1
a
Lj, ∀j ∈ [0, N ].
Adopting a technology N in sector h involves cost C(N,ϕ) units of labor. Using a
large number of intermediate inputs necessitates more advanced managerial skills and
a sophisticated internal organization. That is, as the number of used intermediate
inputs increases, a firm needs to acquire a higher level of managerial skills that enable
it to organize the process of production efficiently. The cost parameter ϕ is a random
variable drawn from a common cumulative distribution Gh(ϕ), with associated prob-
ability density gh(ϕ) and
1
ϕ
∈ [1,∞). In this setting, firms who receive high ϕ are
less efficient in organizing the production process. The cost of adopting technology
N in sector h, C(N,ϕ), satisfies the following conditions for all sectors h = 1 . . . H.
Assumption 1. (i) For all N ∈ R+, C(N,ϕ) = ϕC(N).
(ii) For all N > 0, C(N) is twice continuously differentiable, with C ′(N) > 0 and
C ′′(N) ≥ 0.
(iii) For all N > 0, NC
′′(N)
C′(N) > κ(εh − 1)− 1.
The first part of Assumption 1 tremendously simplifies the analysis.11 The second
part is standard and quite general. The third part, however, is specific to the firm’s
profit maximization problem in the current context to insure a finite and positive
choice of N .12
2.3 Closed Economy
In this section, I characterize the technology adoption and the equilibrium in the
closed economy.
11Alternatively, we can impose the more general condition ∂C(N,ϕ)/∂ϕ > 0 for a given level of
N .
12Please see the Appendix for detailed derivations of the third part of Assumption 1.
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2.3.1 Technology Adoption in the Closed Economy
I will only consider sector h since the other sectors are analogous. For notational
clarity, h subscript is dropped in the upcoming analysis. The price of the intermediate
input X(j),∀ ∈ j ∈ [0, N ] is normalized to a; therefore, the equilibrium wage is equal
to one.
A representative consumer maximizes her utility given by Equation (2.1) subject
to the standard budget constraint:
´
ω
p(ω)qd(ω)dω = βR. Here, p(ω) and qd(ω) =
q(ω) are the price and quantity demanded of variety ω, respectively. R is the total
expenditure on all varieties for all sectors h = 0 . . . H. The demand for variety ω is
given by:
qd(ω) = Ap(ω)−ε (2.3)
A ≡ βR
P 1−ε is exogenous from firms’ perspective and represents the market size. The
aggregate price level in sector h is given by: P =
(´
ω∈Ω p(ω)
1−εdω
) 1
1−ε .
Production in the differentiated goods sector: There is a continuum of firms
each choosing to produce a different variety ω, where production technology is given
by Equation (2.2). A firm learns its cost draw only after paying a sunk entry cost
fE units of labor. If a firm chooses to produce a positive amount of ω, it must pay a
fixed cost f units of labor. Conditional on producing a positive amount of variety ω,
a firm’s profit maximization problem is calculated as follows:13
max
N,{X(j)}j
pi(N,X(j)) = p(ω)q(ω)−
[ˆ N
0
aX(j)dj + ϕC(N)
]
− f,
13Because we are assuming a continuum of firms, the effects of each firm’s action on the aggregate
variables is negligible; therefore, all firms take the aggregates as given. Moreover, we assume there
is no strategic interaction between firms.
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where p(ω)q(ω) = q(ω)
ε−1
ε A
1
ε and q(ω) = Nκ+1−
1
α
(´ N
0
X(j)αdj
) 1
α
. Since the objec-
tive function above is jointly concave in X(j) and the price of X(j) = a∀j, the firm
chooses the same level X for all intermediate inputs. Imposing X(j) = X ∀j ∈ [0, N ]
and plugging in the constraints in the objective function, the maximization problem
is then simplified to:
max
N,X
pi(N,X) = N
ε−1
ε
(κ+1)X
ε−1
ε A
1
ε − {aNX + ϕC(N) + f} (2.4)
By solving the first-order conditions of the profits maximization problem above, we
obtain
κ
(
ε− 1
ε
)ε
a1−εA(N∗)κ(ε−1)−1 = ϕC ′(N∗) (2.5)
X∗ =
ϕC ′(N∗)
aκ
(2.6)
In the Appendix, I show that the second-order conditions are satisfied under
Assumption 1. The first-order conditions (Equations (2.5) and (2.6)) can be solved
recursively and yield a unique solution for N∗ and X∗.
Proposition II.1. Under Assumption 1, there exists a unique level of N∗ > 0, X∗ >
0 such that N∗, X∗ satisfy
∂N∗
∂A
> 0,
∂X∗
∂A
≥ 0
∂N∗
∂α
= 0,
∂X∗
∂α
= 0
∂N∗
∂ϕ
< 0, sign(
∂X∗
∂ϕ
) = sign(1− κ(ε− 1))
Proof. In the appendix
The level of technology N is increasing with the market size (A). This is a stan-
dard and a well-established result. Firms tend to have higher spending (investment)
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on productivity-enhancing activities (higher N) when facing large markets since the
expected return from such investment is high enough to cover the investment cost.
On the other hand, a firm selling to a small market is reluctant to spend aggressively
on advanced technology because the return from such technology is not large enough
to cover the high costs of adopting it. This is reminiscent of the old argument: Inno-
vation is driven by profits. To be precise, it has been argued that the firm’s profits
ease the financial constraints on funding productivity-enhancing activities, leading
to higher investment in R&D and productivity-enhancing activities. Conversely, the
current model emphasizes on the return of productivity-enhancing activities across
markets. The relationship between α and N is consistent with the result of Acemoglu
et al. (2007): Under complete contracts, N is independent of α. The relationship
between the level of technology adoption and the cost draw is fairly intuitive; firms
with low draws choose higher N .
Although production technology N is decreasing with ϕ, the relationship between
the total cost of adopting technology N , ϕC(N), and ϕ is ambiguous. Nevertheless,
it is crucial to have a reasonable relationship between ϕ and total cost of technology
adoption. Specifically, firms that receive low ϕ are expected to invest (spend) more
on adopting more advanced technology.14 In order to guarantee this relationship for
any level of N , the cost function C(N) has to satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption 2. (i) For all N > 0, C(N) is log- concave.
(ii) For all N > 0, N
[
C′(N)
C(N)
− C′′(N)
C′(N)
]
> 1− κ(ε− 1).
Indeed, the first part of Assumption 2 restricts the set of convex cost functions
we can use, but it is not a very restrictive assumption. Most of the standard cost
14Notice that I use the level of technology investment and the cost of adopting technology N
interchangeably. That is, empirically, firms report their level of expenditures on R&D and/or
productivity-enhancing activities, which often are seen as technology investments through the lens
of econometricians. In the current model, the environment is static (I only consider steady-state
equilibrium); hence, using both terminologies interchangeably shall not cause any confusion.
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functions satisfy the log-concavity assumption. The second part of Assumption 2 is
quite demanding; however, for most of the standard cost functions, it will hold as
long as part 3 of Assumption 1 holds (for example, see Section ??. In general, convex
polynomial functions satisfy the assumption above).
Lemma II.1. Define the total expenditure on technology investment measured in labor
units by ϕC(N). Suppose that Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold, then the total
expenditure on technology investment is decreasing with ϕ.
∂ϕC(N)
∂ϕ
< 0
Proof. In the appendix
Lemma II.2. A firm’s productivity level P ∗ defined by q´N
0 X(j)dj
, which is equivalent
to q
NX
if X(j) = X is decreasing in ϕ.
∂P ∗
∂ϕ
< 0
Proof. In the appendix
Proposition II.2. The profit function pi(N,X) is decreasing in ϕ:
∂pi(N,X)
∂ϕ
< 0
Proof. In the appendix
It is straightforward to see that the price charged by a firm is decreasing with
N , whereas quantity supplied, total revenue, and profit are all increasing with N .
Importantly, the ratio of two firms’ levels of technology is solely a function of the
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ratio of their ϕ’s.15
N(ϕ1)
N(ϕ2)
= ϑn
(
ϕ1
ϕ2
)
ϑ′n(ϕ) < 0
In the closed economy, the model is isomorphic to Melitz (2003), where firm’s pro-
ductivity is just a monotonic transformation in ϕ. That is, ϕ in the Melitz’s model
is replaced by f(ϕ) in the current model (f ′(ϕ) < 0); therefore, the model is solved
accordingly.
2.3.2 Equilibrium in the Closed Economy
Consider the profit maximization problem of a firm with a given N .
max
p(ω)
pi(p, q) = p(ω)q(ω)− aNX −
fixed cost︷ ︸︸ ︷
(ϕC(N) + f),
subject to q(ω) = Ap(ω)−ε, and X = q(ω)
Nκ+1
.
The first-order condition of the above problem implies that a firm charges a price
that is a constant markup over the marginal cost. The marginal cost for a given level
of N and a, MC(a,N), is defined by
∂ aNq
Nκ+1
∂q
.
p(ω) =
ε
ε− 1
a
Nκ
(2.7)
The price rule here is consistent with the standard monopolistic competition models
with the CES preferences of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). However, it is important
to highlight the difference between the price rule in the current framework and in
Melitz (2003). In contrast to Melitz (2003), the marginal cost in Equation (2.7) is
endogenous; in particular, it depends on the chosen level of technology N , which in
turn is given by Equation (2.5), that is, the marginal cost of a firm is endogenous to
export participation. In a closed economy, nonetheless, the exogenous cost draw is
15In the Appendix I elaborate more on this point and show how we can use it to prove the
existence of the equilibrium in both the closed and the open economies.
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the only heterogeneous variable across firms (market size A is common to all firms in
sector h); therefore, the choice of N and hence the marginal cost are distinct among
firms who are serving the same sector h only because of the firm-specific cost draw
ϕ (i,e., isomorphic to Melitz (2003)). A firm’s revenue r(ω) = p(ω)q(ω) and profit,
pi(ω) are given as follows:
r(ω) = A
(
ε
ε− 1
a
Nκ
)1−ε
(2.8)
pi(ω) =
1
ε
r(ω)− (ϕC(N) + f) (2.9)
Firms with the same cost draw behave symmetrically. In particular, they choose the
same technology N , charge the same price, and supply the same quantity. I therefore
index the firms from now on by N or ϕ interchangeably instead of ω.
Definition II.1. A steady-state equilibrium is characterized by constant masses of
firms entering and producing, as well as, a stationary ex post distribution cost pa-
rameter ϕ among producing firms such that goods and labor markets clear.
Firms pay a fixed cost of production fE in order to discover ϕ. After observing
their draws, firms decide to operate or exit the market. Existing firms face a constant
and exogenous probability of death δ each period. Let ME denote the total mass of
firms that enter in a given period. M is the mass of firms operating in equilibrium.
The value of a firm operating in the market is:
V (ϕ) = max
{
0,
∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)tpi(N(ϕ))
}
= max
{
0,
pi(N(ϕ))
δ
}
(2.10)
pi(N) is given by Equation (2.9). The ex post ϕ’s distribution µ(ϕ) is a truncation of
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the ex ante ϕ’s distribution, g(ϕ), at the zero profit.
µ(ϕ) =

g(ϕ)
G(ϕD)
, if ϕ < ϕD
0, otherwise
where ϕD is the zero-profit cutoff (ZPC) draw: ϕD; pi(N(ϕD) = 0. A ZPC can be
written as
1
ε
r(N(ϕD) = f + ϕDC(N(ϕD)) (2.11)
A free entry condition (FEC) drives the expected value of the firm to 0. That is,
ˆ ϕD
0
pi(N(ϕ))g(ϕ)dϕ = δfE (2.12)
In order for the mass of operating firms M to be constant, the mass of new producers
has to be equal to the mass of firms that die every period: G(ϕD)M
E = δM . In this
setting, ME represents the mass of potential entrants. Labor market clearing is given
by:
βL =
M
G(ϕD)
[
δFE +
ˆ ϕD
0
(
f +
aq(N(ϕ))
N(ϕ)κ
+ `(C(N(ϕ), ϕ))
)
dG(ϕ)
]
(2.13)
Goods market clearing is
R = L (2.14)
`(C(N(ϕ), ϕ)) = `(ϕC(N(ϕ))) is the cost of adopting technology N measured in the
units of labor. For simplicity, I assume that `(ϕC(N)) = ϕC(N). Hence, the total
cost of adopting technology N measured in the units of labor is wϕC(N(ϕ)).
Proposition II.3. There exists a unique steady-state equilibrium that satisfies (2.11),
(2.12), (2.13), (2.14), and the constant mass of firms condition G(ϕD)M
E = δM
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Proof. In the appendix
Proposition II.4. The ZPC ϕD is independent of L as well as the market size A.
The number of operating firms in the equilibrium and the welfare measured by the
inverse of the price level, nevertheless, are increasing with L.
Proof. In the appendix
2.4 Open Economy
The world economy consists of two countries, D and F with identical preferences
and production technology in all sectors but different labor force size, LD 6= LF .
Firms from country i = D,F that export to country i′ 6= i pay a one time fixed
cost of exporting fi′i. In addition, shipping goods from country i to i
′ is costly. In
particular, firms in country i ∈ {D,F} need to ship τi′i > 1 units of variety ω in order
for one unit of variety ω to arrive at country i′ ∈ {D,F}. The homogenous good Q0
is freely traded and is used as the numeraire. Its price is set equal to a. If country i
produces Q0 in the open economy, the wage in country i is 1. I assume that the share
of expenditures on Q0, β0, and Li i ∈ {D,F} are large enough so that both countries
continue to produce the homogenous good in the open economy.16 I also assume that
there is no trade in intermediate goods; only final goods are traded. Preferences in
country i ∈ {D,F} are as follows
U i = Qβ00
H∏
h=1
(ˆ
ω∈Ωi∗h
qh(ω)
εh−1
εh dω
)( εh
εh−1
)βh
(2.15)
Ωi∗h = Ω
ii
h
⋃
Ωii
′
h is the set of all available varieties in sector h in country i, which is a
composite of all domestically produced varieties and imported varieties from country
16The assumption is made for simplification purposes. Relaxing this assumption would not alter
the main results of the paper because the model’s mechanisms depend on the real wages in both
countries not on the nominal wages. In response to trade liberalization, real wages increase in the
model with or without the outside sector.
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i′. Again, in the upcoming analysis, I consider only the equilibrium outcome for sector
h = 1 . . . H (sector’s subscript is suppressed for notational clarity).
2.4.1 Technology Adoption in the Open Economy
The profit maximization problem for nonexporters in country i is identical to the
closed economy, except that they face a different market size, Ai∗ ≡ βLiP 1−εi∗ , where
Pi∗ =
[ˆ
ω∈Ωi∗
p(ω)1−εdω
] 1
1−ε
(2.16)
As a result, the nonexporter’s optimal choices of Nii and Xii are given as follows:
κ
(
ε− 1
ε
)ε
a1−εAi∗N
κ(ε−1)−1
ii = ϕC
′(Nii) (2.17)
Xii =
ϕC ′(Nii)
aκ
(2.18)
Now consider the profit maximization problem for a country i exporter:
max
N,X
pi(N,X) = pii(ω)qii(ω) + pi′i(ω)qi′i(ω)−
[ˆ N
0
aX(j)dj + ϕC(N) + fi + fi′i
]
,
where pii(ω)qii(ω) = q
ε−1
ε
ii A
1
ε
i∗, pi′i(ω)qi′i(ω) = q
ε−1
ε
i′i A
1
ε
i′∗, and qii + τi′iqi′i = q = N
κ+1X.
ri′i(ω) = pi′i(ω)qi′i(ω) is the value of exports of a firm that resides in country i to
country i′ net of the transportation cost. The exporter profit maximization problem
is simplified to17
17Too see this, consider the profit maximization problem for an exporter given a constant level
of N
max
qii,qi′i
q
ε−1
ε
ii A
1
ε
i + q
ε−1
ε
i′i A
1
ε
i′ −
aq
Nκ
− (ϕC(N) + fii + fi′i)
subject to qii + τqi′i = q. From the first-order conditions, qii =
(
ε
ε−1a/N
κ
)−ε
Ai and qi′i =(
ε
ε−1τa/N
κ
)−ε
Ai′ . The prices are given by pii =
ε
ε−1a/N
κ and pi′i = τpii. Substitute for the
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max
N,X
pi(N,X) = N
ε−1
ε
(κ+1)X
ε−1
ε A 1ε − aNX − ϕC(N)− (fi + fi′i) (2.19)
The first-order conditions of the above problem yield the following optimal choices of
the level of technology and the amount of each intermediate Ne, Xe:
κ
(
ε− 1
ε
)ε
a1−εAiNκ(ε−1)−1e = ϕC ′(Ne) (2.20)
Xe =
ϕC ′(Ne)
aκ
(2.21)
Here Ai ≡ Ai + τ 1−εi′i Ai′ is the total (domestic and foreign) market size that faces an
exporter from country i. The elasticity of substitution ε controls the importance of
trade impediments for trade flows. Indeed, propositions (1)–(4) apply to the technol-
ogy adoption in the open economy. Two points are worth mentioning, however: (1)
the level of technology N is decreasing in transportation cost τ since A is decreasing
in τ and increasing in the export market size Ai′ , and (2) the differences in N across
exporters depend only on the cost parameter ϕ. Nevertheless, the ratio of exporter’s
technology to nonexporter’s technology is now determined by both the ratio of their
costs parameter and the ratio of market sizes faced by each firm,
N(ϕ1)
EXP
N(ϕ2)NEXP
= ϑa
(A
A
)
ϑn
(
ϕ1
ϕ2
)
, ϑ′a(.) > 0. (2.22)
prices and quantities in the profit function to get the reduced form function as a function of N :
N(.) = argmax
N
pi(N) =(
ε
ε− 1a/N
κ
)1−ε [
Ai + τ
1−εAi′
]− a1−ε( ε
ε− 1a/N
κ
)−ε [
Ai + τ
1−εAi′
]
/Nκ − ϕC(N)− fii − fi′i
f.o.c. and some algebra,
κ
(
ε− 1
ε
)ε
a1−εAiNκ(ε−1)−1 = ϕC ′(N)
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Ai
Ai∗
= 1 + τ 1−ε Ai′i∗
Ai∗
is increasing with the export destination market size Ai′i∗ and de-
creasing in the domestic market size Ai∗ and the transportation cost τi′i. As a result,
the ratio of the level of technology adopted by an exporter to that of nonexporter
is increasing with the size of export market destination and decreasing with τ and
the domestic market size Ai∗.18 Equation (2.22) is of great interest theoretically and
empirically. The equation generates a clear-cut prediction about the effects of trade
openness/liberalization on the level of technology adopted by exporters relative to
nonexporters. That is, trade liberalization magnifies the productivity differences be-
tween exporters and nonexporters. Interestingly, the magnitude of the magnification
depends on the ratio of the export destination market size to the domestic market
size. Moreover, in a multicountry model, the size of the export destination market is
also increasing with the number of the markets. This said, the ratio of an exporter’s
level of technology to a nonexporter’s level of technology is also magnified by the
number of export destinations. Unless we solve for the steady state equilibrium in
the open economy, nothing can be said about firms’ level of technology posttrade
liberalization relative to their level of technology in autarky.
2.4.2 Equilibrium in the Open Economy
To solve for the steady-state equilibrium in the open economy, I use the same tech-
nique I used in the closed economy; namely, I start with the reduced-form description
of the economy for a given level of N and then from there proceed to solve for the
steady-state equilibrium. In so doing, I provide a comparable model with the stan-
dard Melitz’s model, and more importantly, I develop a tractable framework for the
analysis of the impact of trade liberalization on firms’ productivity.
As in the closed economy, a nonexporter with fixed Nii sets pii =
ε
ε−1
a
Nκii
and
18In the symmetric country case, the ratio is reduced to ϑa((1+τ
1−ε))ϑn(ϕ1ϕ2 ); therefore, the ratio
is magnified by a constant multiple that is greater than 1.
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generates a revenue and a profit of rii = Ai∗
(
ε
ε−1
a
Nκii
)1−ε
and piii =
1
ε
rii− (ϕC(Nii) +
fii). Similarly, an exporter’s quantities supplied in both markets, the prices charged
in the domestic and foreign markets, the total revenues, and the profits are given
by:19
qeT ≡ qeii + τi′iqei′i = Nκ+1e X
peii =
ε
ε− 1
a
Ne
, pei′i = τi′ip
e
ii
reT ≡ reii + rei′i =
(
Ai∗ + τ 1−εi′i Ai′∗
)( ε
ε− 1
a
Nκe
)1−ε
pieT ≡ pieii + piei′i =
1
ε
rT − [ϕC(Ne) + fi + fi′i]
Again, the price charged by an exporter in both markets is standard and consistent
with the standard monopolistic competition models with CES preferences: the price
is a constant markup over the marginal cost. In contrast to the standard model, the
marginal cost is an endogenous variable via the choice of N . Moreover, markets are
not separable as in the standard model. The decision to export affects the choice of N
and, hence, the marginal cost, price, and sales in the domestic market. This result is
also presented by Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012). The result is also consistent
with the empirical documentation Eaton et al. (2011) about French firms. They find
that average sales in domestic market rises with selling to more markets. The model
above naturally leads to a positive relationship between exporting sales and domestic
market sales.
As in the closed economy, the steady-state equilibrium in the open economy is
characterized by the free entry; the ZPC, the export cutoff, labor and goods market
clearing; constant masses of firms entering, producing, and exporting; stationary ex
post distributions of ϕ among producing and exporting firms; and balanced trade.
19Note that τi′iq
e
i′i is the total amount that is shipped from i to i
′ and qi′i is the amount consumed
by consumers in i′.
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The ZPC is derived from
piii(ϕi) = 0 (2.23)
An export cutoff condition is written as follows:20
piT (ϕi′i) = max {0, piii(ϕi′i)} (2.24)
A free entry condition in the open economy is expressed as follows:
ˆ ϕi
ϕi′i
piii(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ+
ˆ ϕi′i
0
piT (ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ = δf
E (2.25)
Labor market clears:
βL =
Mi
G(ϕii)
{
δfE +
ˆ ϕii
0
(f +
aq(N(ϕ))
N(ϕ)κ
+ `(C(N(ϕ), ϕ)))dG(ϕ) +
ˆ ϕi′i
0
fi′ i dG(ϕ)
}
(2.26)
The goods’ market clearing:
Ri = Li, i ∈ {D,F} (2.27)
When countries are symmetric (i.e., LD = LF ) the trade balanceMi′i
´ ϕi′i
0
ri′i(ϕ)
g(ϕ)
G(ϕi′i)
dϕ =
Mii′
´ ϕii′
0
rii′(ϕ)
g(ϕ)
G(ϕii′ )
dϕ is guaranteed by Equations (2.27),(2.26), and (2.25). Here
Mi′i denotes the mass of country i exporters to country i
′. For asymmetric countries,
it is well known that the country with larger labor force exports the differentiated
goods in net and imports the homogenous good.21 In the steady-state equilibrium,
the masses of exporters and producers (Mi) given the exogenous death probability δ
are constant, that is, G(ϕi)M
E
i = δMi = δ(Mii +Mi′i). Mii is the mass of firms that
20fi′i is assumed to be large enough such that only the most productive firms export and the
fraction of exporters, G(ϕi′i) is less than the fraction of nonexporters.
21In order for both countries to produce the outside sector in the asymmetric countries setting,
we impose a lower bound on trade costs τ(LiLj ), which is increasing in its argument.
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only produce and sell in the domestic market.
Proposition II.5. There exists unique {ϕi′i,Mi,Mi′i, Pi} that satisfy the equilibrium
conditions (Equations(2.23)-(2.27)) and the constant masses of exporting and produc-
ing firms as well as a stationary ex post ϕ distribution. Moreover, the ZPC in the
open economy, (ϕi)
open, is lower than the ZPC in the closed economy, (ϕi)
closed.
Proof. In the appendix
The proof of Proposition II.5 is analogous to the proof in the closed economy.
I show that the aggregates can be summarized by a weighted average cost draw ϕ˜,
where the new weighted average is taken for all available varieties in the economy (i.e.,
local producers and exporters and the other country exporters). As a result, the ZPC
can be written as the relationship between the average profits (for both exporters
and nonexporters) and the weighted average cost draw. The FEC is still the same as
before: Pr(ϕ < ϕi)p¯i = δf
E. Again, p¯i is the average profit for both exporters and
nonexporters conditional on successful entry. I also show that ϕi′i = fϕ(ϕi); that is,
the exporting cutoff is solely a function of the ZPC.
Proposition II.6. Trade openness increases the welfare in both countries measured
by P−1i i ∈ {D,F}.
Proof. In the appendix
Proposition II.7. Nonexporters adopt a lower level of technology N in response to
trade openness, whereas exporters adopt a higher level of N compared with the autarky
level.
Proof. In the appendix
If there is no fixed cost associated with export, fx = 0, all firms export, and
the impact of trade openness is isomorphic to increasing the labor size in the closed
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economy. As a result, A remains unchanged as well as the choice of N by any existing
firm.22 On the other hand, if fX > 0, only a subset of firms export. Nonexporters
will adopt lower level of technology because the market size L is constant and the
new aggregate price level is lower than the pretrade aggregate price level. In order for
the FEC to be satisfied, exporters adopt a higher level of technology as the decrease
in aggregate price level is more than offset by the boost in export market revenues.
The model in the open economy is able to generate one of the most prominent
features of the Melitz (2003) model and the monopolistic competition models with
heterogenous firms23; namely, trade liberalization forces the least productive firms to
exit the markets and the most productive firms to self-select to export. Neverthe-
less, in the present model, the self-selection impact is not the only force that affects
the aggregate productivity in the economy. Surviving firms also alter their levels of
production technology in response to trade openness. That is, trade affects average
productivity by forcing the least productive firms to exit the market and by reallocat-
ing the resources to more productive firms (i.e., Meltiz’s effect), and by inducing the
surviving firms to optimally change their levels of production technology and hence
productivity.
Gains from trade are assured by Proposition II.6. A very important and vital
question in the recent trade literature is the order of magnitude of gains from trade
across the predominant trade models.24 I carry this exercise and compare the gains
from trade in the current model when a firm’s productivity is endogenous and respon-
22Eaton and Kortum (2001) and Atkeson and Burstein (2010) also show that if all firms export,
no firm will improve its product quality/production technology.
23For example, Chaney (2008); Arkolakis (2010); Arkolakis et al. (2008).
24In Eaton and Kortum (2002); Krugman (1980); Melitz (2003) a firm’s productivity is constant
and unaffected by trade openness. The gains from trade in these models emanate from different
channels: resource reallocation toward the comparative advantage sectors (Eaton and Kortum, 2002
as well as factor proportions models), economies of scale and the love for variety (as in Krugman,
1980), and the creative destruction and inter-firm resource reallocation as in Melitz (2003). Inter-
estingly, Arkolakis et al. (2012) show that gains from trade across a wide range of trade models
depend on two sufficient statistics: the elasticity of imports with respect to trade impediments and
the share of expenditure on domestic goods.
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sive to trade liberalization with the gains from trade when the production technology
N and the firm’s productivity is given by the autarky level in the open economy.
The following proposition summarizes the order of magnitude of the gains from trade
under the endogenous production technology setting presented in the current model
relative to the gains from trade when production technology N is unaffected by trade
liberalization.
Proposition II.8. The gains from trade under endogenous production technology N
specified in the current model are larger than the gains from trade when production
technology N is constant.
Proof. In the appendix
A firm that had survived trade openness in the Melitz’s model might not be able to
do so in the present model. Firms are confronting much tougher competition relative
to the standard Melitz (2003): in addition to the competition coming from foreign
exporters, trade openness enhances domestic exporters productivity, leading them to
charge lower prices and sell more in the domestic markets. Overall, the forces of
creative destruction are magnified on both the extensive and the intensive margins,
which, in turn, enlarges the gains from trade.
2.5 Illustrative Examples
In this section, specific functional forms for the technology cost function are provided.
Although analytical solution is available in some cases with simple functional forms of
the cost of technology, we have to resort to numerical analysis with more complicated
cost functions. Even with the simplest cost function I can think of, comparing the
gains from trade between models with exogenous productivity and models featuring
endogenous technology necessitates the use of numerical methods. Thus, the param-
eters are calibrated such that the model matches some of the stylized facts regarding
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the firm’s characteristics in the global economy. I simulate the model and calculate a
firm’s production technology choice under a wide range of settings. The comparative
statics analysis is also provided. Moreover, I provide quantitative assessments of the
gains from trade and compare it with the no-technology-upgrading scenario.
2.5.1 Example One: Symmetric Countries and Linear Cost
of Technology Adoption
The simplest cost function that satisfies Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 is the linear
function: C(N) = N . In this case, 1− κ(ε− 1) has to be greater than zero, and X is
therefore increasing with ϕ. The first-order conditions Equations (2.5) and (2.6) are
then given by:
N∗ = ΨA
1
1−κ(ε−1)ϕ
1
κ(ε−1)−1 , X∗ =
ϕ
aκ
Ψ is constant. The exact forms of all constants are provided in Appendix 2.8.
We cannot proceed without parameterizing the distribution of the cost parameter ϕ.
Complying with the literature, I assume that ϕ−1 with the support [1,∞) is drawn
from a Pareto distribution with the shape parameter θ.25 Using this distribution in
the FEC, integrating and substituting for the value of ϕi from the ZPC yield the
solution for the ZPC, ϕi, in terms of the model’s parameters:
ϕi =
[
δfE
fi
λ
] 1
θ
, i ∈ {D,F}
25The cumulative distribution function of a Pareto random variable X with the shape parameter
θ is given by: F (X) = Pr(x < X) = 1 − ( bX )θ, forx ∈ [b,∞) and b > 0. Hence, G(ϕ) = ϕθ forϕ ∈
(0, 1]. In order to guarantee the existence of a finite mean we also assume that θ > κ(ε−1)1−κ(ε−1) .
The Pareto distribution assumption provides a good fit for firm level data. Specifically, it is a
good approximation of the upper tail of the distribution of firm sizes (Axtell, 2001; Luttmer, 2007;
di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2013).
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λ is constant. To solve for the number of operating firms, Mi ∈ {D,F}, I use the
labor market clearing condition Equation(2.13),
ME =
L
fE
1
ε
κ(ε− 1)
θ
, Mi =
G(ϕi)
δ
ME.
Consequently, the aggregate price level Pi, the market size A, and the production
technology cutoff Ni are derived.
The characterization of the equilibrium in the closed economy is complete. I
turn now to the equilibrium in the open economy. A nonexporter’s maximization
problem is similar to the closed economy, whereas an exporter with ϕ draw solves
Equation(2.19). The levels of technology N for a nonexporter and an exporter, re-
spectively, are calculated as follows:
N∗ = ΨA
1
1−κ(ε−1)ϕ
1
κ(ε−1)−1 , X∗ =
ϕ
aκ
N∗e = B(τ)N
∗(ϕ), X∗ =
ϕ
aκ
B(τ) is constant for a given τ . The ZPC ϕi, the exporting cutoff ϕX and the number
of operating firms Mi in the open economy, respectively, are given as follows:
ϕi =
[
δfE
f
λ
+ Λθ fX
λ
] 1
θ
, ϕX = Λϕi, M
E =
L
fE
1
ε
κ(ε− 1)
θ
, Mi =
G(ϕi)
δ
ME
Λ is constant. The characterization of the equilibrium in the open economy is com-
plete, whereA and the production technology cutoffN∗ are derived from the aggregate
price level.
2.5.2 Calibration and Simulation
In order to solve the model numerically, I calibrate the model’s parameters :
{ε, κ, a, θ, fE, fi, fx, τ, δ}. I solve the model by having firms draw their cost parameter
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from a Pareto distribution. Given the cutoffs and the price level derived in the
previous example, the choice of technology N by each firm in the closed and the
open economies can be obtained. Without loss of generality, the size of labor force L,
the wage w, and the fixed cost of producing fi are normalized to one. Parameter κ
determines the elasticity of productivity with respect to technology level N is set to
0.25 as in Acemoglu et al. (2007). The elasticity of substitution ε = 3.8 is taken from
Bernard et al. (2007). In fact, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) report available
estimates of ε to be in the range of 3 to 10. Given the choice of κ and the restriction
imposed by the linear cost function, (1− κ(ε− 1)) > 0, we are bounded to set ε less
than 5. I use the approach of di Giovanni and Levchenko (2013) and di Giovanni et al.
(2011) to show that a firm’s sales follow a power law with exponent equal to 1−κ(ε−1)
κ(ε−1) θ.
In the data, firm sales follow a power law with exponent close to 1. I use 1.06 (Axtell,
2001); hence, θ = 1.06 κ(ε−1)
1−κ(ε−1) (see Appendix 2.9). The benchmark of variable trade
costs τ is set to 1.3 (Ghironi and Melitz, 2005). The exogenous exit rate δ is set to
0.1 (Ghironi and Melitz, 2005; Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012). The fixed cost
of exporting fX is calibrated such that only 21 percent of the surviving firms export
(Bernard et al., 2003). Finally, as in Ghironi and Melitz (2005), as long as f/fX is
constant, the choice of fE does not affect the relative responses of firms’ technology
(or the relative response of any variable) to trade liberalization; thus, without loss of
generality, it is considered as a free variable.
In our baseline economy, as we can see in Figures (2.1) and (2.2), in response
to trade openness, the most productive firms self-select into selling in both markets
(they become exporters), adopt higher N , and hence experience higher productivity.
In contrast, low productivity firms sell only to the domestic market and downgrade
their level of production technology N ; as a result, their productivity falls. The
impact of trade liberalization on a firm’s productivity is heterogenous. Exporting
increases a firm’s productivity by almost 3.5% for all firms that induced to export,
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whereas nonexporters’ productivity falls by almost 25% (see Figure (2.3)).
Firms’ profits take the usual shape as in the standard Melitz’s model (Figure
(2.4)). Nonexporters generate lower profits in the open economy relative to the closed
economy as well as the least productive exporters. The most productive exporters
earn higher profits relative to closed economy profits. Unlike profits, all exporters
generate higher revenues, employ more workers, and adopt higher N relative to the
closed economy. As shown above, the level of N adopted by a firm is related to the
effective market size A facing it. The effective market size A decreases26 as we liber-
alize the economy, which severely inflicts firms who only sell to the domestic market.
Although exporters suffer from lower sales revenue in the domestic market, they are
more than offset by the sales revenues from the export destination market. Yet be-
cause of the gigantic reduction in the domestic market size, their relative productivity
would not increase as much as the reduction in nonexporters’ relative productivity.
2.5.3 Example Two: Symmetric countries, Strictly Convex
Cost of Technology Adoption and Fixed Cost of
Adjustment
In this example, the cost function of Example 1 is generalized such that the new
cost function of technology adoption is strictly convex: C(N) = 1
φ
Nφ, φ > 1. It
is straightforward to check that both Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 are satisfied
with the restriction: φ − κ(ε − 1) > 0. In a closed economy, a firm chooses its
production technology N(ϕ) and X by solving the maximization problem Equation
(2.4) with the above cost of technology adoption. Unlike Example 1, in this example,
in addition to the recurrent variable cost of adopting technology N , C(N), changing
a firm’s initial technology incurs a fixed cost of adjustment. In other words, a firm
26Note that the decrease of A is necessary to have gains from trade, where the size of the gains
depends on the size of the reduction in A.
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that adopts a new level of technology for whatsoever reason needs to pay the variable
costs associated with adopting technology N , C(N) and a fixed cost of adjustment,
which is independent of N . In our context, the cost of adopting technology N ′ in the
open economy can be written as follows;
C(N ′) =
1
φ
(N ′)φ + cI{N ′ 6= N}, (2.28)
where I is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if a firm adjusts its production
technology in the open economy and 0 otherwise. Parameter c refers to the fixed cost
of adjustment measured in units of labor.
2.5.3.1 No Adjustment Cost c = 0
First, I characterize technology adoption in this economy and the aggregate equi-
librium variables when c = 0. In this case, Example 2 is isomorphic to Example 1
qualitatively (see Figure (2.5)). However, the level of technology adoption for every
firm is lower when the parameter that governs the cost function convexity φ > 1 is
larger. Intuitively, the cost of adopting technology N is higher with strictly convex
function, and therefore, the optimal value of N is lower for any cost parameter draw.
The equilibrium with this cost function is fully characterized in Appendix 2.8.
2.5.3.2 No Technology Upgrading/Downgrading
I turn now to study industry equilibrium and general equilibrium when the firm’s
technology N is constant and given by the optimal choice in autarky. That is, I set
the fixed cost of adjustment c =∞. In the open economy, the model is transformed to
the standard Melitz’s model with the technology of production given by q = Nκ(NX).
This setting is of vital importance since it allows us to assess the magnitude of gains
from trade when firm productivity is endogenous to trade liberalization relative to
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the gains from trade when the firm’s productivity is invariant to trade liberalization
(i.e., gains from trade when c = 0 versus gains from trade when c =∞).
At the beginning of each period, the dying firms are exactly offset by the new
entrants who have to adopt the production technology, N , at the beginning of the
period before observing the state of the economy in that period. For simplicity, I
assume that firms are unable to anticipate their export status and trade liberaliza-
tion to be a surprise. In effect, all firms will start the period with a production
technology that reflects the optimal choice in the previous period (here in autarky)
and have to pay the fixed cost of adjustment if they decide to change production
technology afterward. Indeed, this will shut down the dynamic process of technology
adoption27 and greatly simplify the calculations of the open economy aggregate equi-
librium variables; nevertheless, the main purpose of this exercise (gains from trade
under endogenous technology relative to gains from trade under fixed technology of
production) is preserved and still meaningful (for details, see Appendix 2.8).
Allowing the production technology to be endogenous to trade liberalization al-
most doubles the gains from trade. The intuition behind this large increase in gains
from trade is as follows: when production technology and hence firm’s productivity
are endogenous to trade liberalization, the forces of creative destruction are intensi-
fied and become more salient. In a sense, the zero profit cutoff, ϕi, is pushed down
further, which induces more firms to exit the market relative to a fixed productivity
economy. Exporting is more profitable under endogenous productivity. In addition
to the usual revenue gains from exporting, exporters enjoy higher productivity, which
enhances both the domestic and the export sales.28 That is, the opportunity cost
27Otherwise, firms should consider the expected export status in the open economy when they
choose production technology N .
28Notice that the ratio of exporting firms is constant and given by 21 percent under both ex-
ogenous and endogenous productivity setting, which translates to lower exporting cutoff under the
endogenous productivity setting. If I were to leave the level of fixed cost of exporting fx constant as
given by the benchmark value, almost no firm finds it optimal to export under exogenous production
technology setting.
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of not being an exporter increases when productivity is endogenous to trade rela-
tive to the exogenous firm’s productivity setting. On the other hand, the marginal
nonexporters who had survived trade liberalization under constant production tech-
nology will ultimately not survive the stiff competition in the world economy with
endogenous productivity.
In summary, in addition to the effect of the entrance of foreign exporters to the
domestic market, most productive domestic firms self-select to exporting activities,
which makes them more productive firms with lower prices in the domestic market.
This will significantly push the aggregate price level down, which, in turn, increases
the cost of production by increasing the real wage in the economy. As a result, fewer
and fewer firms are able to survive this economy relative to the one with exogenous
productivity, and therefore, the increase in weighted average productivity is signifi-
cantly higher.
2.5.3.3 Finite and Positive Cost of Adjustment
When the cost of adjustment is positive, but not prohibitive, only a subset of firms
adjust their level of production technology in response to trade openness. If the gains
in profits from upgrading/downgrading N relative to maintaining the autarky level of
N are larger than the fixed cost of adjustment, firms choose to upgrade/downgrade.
Alternatively, firms will refrain from adjusting their production technology if the
benefit from doing so is less than the fixed cost of adjustment. In what follows, I
assume that only firms who choose to upgrade are entitled to both variable costs and
fixed cost of adjustment c ∈ R++/∞, whereas downgraders are subject to variable
costs only. That is, the cost of adopting technology N ′ is expressed by;
C(N ′) =
1
φ
(N ′)φ + cI{N ′ > N}
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Let N∗ be the optimal choice of production technology for firms who decide to ad-
just their level of technology in an open economy and N is the optimal production
technology for firms who do not adjust (N = Nautarky). The level of technology for
ϕ-firm is;
N open(ϕ) =

N∗(ϕ), if pi(N∗(ϕ))− pi(N(ϕ)) > c,
N, otherwise
N∗(ϕ) = Ψφ
(
Aopen
ϕ
) 1
φ−κ(ε−1)
, N(ϕ) = Ψφ
(
Aautarky
ϕ
) 1
φ−κ(ε−1)
Ψφ is constant. Indeed, all nonexporters choose to downgrade in this setting since
there is no fixed cost of downgrading, and by construction, pi(N∗(ϕ))− pi(N(ϕ)) > 0
for any ϕ ∈ (0, 1]. On the other hand, not all exporters choose to upgrade their
production technology. For sufficiently high c, only the most productive exporters
adjust(remember, all exporters are new exporters when we move from autarky to the
open economy). To see this, consider the loss function, ∆(ϕ) ≡ pi(N(ϕ))−pi(N∗(ϕ)) <
0. It is straightforward to show that ∆(ϕ) is increasing in ϕ. The most productive
exporters (low ϕ) suffer more from sticking to the old production technology relative
to the least productive exporters. In fact, ∆(ϕ) is monotonically increasing in ϕ, and
therefore, for an appropriate value of c, there exists an adjusting cutoff ϕadjustX < ϕX
such that all exporters with ϕ < ϕadjustX choose N
∗(ϕ). Exporters with ϕ > ϕadjustX
choose N(ϕ). Consequently, producing and exporting cutoffs can be found in the same
way similar to Example 1, and the adjusting cutoff is figured out by the indifference
between exporting using old technology and exporting using the updated technology:
∆ + c = 0. Similar analysis applies when nonexporters are subject to the fixed cost
of adjustment.
As in Bustos (2011b), not all exporters find it profitable to upgrade; in particular,
the marginal exporter continues to use the autarky production technology. In fact, if
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the cost of adopting technology N ′ is represented by Equation (2.28) for N ′ ∈ (0, N¯ ],
where N¯ is the maximum available level of technology29 and for sufficiently high c,
the model predictions completely coincide with those in Bustos (2011b): (1) the non-
exporters’ production technology is constant and invariant to trade liberalization, (2)
the marginal exporter chooses not to upgrade, and (3) medium productivity exporters
upgrade, and the most productive firms with N(ϕ) = N¯ continue to use the same
production technology.
2.5.4 Example Three: Asymmetric Countries
It is well known that the level of effective market size A and the ZPC are invariant to
labor force size L under CES preferences, which is in a stark contrast with the empir-
ical facts where many scholars have documented positive and significant relationship
between market size and average productivity. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) adopt
a linear demand system in what would be a standard Melitz’s model otherwise, to
capture the impact of market size on aggregate productivity. The question is whether
the firms’ choice of production technology under this framework, which features en-
dogenous markup, is similar to the constant markup framework. I do not attempt to
do this here and leave this to future work30 The purpose of this example is to show
how exporters and nonexporters operating in markets with different sizes respond
to trade liberalization, and thus, I choose to differentiate between markets not by
choosing different labor force sizes. Instead, I differentiate the level of entry cost fE
across markets. Larger fE is manifested in larger effective market size A and higher
zero profit cutoff.31 I solve the model numerically (for details, see Appendix2.8).
29We assume that N¯ is small enough; specifically, there exists ϕN such that N(ϕ) = N¯ for all
ϕ < ϕN .
30The complications arise here form the fact that firms will not pass all of a cost differential to
consumers. By adopting a higher level of N , a firm’s cost of production decreases. However, the
reduction in cost will not be completely reflected in proportional reduction in price since a firm will
be able to charge a higher markup.
31Again, we shall not confuse the usual view of market size, which ultimately lowers the ZPC as
in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), with the effective market size A in the current model.
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Again, in both countries, exporters adopt higher levels of production technology in
the open economy relative to the closed economy, while nonexporters downgrade N .
The percentage increase in exporters’ productivity in the small country is larger than
the percentage increase in productivity for large country exporters. On the other
hand, the small country nonexporters’ productivity falls disproportionally more than
the large country nonexporters’ productivity (see Figures (2.13) and (2.14)).
2.5.5 Comparative Statics
The comparative statics analysis is carried out by changing the variable costs of trade
and the fixed costs of trade separately. In the first exercise, I vary the level of variable
costs of trade τ and leave all other parameters constant, including the fixed cost of
trade fx. In response to a variable cost of trade reduction from 1.3 to 1.2, in symmetric
countries with C(N) = N , nonexporters experience 6.2% loss in their productivity,
whereas old exporters’ productivity increases by 0.12%. New exporters (firms that
are induced to export because of this reduction in τ) enjoy a significant boost in their
productivity: 38.79%. Similar patterns arise when variable trade costs are pushed
further down to 1 (see Figures (2.6) and (2.7)). On the other hand, if variable costs
of trade increase from 1.3 to 1.5, nonexporters (before and after increase in τ) enjoy
an increase in their productivity by 26.6%, whereas exporters’ productivity falls by
0.54%. New nonexporters, i.e., those who used to be exporters at the old level of τ but
find it optimal not to export under the new level of τ , lose 21% of their productivity.
In our second thought experiment, I change the value of fixed cost of exporting
while leaving all other parameters constant, including the variable cost of trade. To
my knowledge, no previous paper has studied the impact of the fixed cost of exporting
on a firm’s productivity. We are able to do so here because of the richness of the model
we have introduced. In particular, the general equilibrium effects on a firm’s produc-
tivity are derived in a tractable way that facilities the comparative static analysis
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regarding the change in any model’s parameter in interest. Disentangling the source
of trade liberalization into variable and fixed costs of trade yields very interesting
results. Surprisingly, when fixed cost of trade falls, old exporters and nonexporters
adopt lower levels of production technology relative to the trading equilibrium with
higher fixed costs of exporting. New exporters who find it optimal to start exporting
as fixed cost of exporting declines experience a large increase in productivity. As
the fixed cost of exporting increases, exporters and old nonexporters, in fact, enjoy
a modest increase in productivity, whereas the new nonexporters who cannot make
it anymore to the export market because of the high fixed cost of exporting suffer a
sizable decrease in productivity.
Another interesting experiment is to have a zero fixed cost of exporting (i.e.,
Krugman (1980)). In this case, all surviving firms will sell to both markets domestic
and foreign. As anticipated by the model, a firm’s productivity is constant under
this scenario. That is, if the fixed cost of exporting drops from trade prohibitive level
(fX = ∞) to zero and, hence, all surviving firms export, the impact of this kind of
trade liberalization is isomorphic to an increase in the size of labor force, which, as is
well known, does not affect the effective market size A when preferences are presented
by CES. In Figures (2.8) and (2.9), it shown how firms respond to changing the fixed
cost of exporting. For instance, the left graph of Figure (2.9) demonstrates the firms’
productivity responses to a 50% reduction in fixed export cost: old exporters and
old nonexporters decrease their productivity by 1%. The new exporters’ productivity
increases by almost 35%. The right figure depicts the firms’ productivity in an open
economy with zero fixed cost relative to firm’ productivity in autarky. Trade in this
case is welfare improving but has no impact on firms’ productivity.
Our analysis of the impact of variable costs of trade on a firm’s productivity and
technology adoption resonates the findings of Lileeva and Trefler (2010). As discussed
above, once we introduce fixed cost of adjustment and bound the level of production
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technology from above, the results will be similar to those of Bustos (2011b), where
the impact of trade liberalization on the firm’s productivity is stronger on the firms
that are in the third quartile of the firm size distribution. Nevertheless, the model
presented here diverges from Bustos (2011b) by introducing the differentiated impacts
of trade liberalization on new exporters’ and old exporters’ technology adoption. The
impact of trade liberalization via reductions in variable costs of trade is to some de-
gree consistent with Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012). Exporters’ heterogeneous
responses in their model and the Lileeva and Trefler (2010)’s negative selection can
be easily produced in the current model by imposing an upper boundary on the
production technology N¯ . As a result, firms already using N¯ are invariant to trade
openness. Firms faraway from N¯ experience higher percentage change in productivity
in response to trade liberalization.
The gap between an exporter and a nonexporter is governed by Equation (2.22).
In Figures (2.10) (2.11),(2.12), (2.13) and (2.14), it is shown how the productivity
gap between an exporter and a nonexporter varies as variable costs of trade τ change,
confirming the analytical analysis (i.e., Equation (2.22)). The gap is decreasing in
τ in both countries and is larger in the small country for any level of τ . Moreover,
the productivity gap is more sensitive to τ in the small country, in the sense that it
expands much faster in the small country relative to the big country as τ decreases.
Interestingly, the productivity gap increases at an increasing rate as τ falls in the
small country, whereas it increases at a decreasing rate in the large country as τ falls.
2.6 Conclusion
I present a tractable model that introduces the choice of technology investment by
firms into the standard Melitz’s model. Trade openness, indeed, increases aggregate
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productivity not only because of the Melitz self selection effect but also because firms
adjust, optimally, their choice of technology adoption and hence their productivity.
The model exploits the old idea of the affinity between market size and innovation
in a tractable way: ceteris paribus, nonexporters downgrade production technology
whereas exporters upgrade. Different trade costs (variable vs. fixed export cost)
impact firms’ productivity differently. Moreover, lowering trade variable costs seems
to have a very small impact on old exporters’ productivity but a large impact on
new exporters’ productivity. The relative export market size to domestic market
size is indispensable in understanding the magnitude of trade impact on a firm’s
productivity.
The implication of the model is also striking regarding the gains from trade: The
gains from trade are larger relative to the standard Melitz’s model as a consequence
of tougher competition, which makes it even harder for the least productive firms to
survive. In this economy, the forces of creative destruction are magnified on both the
extensive andt he intensive margins.
2.7 Appendix A: Proofs
Second-Order Conditions of the Profit Maximization:
The solution to the maximization problem is unique if the matrix of the second-order
condition evaluated at the optimal level of N and X is negative definite.
Γ =
 ∂
2pi
∂X2
∂2pi
∂N∂X
∂2pi
∂N∂X
∂2pi
∂N2
 =
 −1ε a2κ NϕC′(N) a
[
ε−1
ε
(κ+ 1)− 1]
a
[
ε−1
ε
(κ+ 1)− 1] 1
N
( ε−1
ε
(κ+ 1)− 1)ϕC ′(N)1+κ
κ
− ϕC ′′(N)
 < 0
Γ is negative definite if the diagonal elements are negative and the determinant
is positive. The first diagonal element is negative since the first derivative of the
cost function is positive. The second diagonal element is negative if N
C′′(N)C
′(N) >
43
( ε−1
ε
(κ + 1) − 1)κ+1
κ
. The determinant is negative if NC
′′(N)
C′(N) > κ(ε − 1) − 1. If
κ(ε−1)−1 < 0, the second diagonal element and the determinant are both negative.
If κ(ε − 1) − 1 > 0, then Assumption 1 implies that both the determinant and the
second diagonal element are negative because the condition for negative determinant
implies that the second diagonal element is negative.
Proof of Proposition II.1. Define F (.) = κ
(
ε−1
ε
)ε
a1−εANκ(ε−1)−1 − ϕC ′(N) =
0. By implicit theorem,
∂N
∂A
= − ∂F/∂A
∂F/∂N
=
−κ ( ε−1
ε
)ε
a1−εNκ(ε−1)−1
(κ(ε− 1)− 1)κ ( ε−1
ε
)ε
a1−εANκ(ε−1)−2 − ϕC ′′(N)
The numerator is always negative. The sign of the dominator is given by the sign of
κ(ε− 1)− 1− NC′′(N)
C′(N) , which is negative (see Assumption 1). Hence , N is increasing
in A. Similarly,
∂N
∂ϕ
=
C ′(N)
(κ(ε− 1)− 1)κ ( ε−1
ε
)ε
a1−εANκ(ε−1)−2 − ϕC ′′(N) < 0
And, ∂X
∂A
= ∂X∂N
∂N∂A
> 0.
sign(
∂X
∂ϕ
) = sign((κ(ε− 1)− 1)Nκ(ε−1)−2∂N
∂ϕ
) = −sign(κ(ε− 1)− 1)
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Proof of Lemma II.1.
ϕC ′(N) = κ
(
ε− 1
ε
)ε
a1−εANκ(ε−1)−1 by (2.5)
ϕC(N) =
C(N)
C ′(N)
Nκ(ε−1)−1C1 C1 > 0 is constant
∂ϕC(N)
∂ϕ
= C1
∂(Nκ(ε−1)−1 C(N)
C′(N))
∂N
∂N
∂ϕ
The derivative above is negative if and only if
∂
C(N)
C′(N)N
κ(ε−1)−1
∂N
> 0. With some alge-
braic manipulation, we can show that this term is positive if N
[
C′(N)
C(N)
− C′′
C′(N)
]
>
1− κ(ε− 1).
Proof of Lemma II.2. Notice that the productivity P can be written as,
P ∗ = Nκ. Hence, ∂P
∗
∂ϕ
= κNκ−1 ∂N
∂ϕ
< 0.
Proof of Proposition II.2. Assume that the level of technology N is fixed.
We want to find the level of X that maximizes (2.4). That is , X(N,A, .) =
argmaxX pi(Nconstant, X), which is a function of N , but not ϕ. Define the reduced-
form profit function as
pi(N) = N
ε−1
ε
(κ+1)X(N,A, .)
ε−1
ε A
1
ε − {aNX(N,A, .) + ϕC(N) + f} (2.29)
= φ(N,A, ε, κ, a)− ϕC(N)− f (2.30)
The optimal value of N that is derived in (2.5) can also be calculated as N(A,ϕ, .) =
argmaxN pi(N). Define v(N) such that
v(N) ≡ pi(N(A,ϕ, .)) = φ(N(A,ϕ, .), A, a, ε, κ)− ϕC(N(A,ϕ, .)) (2.31)
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By envelope theorem,
∂v(N)
∂ϕ
= −C(N) < 0.
Proof of Proposition II.3. Notice that the ratio of any two firms’ output,
technology, revenues and variable profits, s= 1
ε
r − ϕC(N), depend only on the ratio
of the cost shocks ϕ:
q(ϕ1)
q(ϕ2)
= ϑq
(
ϕ1
ϕ2
)
r(ϕ1)
r(ϕ2)
= ϑr
(
ϕ1
ϕ2
)
N(ϕ1)
N(ϕ2)
= ϑn
(
ϕ1
ϕ2
)
s(ϕ1)
s(ϕ2)
= ϑs
(
ϕ1
ϕ2
)
Where ϑi i ∈ {q, n, s, r} is decreasing with ϕ. As in Melitz (2003), the aggregate
variables can be defined by the weighted average cost draws ϕ˜. Specifically,
P = M
1
1−ε
(ˆ ϕD
0
p(ϕ)1−εµ(ϕ)dϕ
) 1
1−ε
= M
1
1−εp(ϕ˜(ϕD))
ϕ˜(ϕD) =
(ˆ ϕD
0
N(ϕ)κ(ε−1)
g(ϕ)
G(ϕD)
dϕ
) 1
ε−1
We also can write the revenue, the variable profits, and the net profits in terms of ϕ˜:
R = M
ˆ ϕD
0
r(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ = Mr(ϕ˜)
S = M
ˆ ϕD
0
s(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ = Ms(ϕ˜)
Π = M
ˆ ϕD
0
pi(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ = M(s(ϕ˜)− f)
= Mpi(ϕ˜)
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Let p¯i = pi(ϕ˜)
p¯i = s(ϕ˜)− f
= s(ϕD)ϑs(
ϕ˜
ϕD
)− f = fϑs( ϕ˜
ϕD
)− f
= fk(ϕ)
Where, k(ϕ) = ϑs(
ϕ˜(ϕ)
ϕ
)− 1. A FEC is given by:
G(ϕD)
ˆ ϕD
0
pi(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ = δfE
p¯i =
δfE
G(ϕD)
Combine ZPC and FEC together:
fj(ϕ) = δfE
Here j(ϕ) = G(ϕ)k(ϕ) . In the space of (pi, ϕ) we need to show that (FEC) is decreas-
ing in ϕ, while (ZPC) is increasing, and they intersect at a unique point by showing
that j(ϕ) is increasing in ϕ with limϕ→0j(ϕ) = 0 and Limϕ→∞j(ϕ) = ∞. Indeed,
the problem is similar to Melitz (2003); hence, the proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition II.4. Notice that ϕ˜(ϕD) is only a function of ϕD. Thus,
ϕ that satisfies (ZPC) and (FEC) simultaneously is only a function of the exogenous
parameters. For the second part of the proposition (i,e., A is independent of L),
notice that the price level P = M
1
1−εp(ϕ˜) depends on A. In particular, p(ϕ˜) =
ε
ε−1
a
ϕ˜
N−1(A)−κ. Since labor is the only factor of production, we impost that L =
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R = M
´ ϕD
0
r(ϕ)µ(ϕ)dϕ = Mr(ϕ˜). The explicit formula of r(ϕ˜) is given as follows:
r(ϕ˜) = A1−εN−1(A)κ(ε−1)(
ε
ε− 1a)
1−ε(ϕ˜(ϕD))ε−1
Hence,
A =
r(ϕ˜)
p(ϕ˜)1−ε
= ϑa(A, exogenous parameters)
As shown above, the number of operating firms M can be calculated from the income-
expenditure identity: R = L.
M =
L
r(ϕ˜)
= ϑm(L,A, ϕ˜) ≡ L
ϑm(A, ϕ˜, parameters)
Since A and ϕ˜ are only functions of the exogenous parameters, M is a function of
the model’s parameters and L. Indeed, M is increasing with L. The positive effect
of L on the welfareW = M
1
ε−1p(ϕ˜)−1 follows from the relationship between M and L.
Proof of Proposition II.5. The proof is analogous to the proof in the closed
economy with some modification. First, without loss of generality, I only consider
the proof for the symmetric countries case. The proof of asymmetric countries is
similar but is more computationally involved. I start with the price index in the
open economy and show that, as in the closed economy, we can write it in term of
a weighted average cost parameter ϕ. In fact, I will express all aggregates in the
economy in terms of this weighted average.
Pi =
{
Mi
ˆ ϕi
0
pii(ϕ)
1−εµi(ϕ)dϕ+Mii′
ˆ ϕii′
0
pii′(ϕ)
1−εµii′dϕ
} 1
1−ε
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By symmetry, Mi′i = Mii′ = Mx and ϕii′ = ϕi′i = ϕx. Hence,
Pi = {Mii
ˆ ϕi
ϕx
pii(ϕ)
1−εµii(ϕ)dϕ+
Mx
ˆ ϕx
0
pii(ϕ)
1−εµx(ϕ)dϕ+
Mx
ˆ ϕx
0
(τpii(ϕ))
1−εµx(ϕ)dϕ} 11−ε
=
{
Miip(ϕ˜i(ϕi, ϕx))
1−ε + (1 + τ 1−ε)Mxpe(ϕ˜x(ϕx))1−ε
} 1
1−ε
where,
ϕ˜i =
(ˆ ϕi
ϕx
N(ϕ)κ(ε−1)µii(ϕ)dϕ
) 1
ε−1
ϕ˜x =
(ˆ ϕx
0
N(ϕ)κ(ε−1)µx(ϕ)dϕ
) 1
ε−1
.
p(ϕ˜i) =
ε
ε− 1aN
−1(A, .)−κ
1
ϕ˜i
pe(ϕ˜x) =
ε
ε− 1aN
−1(A(1 + τ 1−ε))−κ
1
ϕ˜x
= Gτ (τ)p(ϕ˜x)
Gτ (τ) = N
−1((1 + τ 1−ε)−κ < 1 , Gτ (∞) = 1 and τ = 1 = argmaxτ Gτ (τ) . Then the
price level can be written as follows:
Pi =
{
Miip(ϕ˜i)
1−ε + (1 + τ 1−ε)Gτ (τ)Mxp(ϕ˜x)1−ε
} 1
1−ε
= M
1
1−ε
t p(ϕ˜t)
Mt is the mass of all available varieties in country i: Mt = Mii + 2Mx = Mi + Mx.
The weighted average cost draw of all firms competing in country i is given by ϕ˜t,
ϕ˜t =
{
1
Mt
(
Miiϕ˜
ε−1
i + (1 + τ
1−ε)Gτ (τ)Mxϕ˜ε−1x
)} 1ε−1
Again, the total revenue R = Mi
´ ϕi
0
r(ϕ)µidϕ can be written as a function of ϕ˜t.
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That is,
R = Mtr(ϕ˜t)
Similarly,
Π = Miipiii(ϕ˜i) +MxpiT (ϕ˜x)
= Mtpi(ϕ˜t)
In the previous derivations, I exploit the fact that the ratio of two exporters’ output,
revenues, variable profits, and technology is solely a function of the ratio of their cost
draw and equals to the ratio of two non-exporters’ output, revenues, variable profits,
and technology with the same draws as exporters. Indeed, the ratio of an exporter’s
production technology to a nonexporter’ production technology is determined by
Equation (2.22). The next step is to show that ϕx is a function of ϕi and the model’s
exogenous parameters. As a result, ϕ˜t is going to be a function of ϕi and the exoge-
nous parameters.32 To show that ϕx(ϕi), note that sii(ϕi) = fi, s
e(ϕx) = sii(ϕx) + fx
and s
e(ϕ)
sii(ϕ)
= d(τ) > 1.33 Consequently,
se(ϕx) = fϑs(
ϕx
ϕi
) + fx
se(ϕi)ϑs(
ϕx
ϕi
) = fϑs(
ϕx
ϕi
) + fx
sii(ϕi)dϑs(
ϕx
ϕi
) = fϑs(
ϕx
ϕi
) + fx
ϕx = ϑ
−1
s
(
fx
f(d(τ)− 1)
)
ϕi
32Again, the effective market size A is given by the exogenous parameters.
33d(τ) is constant for a given level of τ and d′(τ) < 0. As τ goes to infinity, d con-
verges to one. Also, note that se(.) is linked to sii by the following relation: s
ee(ϕx) =
1
ε
re(ϕx)︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1 + τ1−ε)Gτ (τ)ε−1rii(ϕx)−ϕx
Ce(N(ϕx))︷ ︸︸ ︷
C(Gτ (τ))C(N(ϕx)).
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From the Equation above, it is straightforward to see that ϕx is increasing by one-
to-one in ϕi. Similar to the closed economy proof, I define p¯i to be the average profits
conditional on successful entry and rewrite the (ZPC) as a function of p¯i. Formally,
p¯i = piipiii(ϕ˜i) + pxpi(ϕ˜x)
= piifk(ϕi) + pxfkx(ϕi) + pxfxk(ϕx)
pii =
G(ϕi)−G(ϕx)
G(ϕi)
is the probability of only selling to the domestic market conditional
on successful entry. px =
G(ϕx)
G(ϕi
is the probability of selling to both markets conditional
on successful entry. k(ϕj) = ϑs(
ϕ˜j
ϕj
) and kx(ϕj) = ϑs(
ϕ˜x
ϕj
) − 1. The ZPC can be
simplified more as follows:
p¯i = fk(ϕi) + pxfxk(ϕx) + pxf(kx(ϕi)− k(ϕi)) (2.32)
Since we impose that fx is large enough such that the fraction of exporters is less
than the fraction nonexporters, ϕ˜x < ϕ˜i, and thus pxf(kx(ϕi)−k(ϕi)) > 0. The FEC
is given by:
p¯i =
δfE
G(ϕi)
Again, in the space of (pi, ϕ), there exists a unique ϕi that simultaneously solves ZPC
and FEC. Formally, in the space (pi, ϕ), we need to find ϕ that satisfies the following
equation:
δfE = fj(ϕ) = fxj(ϕx(ϕ)) +G(ϕx(ϕ))f(kx(ϕ)− k(ϕ))
The problem is similar to the closed economy, given that the second term is increasing
in ϕ as well as the last term. To show that ϕopeni < ϕ
closed
i , note that in the space
of (pi, ϕ), the FEC remains unchanged compared with the closed economy: In equi-
librium, the expected value of future profits must equal the suck entry cost fE. On
51
the other hand, ZPC shifts up since the first term is similar to the one in the closed
economy, while the second and the third terms are positive and increasing in ϕ. In
other words, trade openness, as expected, increases the ex ante expected profits per
firm.
Proof of Proposition II.6. The proof is proceeded by contradiction. Assume that
fx = 0; hence, all firms export. Indeed if this is the case, A is constant, and therefore,
the technology choices and the prices remain constant for all firms. Moreover, the
ZPC is unchanged relative to the closed economy. Consequently, the trade openness
impact is isomorphic to doubling the labor size in the closed economy. Now assume
that fx > 0 and only some firms export. If the resulting aggregate price level is higher
relative to the autarky aggregate price level, all surviving firms choose a higher level
of N and charge lower prices. However, if this is the case, the ZPC in the open econ-
omy must be higher than the ZPC in autarky, which means larger mass of producing
domestic firms. If the number of firms producing in the open economy relative to the
number of producing firms in the closed economy is greater than one and all firms
charge lower prices relative to the closed economy, the resulting aggregate price level
must be lower than the closed economy aggregate price level (contradiction) . Similar
argument can be made when the price level in the open economy equals the price level
in the closed economy. In conclusion, the aggregate price level in the open economy
must be less than the aggregate price level in the closed economy.
Proof of Proposition II.7. The first part follows immediately from Proposition
II.6. The second part is true if A > Aclose. In case of symmetric countries (without
loss of generality), A = Aτ + τ 1−εAτ . I denote the level of A in the open economy for
a given level of τ by Aτ . First, notice that limτ→∞A = Aclose. Hence, to show that
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A > Aclose, it is sufficient to show that A is decreasing in τ ,
∂A
∂τ
=
∂Aτ
∂τ
(1 + τ 1−ε) + (1− ε)τ−εAτ .
The first argument of the right-hand side of the equation above is positive, while the
second one is negative. We need to show that the first argument is less than the
second. Notice that Aτ depends on the ZPC ϕi, and therefore, Aτ is connected to τ
through ϕi. As we have shown above, the properties of FE C and ZPC in the current
model are identical to the ones in Melitz (2003) and, consequently, his result that an
exporter’s revenues in the open economy (domestic sales rD and export sales rX) are
strictly greater than its revenues in a closed economy: rclose(ϕ) < r
D
open(ϕ) + r
X
open(ϕ)
also holds here, which is equivalent toA > Aclose. In fact, the strict inequality is larger
in the current model. To show that an exporter’s production technology is increasing
in fx conditional on being an exporter, it is sufficient to show that
∂(1+τ1−ε)A(τ,fx)
∂fx
> 0,
which is indeed the case since A(τ,fx) is increasing with fx and limfx→0A(τ,fx) = Aclose.
Proof of Proposition II.8 The proof simply follows by noting that the expected
profits conditional on successful entry p¯i when N is endogenous is higher than p¯i when
N is constant. In particular, the last term in (2.32) equals zero when N is constant.
2.8 Appendix B: Examples and Simulations
2.8.1 Example One
By solving the firm’s maximization problem in the closed economy (i.e., Equation (2.4)),
the level of technology N adopted by a firm with ϕ productivity (ϕ-firm) is,
N∗ = ΨA
1
1−κ(ε−1)ϕ
1
κ(ε−1)−1 , X∗ =
ϕ
aκ
(2.33)
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Ψ ≡
(
aε−1
κ
) 1
κ(ε−1)−1
(
ε
ε−1
) ε
κ(ε−1)−1
. The ZPC in the closed economy is,
ϕ
κ(ε−1)
κ(ε−1)−1
i Θ(A) = f, i ∈ {D,F} (2.34)
where Θ(A) ≡ 1−κ(ε−1)κ(ε−1) ΨA
1
1−κ(ε−1) . Using the Pareto distribution in the FEC, integrating
and substituting for the value of ϕi from the ZPC yield the solution of ϕi in terms of the
model’s parameters:
ϕi =
[
δfE
fi
λ
] 1
θ
, i ∈ {D,F} (2.35)
λ ≡ θ+
κ(ε−1)
κ(ε−1)−1
κ(ε−1)
1−κ(ε−1)
. To solve for M , I use the labor market clearing condition Equation (2.13).
First, note that a firm that receives a shock ϕ1 chooses X
∗ = ϕ1aκ =
1
aLx; hence, the
amount of labor used to produce X∗, Lx, is given by ϕ1κ . The labor requirement that is
used in production by ϕ1-firm is given by
aq(ϕ1)
N(ϕ1)κ
= N(ϕ1)Lx =
1
κΨA
1
1−κ(ε−1)ϕ
κ(ε−1)
κ(ε−1)−1
1 . In
addition, the firm’s expenditures on technology investment are measured in units of labor
requirement, which is given by `(CL(C(ϕ1))) = ϕ1N(ϕ1) = ΨA
1
1−κ(ε−1)ϕ
κ(ε−1)
κ(ε−1)−1
1 . Given the
total labor demand by each firm, we can solve the market clearing condition and find M as
a function of the model’s parameters:
ME =
L
fE
1
1 + Ψ1
(2.36)
M =
G(ϕD)
δ
ME (2.37)
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Ψ1 ≡
λ︷ ︸︸ ︷
θ + κ(ε−1)κ(ε−1)−1
κ(ε−1)
1−κ(ε−1)
+θ 1+κκ . The price level is immediately derived from ϕD and M
E . That
is,
P 1−ε = M
ˆ ϕi
0
p(ϕ)1−εµ(ϕ)dϕ
=
ME
δ
ˆ ϕi
0
(
ε
ε− 1
a
N(ϕ)κ
)1−ε
dG(ϕ)
=
ME
δ
θ
(
ε
ε− 1a
)1−ε
Ψκ(ε−1)
(
L
P 1−ε
) κ(ε−1)
1−κ(ε−1)
ˆ ϕi
0
ϕ
κ(ε−1)
κ(ε−1)−1+θ−1dϕ
P
1−ε
1−κ(ε−1) =
θ
δ
ME
(
ε
ε− 1a
)1−ε
Ψκ(ε−1)L
κ(ε−1)
1−κ(ε−1) ϕ
κ(ε−1)
κ(ε−1)−1+θ
i
κ(ε−1)
κ(ε−1)−1 + θ
P =
L
1
1−ε
 1κ(ε−1)
κ(ε−1)−1 + θ
θ
1 + Ψ1
(
εa
ε− 1
)1−ε
Ψκ(ε−1)
(
δfE
) κ(ε−1)
(κ(ε−1)−1)θ
(
λ
fi
) κ(ε−1)
(κ(ε−1)−1)θ+1

1−κ(ε−1)
1−ε
Hence,
A =
 1κ(ε−1)
κ(ε−1)−1 + θ
θ
1 + Ψ1
(
εa
ε− 1
)1−ε
Ψκ(ε−1)
(
δfE
) κ(ε−1)
(κ(ε−1)−1)θ
(
λ
fi
) κ(ε−1)
(κ(ε−1)−1)θ+1

κ(ε−1)−1
(2.38)
The ZPC is calculated as follows:
Ni(ϕi) = Ψ
1−κ(ε−1)
[
δfE
f
λ
] 1
θ(κ(ε−1)−1)
 1κ(ε−1)
κ(ε−1)−1 + θ
θ
1 + Ψ1
(
εa
ε− 1
)1−ε (
δfE
) κ(ε−1)
(κ(ε−1)−1)θ
(
λ
fi
) κ(ε−1)
(κ(ε−1)−1)θ+1

−1
The characterization of the equilibrium in the closed economy is complete. I turn now to the
equilibrium in the open economy. The ϕ-nonexporter’s maximization problem is similar to
the closed economy, whereas the ϕ-exporter solves Equation (2.19). The levels of technology
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N for nonexporter and exporter, respectively, are:
N∗(ϕ) = ΨA
1
1−κ(ε−1)ϕ
1
κ(ε−1)−1 , X∗ =
ϕ
aκ
(2.39)
N∗e (ϕ) = Ψ
(
A(1 + τ1−ε)
) 1
1−κ(ε−1) ϕ
1
κ(ε−1)−1 , X∗ =
ϕ
aκ
(2.40)
N∗e (ϕ) = B(τ)N
∗(ϕ) (2.41)
B(τ) ≡ (1 + τ1−ε) 11−κ(ε−1) > 1. From the ZPC:
ϕ
κ(ε−1)
κ(ε−1)−1
i Θ(A) = fi , i ∈ {D,F} (2.42)
The FEC is given by (2.25).
ˆ ϕi
ϕX
piii(ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ+
ˆ ϕX
0
piT (ϕ)g(ϕ)dϕ = δf
E (2.43)
ˆ ϕi
ϕX
[
1
ε
A
(
εa
ε− 1
)1−ε
N(ϕ)κ(ε−1) − ϕN(ϕ)− fi
]
dG(ϕ)
+
ˆ ϕX
0
[
B(τ)
1
ε
A
(
εa
ε− 1
)1−ε
N(ϕ)κ(ε−1) −B(τ)ϕN(ϕ)− fi − fX
]
dG(ϕ) = δfE
θ
λ1
Θ(A)
[
ϕλ1i − ϕλ1X +B(τ)ϕλ1X
]
− ϕθi fi − ϕθXfX = δfE (2.44)
where, λ1 ≡ θ + κ(ε−1)κ(ε−1)−1 . In order to solve for the ZPC from the FEC, we need to write
ϕX as a function of ϕi.
34
ϕX = Λϕi (2.45)
where Λ ≡
(
fX
fi(B(τ)−1)
)κ(ε−1)−1
κ(ε−1)
< 1.35 Substitute for ϕX in FEC,
34The derivation simply follows by noting that se(ϕ)/sii(ϕ) = B(τ), s(ϕ1)/s(ϕ2) = (
ϕ1
ϕ2
)
κ(ε−1)
κ(ε−1)−1 ,
and sii(ϕi) = fi. See the Appendix 2.7 for details.
35To guarantee that only the most productive firms export i.e., Λ < 1, fx must be greater than
fi(B(τ)− 1).
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ϕi =
[
δfE
f
λ + Λ
θ fX
λ
] 1
θ
<
[
δfE
fi/λ
] 1
θ
(2.46)
Again, I solve for the equilibrium numbers of producing and exporting firms by solving the
labor market clearing conditions:
MEfE +
ME
δ
ˆ ϕX
0
(
fi + fX +
aqe(Ne(ϕ))
Ne(ϕ)κ
+ `(C(Ne(ϕ), ϕ))
)
dG(ϕ)
+
ME
δ
ˆ ϕi
ϕX
(
f +
aq(N(ϕ))
N(ϕ)κ
+ `(C(N(ϕ), ϕ))
)
dG(ϕ) = L
MEfE +
ME
δ
[
θ
λ1
ΨA
1
1−κ(ε−1) 1 + κ
κ
(
B(τ)ϕλ1X − ϕλ1X + ϕλ1i
)
+ ϕθXfX + ϕ
θ
i fi
]
= L (2.47)
Substituting for ϕX = Λϕi and manipulating, we get
ME =
L
fE
1
1 + Ψ2
(2.48)
Here Ψ2 ≡ c2((B(τ)−1)Λ
λ1+1)+1+ΛθfX/fi
1/λ+ 1
λ
ΛθfX/fi
and c2 ≡ θλ1
κ(ε−1)
1−κ(ε−1)
1+κ
κ . Further simplification of
Ψ2 yields, as expected under the Pareto distribution assumption, Ψ2 = Ψ1.
Pi =
{
ME
δ
(ˆ ϕi
ϕX
p(ϕ)1−εdG(ϕ) + (1 + τ1−ε)
ˆ ϕX
0
p1−εx (ϕ)dG(ϕ)
)} 1
1−ε
(2.49)
P
1−ε
1−k(ε−1)
i =
θ
λ1δ
(
εa
ε− 1
)1−ε
Ψκ(ε−1)L
κ(ε−1)
1−κ(ε−1)ME
{
1− Λλ1 +B(τ)Λλ1
}
ϕλ1i (2.50)
Where p(ϕ) is the price charged by nonexporters and px(ϕ) is the exporter’s price charged
in the domestic market. substituting for ME and ϕi, we obtain the following:
Pi = L
1
1−ε 1λ1 θ1 + Ψ2
(
εa
ε− 1
)1−ε
Ψκ(ε−1)
(
δfE
) κ(ε−1)
(κ(ε−1)−1)θ
(
1 + Λλ1(B(τ)− 1)
) 1
fi
λ +
ΛθfX
fi

λ1
θ

1−κ(ε−1)
1−ε
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The characterization of the equilibrium in the open economy is complete, where A and the
production technology cutoff N∗ are immediately derived from the aggregate price level.
A = 1λ1 θ1 + Ψ2
(
εa
ε− 1
)1−ε
Ψκ(ε−1)
(
δfE
) κ(ε−1)
(κ(ε−1)−1)θ
(
1 + Λλ1(B(τ)− 1)
) 1
fi
λ +
ΛθfX
fi

λ1
θ

κ(ε−1)−1
2.8.2 Example Two
When c = 0, C(N) = 1φN
φ. In the closed economy, the technology adoption by the ϕ-firm,
N(ϕ) = Ψφ
(
A
ϕ
) 1
φ−κ(ε−1)
X =
ϕNφ−1
aκ
. (2.51)
Ψφ ≡
(
aε−1
κ
) 1
κ(ε−1)−φ
(
ε
ε−1
) ε
κ(ε−1)−φ
. The (ZPC) in the closed economy is,
ϕ
κ(ε−1)
κ(ε−1)−φ
i Θφ(A) = f, i ∈ {D,F} (2.52)
Θφ(A) ≡ φ−κ(ε−1)φκ(ε−1) ΨφφA
φ
φ−κ(ε−1) . Using the Pareto distribution in the FEC, integrating and
substituting for the value of ϕi from the ZPC yield the solution of ϕi in terms of the model’s
parameters:
ϕi =
[
δfE
fi
λφ
] 1
θ
, i ∈ {D,F} (2.53)
λφ ≡
θ+
κ(ε−1)
κ(ε−1)−φ
κ(ε−1)
φ−κ(ε−1)
. Notice that M = Lr¯ , and r¯ =
´ ϕi
0 r(ϕ)
dG(ϕ)
G(ϕi
is the expected revenue
conditional on a successful entry. Using this relationship,
ME =
L
fE
1
(1 + Ψ1)φ
. (2.54)
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Notice that 1 + Ψ = θ εκ(ε−1) . The aggregate price level is given by:
P =
L
1
1−ε
 1κ(ε−1)
κ(ε−1)−φ + θ
θ
φ(1 + Ψ1)
(
εa
ε− 1
)1−ε
Ψ
κ(ε−1)
φ
(
δfE
) κ(ε−1)
(κ(ε−1)−φ)θ
(
λφ
fi
) κ(ε−1)
(κ(ε−1)−φ)θ+1

φ−κ(ε−1)
φ(1−ε)
We follow similar steps as in Example One to find the technology adoption level by firms.
N∗(ϕ) = Ψφ
(
A
ϕ
) 1
φ−κ(ε−1)
, X∗ =
ϕNφ−1
aκ
(2.55)
N∗e (ϕ) = Ψφ
(
A(1 + τ1−ε)
) 1
φ−κ(ε−1) ϕ
1
κ(ε−1)−1 , X∗ =
ϕNφ−1
aκ
(2.56)
We can also show that the export cutoff ϕX = Λφϕi. Here Λφ ≡
(
fX
fi(Bφ(τ)−1)
)κ(ε−1)−φ
κ(ε−1)
< 1,
and Bφ(τ) ≡
(
1 + τ1−ε
) φ
φ−κ(ε−1) > 1. Consequently,
ϕi =
 δfE
f
λφ
+ Λθφ
fX
λφ
 1θ < [ δfE
fi/λφ
] 1
θ
(2.57)
The aggregate price level is
Pi = L
1
1−ε { 1
λ1φ
θ
φ(1 + Ψ1)
(
εa
ε− 1
)1−ε
Ψ
κ(ε−1)
φ
(
δfE
) κ(ε−1)
(κ(ε−1)−φ)θ
(
1 + Λ
λ1φ
φ (Bφ(τ)− 1)
) 1
fi
λφ
+
ΛθφfX
fi

λ1φ
θ
}
φ−κ(ε−1)
φ(1−ε )
λ1φ ≡ θ + κ(ε−1)κ(ε−1)−φ . We can simply find the market size A in the closed and the open
economies from the zero-profit condition once we solve for the ZPC.
No technology upgrading/downgrading. Here I assume that c is large enough such
that no firm finds it optimal to change its production technology chosen in autarky. The
whole goal of this exercise is to asses the gains from trade under the endogenous technology
setting versus the gains from trade under the standard models of trade with heterogeneous
firms and CES preferences. I proceed as follows. First, I characterize the equilibrium in
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the closed and the open economies as in Example 2 with C(N) = 1φN
φ. Our approach
and results are exactly as shown above. The welfare W = wP in the closed and the open
economies are derived consequently. Next, we envision a world economy where every firm
maintains its production technology adopted in the closed economy because adjustment
costs are prohibitive. The ZPC in the open economy therefore is given by;
1
ε
r(N(ϕi))−
fixed in open economy︷ ︸︸ ︷
ϕiC(N(ϕi)) = fi (2.58)
Substitute for r(.) and N in terms of ϕ and simplify, we get
ΨφφA
φ
φ−κ(ε−1)
close
[
Aopen
Aclose
1
κ(ε− 1) −
1
φ
]
ϕ
κ(ε−1)
κ(ε−1)−φ
i = fi (2.59)
The cost of adopting technology N is fixed from a firm perspective once it has been chosen.
Furthermore, in the open economy, since no firm exports without selling to the domestic
market, I comply with the literature and assume that both the fixed cost of producing f and
the fixed cost of technology adoption C(N) are paid from the domestic sales and, hence,
irrelevant to the export decision whenever a firm’s productivity is invariant to trade status.
The exporting cutoff ϕX is pinned down in the standard way here: a firm chooses to export
if the export sales net of variable costs cover the fixed cost of exporting.
rx(N(ϕx)− τaNX − fx = 0 (2.60)
1
ε
τ1−εr(N(ϕx)) = fx. (2.61)
1
ε
τ1−εAopen
(
εa
ε− 1
)1−ε
Ψ
κ∗(ε−1)
φ A
κ∗(ε−1)
φ−κ(ε−1)
close ϕ
κ(ε−1)
κ(ε−1)−φ
X = fx. (2.62)
where rx(.) denotes revenues in export destination market, and r(.) denotes gross sales in
domestic market. FEC is,
ˆ ϕi
0
piD(ϕ)dG(ϕ) +
ˆ ϕD
0
piX(ϕ)dG(ϕ) = δfE (2.63)(
θ
λ1φ
− 1
)[
fiϕ
θ
i + fxϕ
θ
X
]
= δfE . (2.64)
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piD(.) and piX(.) are profits in domestic and export markets, respectively. Apparently, there
are no closed form solutions for the three equations above, thus, I resort to numerical
solution. From the ZPC and the export cutoff equation, I write ZPC and export cutoffs
in terms of the market size in the open economy and the model’s parameters (note that
the market size in the closed economy is given). After plugging the values of producing
and exporting cutoffs in FEC, we end up with one equation and one endogenous variable
Aopen. The value of all model’s parameters are given in our calibration from Example
One. However, the value of the fixed cost of exporting we obtained above to ensure that
only 21% of firms export will be problematic in the current setting. With endogenous
technology, the cost of adopting technology N is paid by sales from both markets since
an exporter maximizes the joint profits in both markets, and therefore, the level of N
is directly connected to export decision. In the current setting, nonetheless, the markets
are completely separable and, importantly, the cost of technology adoption is irrelevant to
exporting decision. In fact, no acceptable numerical solution can be found when using the
value of fx we had in the previous example. Two methods are implemented to solve this
problem. In the first method, for the given values of fx, I characterize the equilibrium for
every value of fx and calculate the ratio of correspondent exporters to the total number
of surviving firms. Among those equilibria, I choose the one with exporters’ fraction that
satisfies the 21% condition and use it to compare the gains from trade under the two
scenarios. In the second method, I impose G(ϕX)G(ϕi) = 21%. Again, there is no closed formula
here to construct the proper restrictions on the related parameters’ value. As a result, I
add this condition to free entry condition and solve simultaneously for both Aopen and fx.
Once market size Aopen is obtained, it is straightforward to compare the gains from trade
under constant technology with the gains from trade with endogenous technology. One
might concern that, given the fact that some parameters (in particular, fx) under the two
scenarios are not the same, we might end up comparing orange with apple. I argue that,
although it is a legitimate criticism, it does not disturb our comparison. In contrast, the
results we obtain provide the minimum impact of endogenous technology on gains from
trade because the calibrated values of fx in constant productivity environment estimated
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by either method are always less than the ones we obtained under endogenous productivity.
2.8.3 Example Three: Asymmetric Countries
I characterize the equilibrium in the case of asymmetric countries with C(N) = 1φN
φ and c =
0. The closed economy aggregate equilibrium variables and the firm’s production technology
are solved for each country i ∈ {D, F} as shown above. The open economy aggregate
variables are obtained numerically by solving the following equations simultaneously (Note
all parameters are common in both countries except fE):
Θ(Ai)ϕ
κ(ε−1)
κ(ε−1)−φ
i = f ZPC
(2.65)
[Θ(Ai)−Θ(Ai)]ϕ
κ(ε−1)
κ(ε−1)−φ
ji = fx i, j ∈ {D, F} Export
(2.66)
1
λ1φ
Θ(Ai)
(
ϕ
λ1φ
i − ϕ
λ1φ
ji
)
−
(
ϕθi − ϕθji
)
f +
θ
λ1φ
Θ(Ai)ϕλ1φji − ϕθji(f + fx) = δfEi FEC
(2.67)
λ1φ and Θ(.) are defined as above, and Ai = Ai + τ1−εAj .
2.9 Appendix C: The Distribution of Firm Sales
in Zipf’s Law
In the data, the distribution of firm size follows a power law with an exponent close to 1.
That is, the firm’s sales, s, are therefore distributed according to
Pr(s > S) = cS−ζ , ζ ≈ 1. (2.68)
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In the current model (with C(N) = 1φN
φ, and c = 0), ϕ-firm sales, s, can be written as
follows:
s(ϕ) = r(ϕ) = p(ϕ)q(ϕ) = A
(
ε
ε− 1
a
Nκ
)1−ε
(2.69)
= A
φ
φ−κ(ε−1)Ψ
κ(ε−1)
φ ϕ
κ(ε−1)
κ(ε−1)−φ (2.70)
= Γϕη (2.71)
where Γ ≡ A
φ
φ−κ(ε−1)Ψ
κ(ε−1)
φ and η ≡ κ(ε−1)κ(ε−1)−φ . The distribution of firm sales in the current
model, then, obtained as follows:
Pr(s > S) = Pr(Γϕη > S) (2.72)
= Pr((
1
ϕ
)−η >
S
Γ
) (2.73)
=
(
S
Γ
) θ
η
(2.74)
= cS−ζ (2.75)
c ≡ Γ−θη and ζ ≡ θ(φ−κ(ε−1)κ(ε−1) ).
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Figure 2.1: Technology Adoption: Example One
Figure 2.2: Firm Productivity Nκ in the Open and Closed Economies: Example One
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Figure 2.3: Relative Productivity: Example One
Figure 2.4: Firms Net Profits in the Open and Closed Economies: Example One
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Figure 2.5: Example Two with φ = 1.25 and No Adjustment cost c = 0
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Figure 2.6: Firms Productivity: Reduction in Variable Trade Costs τ from 1.3 to 1.2
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Figure 2.7: Trade Liberalization Impacts on a Firm’s Productivity: Variable Trade
Costs τ
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Figure 2.8: The Impact of Fixed Cost of Exporting on a Firms’ Productivity
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Figure 2.9: Trade Liberalization Impacts on a Firm’s Productivity: Fixed Cost of
Trade
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Figure 2.10: Productivity Gap between an Exporter and a Nonexporter: Symmetric
Countries
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Note: All remaining parameters are as in the baseline calibration, including the fixed cost of trade
fx. The cost of technology adoption is given by the functional form in Example One. In case of
symmetric countryies, the normalized productivity gap is given by (1+τ1−ε)
1
1−κ(ε−1) , which is indeed
decreasing with τ . The gap is between an exporter who continues to be an exporter for all values
of τ above and a nonexporter who also continues to be a nonexporter for all values of τ above. The
normalization rules out productivity differences from cost draws.
70
Figure 2.11: Exporter’s productivity: Symmetric Countries
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Figure 2.12: Nonexporter’s Productivity: Symmetric Countries
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Note: The figures above show the productivity of one single exporter/nonexporter who continues to
be an exporter/nonexporter for any τ ∈ [1.05 1.5]. The blue line shows the firm’s productivity in
the closed economy.
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Figure 2.13: Productivity Gap between an Exporter and a Nonexporter: Asymmetric
Countries
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Note: The top left and the bottom left figures show the productivity gap between an exporter and
a nonexporter, and an exporter’s productivity in the large country, respectively. The top and the
bottom right figures show the productivity gap between an exporter and a nonexporter, and an
exporter’s productivity in the small country. The blue line in the lower figures denotes an exporter’s
productivity in the closed economy. Notice that, in contrast to symmetric countries case, I cannot
allow τ to be lower than 1.1 in the current example. In fact, for any τ ∈ [1, 1.1), the ZPC in the
small country is lower than the exporting cutoff. The gap is larger in the small country and the
small country exporters’ productivity in the open economy relative to autarky is higher than the
large country exporters’ relative productivity. In absolute values, the average exporter/nonexporter
in the large country enjoys higher productivity.
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Figure 2.14: Nonexporter Productivity: Asymmetric Countries
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Note: The top figure shows a nonexporter’s productivity who resides in the large country. The
bottom figure shows a nonexporter’s productivity in the small country
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CHAPTER III
Contracting Institutions and
International Trade: The Political
Economy of Institutions in the
Global Economy
3.1 Introduction
Since the influential work of Levchenko (2007), numerous papers have documented the im-
portance of domestic institutions as a source of countries’ comparative advantage.1 Nonethe-
less, small but growing literature is emphasizing on the impact of international trade on
domestic institutions.2 A common theme across these studies is that trade openness pro-
1A notable paper here is Nunn (2007) who provides a decisive empirical evidence on the role of
contracting institutions as a source of comparative advantage (for an excellent review of the litera-
ture, see Nunn and Trefler, 2013). In fact, domestic institutions not only impact the comparative
advantage of countries, but also affect the volume of trade and trade policy as well. For instance,
Morrow et al. (1998); Mansfield et al. (2000), and Decker and Lim (2009) show that good institutions
(either in the form of democratic regimes or contracting institutions) favor trade. Anderson and
Marcouiller (2002) empirically demonstrate that low-quality institutions reduce trade, as insecurity
raises the price of traded goods. de Groot et al. (2004), and Yu (2010) present a gravity equation
augmented with institutional quality/democracy and find it has a positive effect on trade flows.
2See, for example (Levchenko, 2013; Eichengreen and Leblang, 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2005).
Broadly, the endogenity problem between domestic institutions and economic performance is indeed
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found affects the evolution of domestic institutions. Yet the literature has not settled on
whether trade liberalization improves domestic institutions and if so under what conditions.
This paper addresses the impact of trade liberalization on contracting institutions.3 As
documented by many researchers, the effect of domestic institutions on economic growth and
economic performance cannot be overemphasized. If the quality of domestic institutions is
affected by trade openness, then the gains from trade go beyond what the standard models
of trade propose. Anecdotes from historical studies suggest that trade openness might
deteriorate or improve domestic institutions, however. Trade alters the political power of
the contested groups in the society by enriching specific groups in the economy who in turn
might affect the domestic institutional change. For instance, the Atlantic triangle trade
enriched the Caribbean plantation elite who exploited their new economic power to exclude
workers from the political sphere.4 Overall, the empirical results are inconclusive, with
some studies finding positive impact of trade openness on institutional quality (Acemoglu
et al., 2005; Lo´pez-Co´rdova and Meissner, 2005; Rudra, 2005; Subramanian et al., 2007;
Levchenko, 2013), others finding negative impact of trade (Li and Reuveny, 2003; Segura-
Cayuela, 2006; Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, 2002; Yu, 2007; Woodward, 1999), and still
others finding no clear impact of globalization on broad democratic institutions (Nicolini
and Paccagnini, 2011; Rodrik et al., 2004; Rigobon and Rodrik, 2005).
The present study provides a unified theoretical framework of international trade with
heterogeneous firms and contractual frictions. This framework has three main features.
First, institutions are a source of comparative advantage. Second, institutional change has
stark distributional consequence across firms within sectors. Third, the domestic institu-
well recognized in both the economic and the political economy literature (North, 1973, 1990; Ace-
moglu et al., 2001; Rodrik, 2008; Rodrik et al., 2004; Olson, 1982; Ostrom, 1990; de Mesquita et al.,
2005; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Przeworski, 2000)
3Contracting institutions refer to the rules and regulations that govern and organize private
contracts between economic agents. Differences in contracting institutions across countries are sub-
stantial; for example, the cost of enforcing a simple commercial debt contract is over 440 percent of
income per capita and requires a process lasting, on average, 495 days in the Dominican Republic,
whereas in New Zealand, it costs less than 12 percent of income per capita and requires only 50 days
(Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). World Bank Doing Business Contract Enforcement Indicator and
Worldwide Governance Indicators, and the indicator of institutional quality developed by Djankov
et al. (2003) are examples of empirical measures (proxies) of contracting institutions.
4The Atlantic triangle trade refers to the Atlantic three-corner trade: Europe, Africa, and the
New World.
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tions are endogenously determined in a political economy equilibrium. The advantage of
this framework is that it reconciles the main lessons from the historical studies of the impact
of trade on domestic institutions. First, whether trade improves or deteriorates the domes-
tic institutions is significantly determined by the initial domestic institutions. Second, it
is the special interest groups that initiate and shape the direction of domestic institutional
change.
To my knowledge, this is the first model that incorporates institutional frictions to
international trade model with heterogeneous firms and monopolistic competition where
institutions themselves are a source of comparative advantage and therefore play a key role
in shaping the patterns of trade.5 The tractability of the model enables me to obtain a rich
set of predictions and propositions. Some of these predictions are empirically supported in
the literature but lack theoretical justification, whereas others are novel and enhance our
understanding of the role of contracting institutional imperfections in the global economy.
The property rights model of Grossman and Hart (1986) is the cornerstone of modeling
institutional frictions in the current model. In particular, the environment is one of the
partial institutional imperfections as in Acemoglu et al. (2007) (see model’s details below).
The advantage of adopting this approach of modeling institutional frictions, in contrast to
the transaction cost approach (Coase-Williamson), is that “the space of contracts and the
5Levchenko (2007) provides a model of institutional comparative advantage in an H-O frame-
work. Acemoglu et al. (2007) present a model of institutional imperfection in the closed economy
and show the distortionary impact of institutional friction on technology adoption and consequently
firms’ productivity. In an open economy, institutions are a source of comparative advantage. In con-
trast to their framework, production technology is constant here, yet institutional differences across
countries are a source of comparative advantage. Moreover, the current model is more tractable in
analyzing patterns of trade and the impact of the interaction of trade impediments with institu-
tional quality in shaping trade patterns and gains from trade. Antras and Helpman (2004, 2008);
Antras (Forthcoming), and Antras and Chor (2013) propose a theoretical framework of institutional
frictions in the global economy, but they are mostly interested in firm organization and offshoring.
Do and Levchenko (2009) develop a model that embeds institutions in the Melitz’ s model, where
institutions are modeled as fixed production cost. That is, institutional reforms in their model can
be understood as deregulations (specifically, improving the doing business environment by reducing
the costs of starting a business). The current paper deals with contracting institutions measured by
rule of law and contract enforcement. Stefanadis (2010) shows how trade impacts institutions by
changing the aggregate allocation of talent between production and appropriation. The main mech-
anism in his model is that, under a new trade theory framework, trade changes the composition of
domestic varieties relative to total varieties. Hence, overall product variety becomes less sensitive to
domestic manufacturing activity. The preopenness institutions determine whether trade enhances
or hinders domestic institutions.
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nature of ex-post negotiations between parties are independent of the ownership structure
decision at period zero” Antras (Forthcoming). As a result, the holdup problem persists
even with vertical integration. Accordingly, the results of the present paper are qualitatively
robust and invariant to different ownership structures. The Melitz model is augmented with
a modified version of the partially imperfect contracts framework of Acemoglu et al. (2007),
and the general equilibrium is accordingly solved.
The world economy consists of two symmetric countries except for contracting institu-
tional quality, and two sectors. The first sector produces homogenous goods under perfect
competition and complete contracts. The other sector produces differentiated products
under monopolistic competition and subject to incomplete contracts. The specification
of firms’ entry, exit, and export in the differentiated products sector is similar to Melitz
(2003)’s model.
Institutional quality in this setting will be a source of comparative advantage in the open
economy. In particular, institutional frictions impact the share of intra-industry trade in a
manner consistent with comparative advantage and factor proportion theories. A country
with superior contacting institutions exports differentiated products on net and imports
homogenous goods. In addition, economic welfare and gains from trade are increasing in
domestic institutional quality.6
How do firms’ preferences over institutions evolve in response to trade liberalization?
Consequently how does trade liberalization facilitate institutional reforms or hinder them?
Institutional reforms redistribute resources across firms, and as a result, firms’ profits also
change in response to changes in institutional quality. Specifically, on the one hand, advanc-
ing contracting institutions proportionately improves all domestic firms’ productivity. Firms
charge lower prices and generate more revenues and profits. On the other hand, as domestic
institutions improve, the domestic market becomes more competitive, reducing firms’ prof-
its from selling in the domestic market. The latter effect outweighs the former, resulting in
6These results are remarkably similar to those of Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) who study the
interaction between labor market frictions and international trade. Although the two studies deal
with different frictions and adopting completely different modeling approaches, both deliver very
similar results regarding the patterns of trade, gains of trade and country-interdependence.
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lower profits in the domestic market as domestic institutions improve. Nonetheless, profits
from exporting to the foreign market increase as domestic institutions improve since the
foreign market competitiveness does not increase with domestic institutional quality. To
satisfy the free entry condition, exporters’ aggregate profits in both markets (domestic and
foreign) increase as domestic institutions improve. Moreover, institutional reform induces
the least productive firms to exit the market and the most productive nonexporters to start
exporting.
Interestingly, the distribution of firm-preferences over institutional reforms depends on
country’s relative institutional quality. In a country with inferior institutions, both the
ratios of exporters to nonexporters and export sales to domestic sales are low relative to the
country with superior institutions. Consequently, the fraction of firms that support/oppose
institutional reforms varies across countries. Overall, for a given level of trade openness, the
opposition to reforms is much more intensified in a country with inferior institutions, and
the fraction of firms that support reforms is small and weak compared with a country with
superior institutions. In other words, countries with weak institutions are more susceptible
to the political pressures from the domestic losers from institutional reforms. The analysis
is consistent with many papers in this vein. For instance, Segura-Cayuela (2006) proposes
a model of trade and inefficient institutions in which trade liberalization in economies with
weak institutions might lead to worse economic policies and institutions.7
Lower trade costs not only impact the relative power of exporters and nonexporters,
but also magnify the distributional consequences of domestic institutional reforms. To see
this, as trade costs fall, the ex-ante expected profits significantly increase in institutional
7Inefficient institutions refer to the ability of the elite (autocrats) to expropriate from the
nonelite. Trade openness reduces the distortionary effects of expropriating institutions on elite-
owned sector’s profits by making the elite sectors rely less on nonelite sectors, thus increasing the
elite’s ability to extract. A similar argument is made by Bourguignon and Verdier (2005). In their
model, physical and human capital are complements. In the societies initially dominated by the
oligarchic capitalist elite and incomplete financial markets, trade liberalization might act as dis-
incentive for investment in human capital (less education subsidy), consolidating less democratic
institutions and less egalitarian economy. Stefanadis (2010) provides a theoretical model where
international trade leads to institutional deterioration in predator-friendly economies, whereas in
producer-friendly economies, trade improves institutions. Acemoglu et al. (2005) argue that the
Atlantic trade between 1500 and 1850 had improved institutions in countries with initially advanced
institutions. In a different vein, Franzese and Mosher (2002) argue that trade strengthens domestic
institutions (networks) regardless of their efficiency.
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quality (since exporting is more profitable), leading more firms to enter the market. That
is, for low trade costs, as domestic institutional quality improves, the greater the profit loss
in the domestic market and the larger the exporting profits. In fact, in the closed economy,
firms’ profits are invariant to domestic institutional qualityincrease in firm’s productivity is
completely offset by the increase of the domestic market competitiveness. In effect, firms are
expecting to engage more in political activities tailored to influence the domestic institutions
as trade costs decrease.
To demonstrate the impact of lowering trade costs on the domestic contracting insti-
tutions, the “Protection for sale” lobbying framework of Grossman and Helpman (1994)
is employed to endogenize contracting institutions. There are two lobbyist groups in the
economy: a subset of nonexporters and a subset of exporters. Each group proposes a menu
of offers that relates prospective monetary contribution to the level of contracting institu-
tions to maximize the group’s joint economic welfare. The incumbent government takes the
offers as given and chooses domestic institutional quality to maximize a weighted sum of
aggregate social welfare and total contribution.
The take-home message is summarized in Figure 3.1. In this example, only nonexporters
Figure 3.1: Impact of Trade on the Political Equilibrium of Institutional Quality
are assumed to lobby (see Section 3.6 for more details on the political economy model and
the parameters used to produce the figure). Given that the losers from institutional reforms
dominate the political economy in the country, the endogenous contracting institutional
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qualities that emerge as the solution to the political economy decrease as the economy
becomes more and more open. In this scenario, trade liberalization worsens contracting
institutions in the country.
The example underscores the importance of the political economy mechanism and the
distribution of the political power in the economy in determining the impact of trade lib-
eralization on the domestic institutions, a feature that is shared with many papers in this
subject. For instance, in Stefanadis (2010), a crucial determinant of the effect of trade
openness on institutions and the distribution of talent is the political economy setting of
a country. Whether the politically dominant group in the economy is the producer or the
predator determines how domestic institutions respond to trade openness. In contrast to
the related literature and consistent with the recent trade models with heterogeneous firms,
the emphasis in the current paper is on firms’ responses to institutional reforms.
An interesting feature of the model is its implication of country interdependence. First,
an improvement in a country’s own institutions enhances its welfare but hinders its trade
partner’s welfare, all else equal. This intriguing result emanates from the fall in trade part-
ner’s competitiveness as domestic institutions advance, which outweighs the effect of term
of trade improvement. The result contradicts the impact of unilateral trade liberalization
where lowering import tariff unilaterally increases the partner’s economic welfare but hurts
the domestic economic welfare because of what is known in the literature as the home mar-
ket effect.8 Second, its is shown that the endogenous contracting institutions that emerge as
the equilibrium solution to the political economy game, for any given level of trade openness,
are increasing with the trade partner’s institutional quality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides the theoretical model
of trade and contracting institutions. Section 3.3 studies the interaction between trade im-
pediments and contractual frictions in shaping patterns of trade and the gains from trade,
and the differential impacts of trade liberalization on countries with different institutional
settings. Distributive consequences of institutional reforms and firm-preferences over insti-
8See, for example, Krugman (1980); Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Recently, Demidova and
Rodriguez-Clare (2013) demonstrate that the home market effect disappears when dispensing with
the outside sector.
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tutions in the open economy are the subject of Section 3.4. Section 3.5 provides a numerical
example and conducts comparative statics analysis. Section 3.6 presents the political econ-
omy framework. Section 3.7 concludes. Detailed derivations and proofs can be found in the
Appendix.
3.2 The Model
The interaction between contracting institutions and trade impediments is studied through
a two-sector two-country model of international trade in which one sector produces a per-
fectly competitive homogenous products under perfect contracts and the other produces
differentiated products subject to partially imperfect contracts. Countries (H and F in-
dexed by i, j) are identical except for contractual friction. Each country is populated by a
unit measure of consumers/workers (or, simply, a representative consumer). Labor the only
factor of production is available in inelastic supply L. That is, the representative consumer
is endowed with L units of labor, which she supplies inelastically.
In the differentiated products sector, the specification of firm exit, entry, and export is
similar to that of Melitz (2003). A firm needs to pay a sunk entry cost fE units of labor to
learn its productivity ϕ drawn from a known cumulative distribution G(ϕ). In addition, a
firm incurs a fixed production cost f units of labor. Exporters are subject to a fixed export
cost fx units of labor, and shipping goods across boarders is subject to iceberg transport
cost. In order for one unit of a variety to arrive in country j, a firm in country i has to ship
τji > 1 units of its variety.
9 A firm decides to produce (export) if domestic (export) sales
are large enough to cover fixed production (export) cost.
3.2.1 Note on Contracting Institutions
Contracting institutions are modeled with the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights ap-
proach, which was adopted by Acemoglu et al. (2007). In particular, each monopolist in
9In what follows, the first subscript refers to the destination country and the second subscript
denotes the source country. Conveniently, τii is normalized to 1.
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the differentiated products sector with a unique productivity draw ϕ uses a CES composite
of N intermediate inputs to produce the final differentiated good. Similar to Acemoglu et
al. (2007), each intermediate input is produced by a perfectly competitive firm/supplier. A
supplier needs to undertake relationship-specific investments in a unit measure of symmetric
activities with constant marginal cost c units of labor to produce the intermediate input. A
fraction of these activities µ ∈ [0, 1] is verifiable and thus contractable ex-ante. The remain-
ing activities 1 − µ are nonverifiable and hence noncontractable ex-ante. µ is the measure
of contracting institutional quality that varies across countries. The quality of intermediate
input produced and the final good producer’s profits depend on the relationship-specific
investments made by the supplier.
As a result, a final good producer designs a contract stipulating an investment level in
contractable activities and an upfront payment (can be positive or negative) but does not
specify the investment levels in the remaining activities. Suppliers choose their investment
levels in noncontractable activities in anticipation of ex-post distribution in revenue (de-
termined by Shapley value as the solution to multilateral bargaining) and may decide to
withhold their service in these activities from the firm.
The equilibrium solution is found by characterizing the symmetric Subgame Perfect
Nash Equilibrium (SSPE). As is well known, a holdup problem emerges, and there will be
underinvestment in noncontractable and contractable activities. After solving the SSPE, the
firm’s profit function is similar to the standard profit function in Melitz (2003). Institutional
friction reduces proportionately gross variable profits in both domestic and foreign markets.
That is, a change in institutions is similar to a proportional change in the productivity of the
country’s firms. In a simple two-sector framework where, by assumption, one sector is not
subject to institutional friction, contracting institutions can be simply modeled by scaling up
a firm’s draw in the differentiated products sector by a constant that represents a country’s
institutional quality, i.e., country-specific productivity that is common to all domestic firms.
However, in a more realistic setup where all sectors in a country are subject to the same
institutional quality, the approach of modeling contracting institutions adopted in this paper
is crucial to determine a country’s comparative advantage sectors. In particular, a superior
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institutional quality country will have comparative advantage in institution-intensive sectors
(in other words, sectors where contracting institutions are very important). The elasticity
of substitution between intermediate inputs determines the importance of institutions in
each sector in our framework. For instance, a sector with high elasticity of substitution
between inputs (high α < 1 see below) is not severely affected by contractual frictions.
3.2.1.1 Intermediate Input Production and Contract Design
The economy is endowed with a large number of perfectly competitive suppliers with zero
outside option. The production of X(j) requires a unit measure of relationship-specific
investment in activity i, x(i, j) ∀j ∈ [0, N ], with constant marginal cost cx. The production
function of intermediate inputs is Cobb-Douglas and symmetric in the activities.
X(j) = exp
(ˆ 1
0
lnx(i, j)di
)
. (3.1)
Contracts are incomplete: A fraction µ < 1 is ex-ante contractable, whereas 1 − µ of the
relationship-specific activity is noncontractable. The timing of the events is as follows (see
Acemoglu et al., 2007, p. 922):
• A firm (final good producer)10 pays fE and discovers its productivity ϕ.
• The ϕ-firm offers a contract [[xc(i, j)]µi=0, d(j)] for every intermediate input j ∈ N ,
where xc(i, j) is an investment level in the contractable activity and d(j) is the upfront
payment.
• Potential suppliers decide whether to apply for the contracts. Then the firm chooses
N suppliers, one for each intermediate input j.11
• All suppliers j ∈ N simultaneously choose investment level x(i, j). In the contractable
activities i ∈ [0, µ], they are bound by the specified amounts in the contract: x(i, j) =
10I refer to final good producers as firms and intermediate input producers as suppliers.
11One might be tempted to think that a supplier might refuse to apply to a firm with low
productivity and prefer to wait for a better match. This is not the case under this framework,
however. As shown in the Appendix, firms are undifferentiated in the eyes of suppliers since every
surviving firm designs an optimal contract that leaves all suppliers with zero quasi-rent.
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xc(i, j) for i ∈ [0, µ]∀j.
• The suppliers and the firm bargain over the division of revenue. Suppliers can with-
hold their services in noncontractable activities at this stage.
• A firm decides whether to exit, or to sell to the domestic market or to both markets.
Revenue is distributed according to the bargaining agreement.
The along-the-equilibrium path behavior in the SSPE can be presented as {x˜c, x˜n, d˜} such
that for every j ∈ [0, N ] the upfront payment d(j) = d˜, and the investment levels are
x(i, j) = x˜x for i ∈ [0, µ] and x(i, j) = x˜n for i ∈ (µ, 1]. The SSPE is characterized by back-
ward induction. In particular, for every final good producer and for the given production
technology and demand (see below), a final producer revenue function will be a function
of xc and xn, R(xc, xn, .). This revenue is distributed among the suppliers and the firm
according to Shapley values. As a result, a firm maximizes its Shapley value net of variable
costs subject to the suppliers’ participation constraints and the incentive compatibility con-
straints (Acemoglu et al., 2007, p. 922). The formal treatment of contracting institutions
and the solution concepts are relegated to the Appendix.
3.2.2 Preferences and Demand
Consumers’ preferences between the homogenous product, q0, and the real consumption
index of differentiated product, Q, are represented by the quasi-linear utility function,12
U = q0 +
1
η
Qη, (3.2)
Q =
[ˆ
ω∈Ω
q(ω)β
] 1
β
, 0 < η < β < 1, (3.3)
where q(ω) denotes the consumption of variety ω, and Ω is the set of varieties available for
consumption. β controls the elasticity of substitution between varieties. The restriction
η < β ensures that varieties are better substitutes for each other than for the outside sector
q0. In what follows, I assume that income is large enough such that the consumption of q0
12This quasi-linear utility function is taken from Helpman and Itskhoki (2010).
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is always positive. The price of q0 in both countries is normalized to one. The numeraire
is produced under perfectly competitive conditions with constant return to scale in both
countries and is freely traded; hence, wages (wi) in both countries are pinned down by the
numeraire sector.
It is easy to verify that economic welfare is directly linked to Q. If total expenditure in
the economy is constant (which it is since labor supply size (L) and wages are constant, and
aggregate profits net of sunk entry cost equal zero), higher Q is manifested in higher welfare.
The above-mentioned utility function implies that a consumer with spending E = wL
chooses Q = P−1/(1−η) and q0 = E − P.Q > 0. Here, P =
[´
ω∈Ω p(ω)
1−ε] 11−ε is the
aggregate price index in the differentiated goods sector, ε = 11−β denotes the elasticity of
substitution between varieties, and p(ω) is the price of variety ω ∈ Ω. The demand for
variety ω is standard and given by
qd(ω) = Q
−β−η
1−β p(ω)
− 1
1−β (3.4)
Therefore, the indirect utility V is given by13
V = E +
1− η
η
Qη. (3.5)
3.2.3 Production and Market Structure
Homogenous sector. Linear production technology in labor: one unit of labor is required
to produce one unit of the homogenous product. L0: q0 = L0. Since the environment is one
of incomplete specialization and zero trade cost in the homogenous sector, the wage wi = 1.
Differentiated sector. Since the productivity draw ϕ is firm specific and each firm pro-
duces one unique variety ω, firms are with ϕ instead of ω. The final good production is
given by
q(ϕ) = ϕN1−
1
α
[ˆ N
0
X(j)αdj
] 1
α
, (3.6)
13Notice that total expenditure in the differentiated products sector PQ = Qη = P−
η
1−η .
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N ∈ R+ is the number of intermediates (exogenous and nontraded), X(j) denotes the
demand for intermediate j, and α controls the elasticity of substitution between intermedi-
ates.14
A country i firm’s revenue function can be written as follows15
Ri = q(ϕ)
β
[
Q
−β−η
1−β
i + 1ji(ϕ)τ
−β
1−βQ
−β−η
1−β
j
]1−β
. (3.7)
The indicator variable 1ji(ϕ) equals one if the firm exports and zero otherwise. In the
Appendix, I show that the SSPE of contracts design under incomplete contracts yields to
the following reduced-form profit function for a firm:
pii(ϕ) = piii(ϕ) + 1ji(Θ)piji(ϕ), total profit=domestic +export (3.8)
piii(ϕ) = (1− β)ΘZ(µi)Q
−(β−η)
1−β
i − f, domestic profit (3.9)
piji(ϕ) = (1− β)ΘZ(µi)τ
−β
1−β
ji Q
−(β−η)
1−β
j − fx, export profit (3.10)
Z(., µ) ≡ β βµ1−β (α(1− γ))
β(1−µ)
1−β
[
1−α(1−µ)(1−γ)
1−β(1−µ)
] 1−β(1−µ)
1−β
c
−β
1−β
x ,Θ ≡ ϕ
β
1−β , and γ ≡ αα+β .
Lemma III.1. Z(., µ) denoting a measure of “derived efficiency” is increasing in µ
At this point, the firm’s profit function in the current framework model is very similar to
the Melitz (2003) model where the first term in domestic and export profit functions repre-
sents variable profits in the domestic and the foreign markets, respectively. An improvement
in institutional quality in country i leads to proportional increase in the productivity of all
country i’s firms. Under a complete contracts environment (µ = 1), the model is isomorphic
14All results derived below hold when N is normalized to one, i.e., one input instead of many
intermediate inputs. In fact, N has no effect on firm’s profits, zero profit cutoff, exporting cutoff,
and aggregate variables. Nevertheless, I choose to present the production function as in (3.6) for
the sake of generality.
15To see this, the price charged by country i firm in country j pji(ϕ) = τpii(ϕ), where pii(ϕ)
denotes the domestic firm price in the domestic market. Total revenue R is given by piiq
d
ii + pjiq
d
ji,
qdii is the domestic demand given by (3.4), and q
d
ji = τQ
− β−η1−β
j pji(ϕ)
−1
1−β is the total amount shipped
by a country i exporter to country j. Then,
qji
qii
= τ
−β
1−β
[
Qj
Qi
]− β−η1−β
. Use this with q(ϕ) = qii + qji to
obtain the revenue function.
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to Melitz (2003) with Z = β
β
1−β c
−β
1−β
x .16 The profit functions (3.8), (3.9), and (3.10) imply
that a firm chooses not to exit the domestic market and sell a positive amount of its variety
if and only if piii(Θ) ≥ 0. Similarly, a firm will export if and only if piji ≥ 0 (1ji(Θ) = 1
for Θ ∈ {Θ ∈ R++ : piji(Θ) ≥ 0} and zero otherwise). Indeed, both domestic and export
profit functions are continuous and increasing in Θ; therefore, the zero profit cutoff (ZPC)
and the export cutoff are given by;
piii(Θii) = 0 : → Θii = 1
1− β
f
Z(µi)
Q
β−η
1−β
i (3.11)
piji(Θji) = 0 : → Θji = 1
1− β
fx
Z(µi)
τ
β
1−βQ
β−η
1−β
j (3.12)
As it is standard, Θji > Θii > Θmin, where Θmin is the lowest productivity level in the
support of the distribution G(Θ). This order of cutoffs ensures that the most productive
firms export, firms with medium productivity only serve the domestic market, and the least
productive firms exit.17
3.2.3.1 Equilibrium
The industry equilibrium in the long run can be characterized by the above-mentioned
cutoffs and the free entry condition. In equilibrium, free entry drives a firm’s ex-ante
expected profits net of sunk entry cost to zero.
ˆ +∞
Θii
piii(Θ)dG(Θ) +
ˆ +∞
Θji
piji(Θ)dG(Θ) = f
E . (3.13)
16Notice that variable profit vpi = (1 − β)Z(µi)Q
−(β−η)
1−β
i , as in the standard monopolis-
tic competition models with CES preferences, is proportional to a firm’s revenue; vpi = (1 −
β)
[
1−α(1−µ)(1−γ)
1−β(1−µ)
]
R(Q,Z). When µ = 1 (i.e., complete contracts), the model collapses to the
standard Melitz model with vpi = (1− β)R.
17Notice that in the case of symmetric countries, Θji > Θii if fx > τ
−β
1−β f . In the current model,
imposing fx > f is sufficient to guarantee that Θji > Θii. The second inequality is true whenever the
ZPC in the closed economy is greater than Θmin, which necessitates
´∞
Θii
ΘdG(Θ) > Θmin(1+f
E/f).
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Equivalently, the free entry condition can be be expressed by
f
ˆ +∞
Θii
(
Θ
Θii
− 1
)
dG(Θ) + fx
ˆ +∞
Θji
(
Θ
Θji
− 1
)
dG(Θ) = fE for i j ∈ {H,F} (3.14)
There are two free entry equations (one for each country) and four cutoffs {ΘHH ,ΘFF ,ΘFH ,ΘHF }.
Using ZPC (3.11), I can express Θji in term of Θjj . Specifically,
Θji
Θjj
=
fxτ
β
1−β
f
Z(µj)
Z(µi)
. (3.15)
Then, the four cutoffs (as a function of exogenous variables) are uniquely pinned down
by (3.14) and (3.15). It is easily verified that the equilibrium, which is characterized by
{ΘHH ,ΘFF ,ΘFH ,ΘHF }, exists and is unique. Interestingly, the cutoffs do not depend on
the levels of institutional quality, but only on its ratio. The equilibrium real consumption
index Qi, then, is derived from the ZPC.
18
3.3 Contracting Institutions, Trade Barriers,
Trade Patterns and Welfare
In this section, I study the impact of differences in institutional quality on trade partners.
Specifically, the interaction between institutional quality and trade impediments shapes
patterns of trade and welfare gains from trade are examined. This is an important ques-
tion because it enhances our comprehension of trade policy differences across countries.
The same trade policy might have different distributional consequences and welfare gains
(losses) when applied to countries with different political and economic institutions, legal
18Notice that in autarky, the free entry condition is given by;
f
ˆ +∞
Θii
(
Θ
Θii
− 1
)
dG(Θ) = fE .
Hence, Θautarkyii is not a function of contracting institutions. Notice the similarity between the
current model and Helpman and Itskhoki (2010). In their model, labor market friction (Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides-type friction) reduces productivity of all firms in the country and the cutoffs
depend on labor market friction only in the open economy.
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institutions, judiciary systems, and contracting institutions. The aim is to have a simple
framework that is capable of delivering testable and intuitive predictions about the patterns
of trade, the gains from trade, and the distributional consequences for simultaneous changes
in both trade impediments and institutional quality. The vast majority of the extant lit-
erature on trade policy does not account for the differentiated impact of changing trade
barriers on countries with different institutional frictions assuming exogenous institutions
with a vague role in the economy. Likewise, the literature that deals with institutions in
the global economy rules out endogenous trade policy.
The current framework is simple yet sophisticated enough to address questions such
as the following: How does institutional reform in one country affect its trade partner?
Does trade liberalization affect countries with different legal institutions differently? Are
countries with similar institutions more likely to engage in free trade? To this end, I derive
the impact of simultaneous changes in both trade barriers and institutional quality on zero-
profit cutoffs and exporting cutoffs. By totally differentiating Equations (3.14) and (3.15),
the following is obtained
Θ̂i =
δji
∆
[
(δij + δjj)
(
Ẑ(µi)− Ẑ(µj)
)
− β
1− β (δjj − δij) τˆ
]
, (3.16)
Θ̂ji =
δii
∆
[
− (δij + δjj)
(
Ẑ(µi)− Ẑ(µj)
)
+
β
1− β (δjj − δij) τˆ
]
, (3.17)
here, δii ≡ fΘii
´ +∞
Θii
ΘdG(Θ), δji ≡ fxΘji
´ +∞
Θji
ΘdG(Θ), ∆ ≡ (δiiδjj − δjiδij), and xˆ stands for
∂x
x
The average variable profits conditional on successful entry in the domestic market i
and in the foreign market j are given by δii and δji, respectively.
19 To assess the impact of
changes in contracting institutions and trade impediments on the real consumption index
Qi and hence economic welfare, the ZPC Equation (3.11) and Equation (3.16) are used to
19It can be shown that the average sales per entering firm in the domestic and the foreign markets
are given by; δii/(1− β)φ and δji/(1− β)φ, where φ ≡
[
1−α(1−µ)(1−γ)
1−β(1−µ)
]
.
89
obtain the following:
β − η
1− β Qˆi =
1
∆
[
δjj (δii + δji) Ẑ(µi)− δji (δij + δjj) Ẑ(µj)− β
1− β δji (δjj − δij) τˆ
]
. (3.18)
Before proceeding further, a couple of useful and technical lemmas are introduced to facil-
itate the analysis of the impact of contracting institutions and trade impediments in the
global economy.
Lemma III.2. if µH > µF , then ΘH > ΘF and ΘFH < ΘHF .
Lemma III.3. Let µH > µF . Then QH > QF .
Lemma III.2 states that in the country with better institutions, exporting requires
lower productivity relative to the country with bad institutions. Nonetheless, surviving the
domestic market in the country with better institutions is much harder than in the country
with inferior institutions. The intuition is, since the ex-ante expected profit from exporting
is higher in the country with good institutions, the ex-ante domestic expected profit in
the country with better institutional quality has to be lower than the inferior institutions
country to satisfy the free entry condition. Lemma III.3 points out that countries with better
institutions enjoy a higher real consumption index and thus a higher economic welfare.
Lemma III.4. Trade liberalization (lower τ) increases the zero profit cutoff in both coun-
tries and decreases export cutoff in both countries.
Lemma III.4 states that the effect of trade liberalization in the current model is equiv-
alent to the standard Melitz model. That is, trade liberalization induces interfirm resource
reallocation with more resources devoted to more productive firms. The next lemma is a
technical one that corresponds to the assumption of incomplete specialization.
Lemma III.5. In equilibrium with incomplete specialization, expected domestic variable
profits per entering firm are larger than expected export variable profits per entering firms
in both countries: δii > δji for i j ∈ {H,F}. Furthermore, if µH > µF , then δHH < δFF
and δFH > δFH .
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Lemma III.5 is a product of the assumption of incomplete specialization. The lemma is
crucial to the paper’s results derived below. The next proposition summarizes the impact
of institutional quality on the pattern of trades.
Proposition III.1. Let µH > µF . Then, country H exports differentiated products on net
and imports homogenous goods. Moreover, the share of intraindustry trade is decreasing in
Z(µH)
Z(µF )
.
As documented by Levchenko (2007) and Nunn (2007), institutions are a source of
comparative advantage. However, institutions in the current framework affect the share of
intraindustry trade.20
Proposition III.2. An improvement in contracting institutions in country H enhances
country H’s economic welfare and harms its trade partner’s economic welfare. Nonetheless,
a simultaneous proportional improvement in institutions in both countries increases welfare
in both countries.
In contrast to Levchenko (2007) and, broadly, pure comparative advantage models where
shocks transmit across countries through fluctuations in terms of trade, the decrease in
competitiveness in the trade partner as a result of domestic institutional improvements
hinders foreign (trade partner) firms’ entrance and hence severely reduces domestically
produced varieties in the foreign market. The increase of import varieties and improvement
in terms of trade in the foreign country is outweighed by the reduction in competitiveness
and therefore economic welfare falls. This result might be overturned once the outside
sector assumption is dispensed such that reforms in one country might be welfare-enhancing
in both countries. This, in fact, resonates with the analysis of home market effects and
unilateral trade liberalization.
Proposition III.3. Both countries gain from trade. However, the welfare in the country
with better institutions rises proportionately more.
20In Levchenko (2007), firms operate under perfect competition, and countries completely spe-
cialize according to comparative advantage; hence, intraindustry trade is absent in his model.
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Proposition III.3 is interesting for two reasons. First, in contrast to a pure compara-
tive advantage model with institutional distortions, gains from trade are assured for both
countries.21 Second, it is consistent with the discussion regarding the impact of domestic
institutions on the gains from trade openness: countries with better domestic institutions
can potentially benefit more from trade openness Rodrik (2008).
Overall, the results in this section resonate with those of Helpman and Itskhoki (2010),
with contractual frictions replacing labor market rigidities in their model.
3.4 Firm-Preferences over Institutions in the
Global Economy
The model thus far provides enough structure and insight to infer firm-preferences over
institutions. I will extensively use the impact of change in institutions on zero profit cutoff,
export cutoff, and real consumption expenditure to infer firm-preferences over institutions
in the open economy.
3.4.1 Domestic Institutions reforms
First, I the effects of changes in domestic institutions on firm’s domestic and export profits
are analyzed (trade partner’s institutions and trade costs are held constant τˆ = Ẑ(µj) = 0).
By using Equations (3.16) and (3.18), it is direct to show that the change in the variable
domestic profits vii(Θ) = piii(Θ)− f is
v̂ii(Θ) = −β − η
1− β Qˆi + Ẑ(µi)
= Ẑ(µh)
[
1− δjj(δii + δji)
∆
]
=

< 0 if Zˆ > 0
> 0 if Zˆ < 0
(3.19)
21For example, Levchenko (2007) shows that the South (the country with inferior institutions)
might lose from trade, whereas the North’s gains are guaranteed. In a broader sense, Helpman and
Krugman (1987) argue that gains from trade might not materialize in economies with nonconvexities
and distortions.
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Ceteris paribus, advancing contracting institutions in country i, lowers variable profits in
domestic markets for all firms. The intuition is that gains in profits resulting from higher
derived efficiency (higher Z(µi)) is more than offset by losses from increased competition
(higher Q). Similarly, the proportional change in export variable profits in response to
domestic institutional change, all else constant, is given by
v̂ji(Θ) = −β − η
1− β Qˆj + Ẑ(µj)
= Ẑ(µi)
[
1 +
δij(δji + δii)
∆
]
=

> 0 if Zˆ > 0
< 0 if Zˆ < 0.
(3.20)
In contrast to variable profits in the domestic market, export variable profits are increasing
in domestic institutional quality. In fact, this can be seen from Proposition III.2, which
states that improvement in domestic institutions harms the trade partner, i.e., lower Qj .
Export profits increase not only because firm’s productivity has increased, but also because
the foreign market is more profitable.
To completely characterize the impact of institutional reforms on firms’ profitability,
firms are divided into three groups: (i) nonexporters who remain nonexporters or exit the
market post reforms; (ii) nonexporters who become exporters in response to institutional
reforms, and (iii) exporters who continue to export. The impact of institutions change on
firms belonging to group 1 is immediately inferred from (3.19): nonexporters’ profits decline
(increase) as domestic contracting institutions improve (deteriorate). In other words, non-
exporters who anticipate to continue being nonexporters will oppose institutional reforms.
Firms in groups 2 and 3 preferences over institutional reforms are scrutinized.
Proposition III.4. Nonexporters who continue to be nonexporters post-reform, oppose
institutional reforms.
Assuming that firms are owned by consumers, the negative impact of institutional re-
forms on nonexporter’s income (profits) outweighs the increase in indirect utility due to
higher Q; as a result, indirect utility of this particular individual declines as institutions
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advance.
Firms in Group 2: nonexporters who become exporters in response to insti-
tutional reforms. From Equation (3.17), institutional reforms decrease the export cutoff;
hence, firms with ϕ ∈ [Θpostji ,Θpreji ] belong to group 2, where Θpostji represents export cutoff
under new institutional quality and Θpreji is the pre-reform export cutoff. In other words,
those are the firms who were induced to export by institutional reforms. Firms in this group
enjoy higher profits if profits generated from exporting outweigh profit lost in the domestic
market. Indeed, the marginal exporter under the new institutional arrangement is worse off
relative to pre-reform. But, then, the question is whether some nonexporters who become
exporters in response to institutional reforms benefit from these reforms. Overall, for any
initial institutional quality level, a productivity cutoff exists Θsupportji > Θ
post
ji such that all
firms with productivity above it enjoy higher profits when institutional quality improves.
Consequently, some firms in group 2 benefit from reforms if and only if Θsupportji < Θ
pre
ji .
Proposition III.5. Nonexporters who become exporters post-reforms i.e., firms with Θ ∈
[Θpostji ,Θ
pre
ji ] are divided between reform proponents and opponents . In particular, all firms
with Θ ∈ [Θpostji ,Θsupportji ] oppose reforms, whereas firms with Θ ∈ [Θsupportji ,Θpreji ] endorse
reforms.
Group 3: exporters-exporters. Firms who export pre and post reforms (i.e., firms
with productivity Θ > Θpreji ) will be affected by institutional reforms through changes in
both domestic and export profits. As shown above domestic profits decline for all firms,
whereas export profits increase for firms belonging to this group. The proportional change
in total variable profit for an exporter is given by
v̂(Θ) = v̂ii(Θ)
vii(Θ)
v(Θ)
+ v̂ji(Θ)
vji(Θ)
v(Θ)
(3.21)
Free entry condition (3.14), and Equation (3.19) guarantee that the change in an exporter’s
total variable profits (domestic and export) is positive in the case of institutional reforms.
Otherwise, the free entry condition will be violated. Therefore, exporters-exporters will
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always support institutional reforms since they enjoy higher gross and net profits.
Summary III.1. For any initial values of µH , µF , and τ , a productivity cutoff exists in
country i ∈ {H,F}, Θsupportji such that all firms with productivity above it experience an
increase in their profits as institutional quality improves, whereas the profits of all firms
with productivity below it decline.
3.4.2 Trade Liberalization
The distributional impact of trade policy (here modeled as different levels of τ) is similar
to the trade policy literature under the framework of new new trade policy. Most exporters
benefit from trade liberalization, whereas nonexporters lose. In this section, on the one
hand, I address the differentiated impacts of lowering trade barriers on countries with
different institutional environments. On the other hand, I analyze the distributional impact
of institutional reforms and thus firms’ preferences over these reforms under different levels
of trade openness.
3.4.2.1 Differentiated Impacts of Trade Liberalization
On the aggregate level, Proposition III.3 states that both countries gain from trade. The
gains from trade are not evenly distributed across trade partners, however. Countries with
relatively superior institutions gain more from trade.
Another interesting comparison is the distributions of winners and losers from lowering
trade barriers across countries with different institutions. As pointed out above, the fraction
of firms that export in a country with relatively worse institutions is less than the fraction
of exporters in a country with relatively better institutions. As a result, the fraction of
winners (losers) in country with relatively inferior institutions is lower (higher) than a
country with relatively superior institutions. An office-seeker politician who is concerned
about getting reelected is perhaps more susceptible to protectionists’ pressure in a country
with weak institutional quality and, importantly, places more political weight on anti-free
trade groups relative to a country with higher institutional quality.
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3.4.2.2 Distributive Consequences of Institutions and Trade Liberaliza-
tion
Institutional reforms redistribute income and reallocate resources across sectors and across
firms within sectors. In autarky, however, institutional reforms will only trigger sectoral
resource reallocation, whereas per firm’s profit is invariant to reforms. The intuition here is
that, in the long-run equilibrium, the impact of institutional reforms on a firm’s productivity
is completely offset by the change in real consumption index Q, leaving firm’s profits and
zero profit cutoff unchanged. To be precise, in the closed economy, institutional reforms
scale a firm’s productivity up. Firms, on average, are more productive and larger relative
to the pre-reforms. Ex-ante expected profits from entry decline, leading to fewer mass of
potential entrants. The impact of more productive firms on the real consumption index is
mitigated by less entrants, slightly increasing the real consumption index.
In the open economy, the story becomes more interesting since institutional reforms trig-
ger both inter and intraindustry resource reallocation. As shown above, in the differentiated
goods sector, exporters’ sales, employment, size, and profits increase, whereas nonexporters
shrink in response to institutional reforms. The main issue here, however, is investigating
the impact of trade liberalization (lower trade barriers τ) on the magnitude of the distribu-
tional effects of institutional reforms. By addressing this issue, the hope is to understand
how firms’ preferences evolve during episodes of trade liberalization and thus the likelihood
of institutional reforms in response to trade liberalization. The change in nonexorters’ vari-
able profits in response to institutional reforms in the home country is given by (3.19).
The magnitude of the change in nonexporters’ profits is determined by
[
1− δjj(δii+δji)∆
]
.
Similarly the term
[
1 +
δjj(δii+δji)
∆
]
determines the magnitude of the change of exporters’
profits in response to institutional change. The next proposition summarizes the impact of
lowering trade costs on the distributional effects of domestic institutions.
Proposition III.6. The distributional effect of institutional reforms is magnified as trade
costs decrease. Nonexporters’ variable profits more proportionately decrease in the more
open economy relative to the less open economy as institutional quality improves. By con-
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trast, exporters’ aggregate profits more proportionately rise in the more open economy rela-
tive to the less open economy as institutional quality improves.
Intuitively, for low trade costs, improvement in domestic institutions not only makes
domestic firms more productive, but also increases the ex-ante expected profits (since ex-
porting is more profitable now), inducing more firms to pay the sunk entry cost. The
domestic market becomes very competitive (larger number of firms and more productive
firms) severely inflicting nonexporters’ profits. Conversely, for export profits, the comple-
mentarity between institutional quality and lower trade costs makes exporting much more
profitable, increasing exporters’ aggregate profits.
3.4.3 Country Interdependence: Reforms in Trade Partner
Institutions
One of the most intriguing results in the paper is in fact related to the impact of institu-
tional reforms on trade partner’s economic welfare (recall Proposition III.2). That is, an
improvement in own institutions raises own economic welfare but harms the trade partner’s
economic welfare. Consequently, institutional reforms in country j would have distribu-
tional effects on country i firms. To see this, notice that the proportional change in country
i’s domestic variable profits as country j’s institutional quality changes is (all else equal)
v̂ii(Θ) = Ẑ(µj)
δji(δij + δjj)
∆
=

> 0 if Zˆ > 0
< 0 if Zˆ < 0.
(3.22)
The change of country i’s exporters variable profits is given by
v̂ji(Θ) = −Ẑ(µj)δii(δjj + δij)
∆
=

< 0 if Zˆ > 0
> 0 if Zˆ < 0.
(3.23)
Moreover, to satisfy the free entry condition in country i, country i exporters’ aggregate
profits fall in response to institutional reforms in country j. Clearly, the qualitative effect of
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country j’s institutional reforms on country i firms is the opposite of the impact of country
i’s institutional reforms on country i firms.
3.5 Pareto Distribution: Numerical Example
For the numerical illustration of the main mechanisms of the model and for the purpose of
conducting comparative static analysis, a Pareto distribution assumption of productivity
draws is used:
G(Θ) = 1−
(
Θmin
Θ
)κ
, for Θ > Θmin andκ > 2.
The shape parameter κ controls the dispersion of the random variable Θ, with higher values
of κ representing less dispersion. The numerical restriction that κ is greater than two ensures
finite variance of the productivity distribution. To ease notation, Θmin is normalized to 1.
As is well known, the Pareto distribution is not only analytically convenient, but also
approximates the right tale of the empirical distribution of firm’s size reasonably well. By
providing a functional form of productivity draws, the model’s main predictions can be
confirmed and, importantly, a comparative static analysis can be conducted to compare the
distributional consequences of institutional reforms across different levels of trade openness
and across different initial institutional qualities in both countries. The solution to the
model under Pareto distribution yields to the following zero-profits cutoffs, export cutoffs,
and real consumption indexes:
Θii =
(
f
(κ− 1)fE
) 1
κ
1−
(
Z(µi)
Z(µj)
)κ
τ
−κβ
1−β
(
fx
f
)−κ+1
1− τ −2κβ1−β
(
fx
f
)2(−κ+1)

−1
κ
i, j ∈ {H,F}
Θji = τ
β
1−β Z(µj)
Z(µi)
(
f
(κ− 1)fE
) 1
κ fx
f
1−
(
Z(µj)
Z(µi)
)κ
τ
−κβ
1−β
(
fx
f
)−κ+1
1− τ −2κβ1−β
(
fx
f
)2(−κ+1)

−1
κ
i, j ∈ {H,F}
Q
β−η
1−β
i = (1− β)f
1−κ
κ Z(µi)
(
(κ− 1)fE)−1κ
1−
(
Z(µi)
Z(µj)
)κ
τ
−κβ
1−β
(
fx
f
)−κ+1
1− τ −2κβ1−β
(
fx
f
)2(−κ+1)

−1
κ
i, j ∈ {H,F}
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The number of potential entrants in country i ∈ {H,F} is given by:
Mi = (1− β)φiκ− 1
κ
fΘ−κjj Q
η
i − fxΘ−κij Qηj
f2Θ−κii Θ
−κ
jj − f2xΘ−κij Θ−κji
i, j ∈ {H,F} (3.24)
φi ≡
[
1− α(1− µi)(1− γ)
1− β(1− µi)
]
i ∈ {H,F}
Parameter Restrictions: Empirically, (i) the most productive firms export, whereas
medium productive firms only serve the domestic market, and (ii) the least productive firms
exit the market as trade barriers decline. To ensure that these empirical regularities in the
current model the following is required: Θii < Θji and Θii > 1. In equilibrium, Θji > Θii
if the model’s parameters satisfy the following inequality:
f
f + fx
(
τ
β
1−β fx
f
)κ
+
fx
f + fx
(
τ
β
1−β fx
f
)−κ
> max
{
Z(µi)
Z(µj)
,
Z(µj)
Z(µi)
}
The conditions on the model’s parameters for empirical regularity Θii > 1 to hold in equi-
librium are limτ→∞Θii(τ) =
(
f
(κ−1)fE
) 1
κ
> 1, which is true if κ < 1 + f
fE
. Finally, the
environment is one of the incomplete specializations if and only if Mi > 0 i ∈ {H,F}.
Therefore, the conditions on the parameters for incomplete specialization can be written as
follows:
fΘ−κjj Q
η
i > fxΘ
−κ
ij Q
η
j
Notice that the condition should be checked only for the country with relatively low insti-
tutional quality (F is the country with relatively low institutional quality). That is:
(
ΘFH
ΘHH
)κ(QF
QH
)η
>
fx
f
Figure 3.2 shows the minimum values of trade costs τ given different values of relative
institutional quality between country H and country F measured by the ratio of derived
efficiency between the two countries for incomplete specialization to hold in the equilibrium
(MF > 0). The value of µH is set to one, where µF ∈ [0, 1]. In ( Z(1)Z(µF ) , τ) space, the
complete specialization schedule (MF = 0) is represented by the upward sloping line: that
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is, given µH = 1, for any µF∗, ∃ τ∗ such that for any τ > τ∗ the number of potential
entrants is strictly positive in both countries. The complete specialization set is given by
{( Z(1)Z(µF∗) , τ∗) : τ ≤ τ∗,MF = 0}. Intuitively, τ∗ is increasing in
Z(1)
Z(µF )
, i.e., decreasing in µF .
As we can see in the Figure, the condition of incomplete specialization is relatively easy to
satisfy: for relatively similar countries, almost any value of τ > 1 satisfies the condition for
incomplete specialization.22
Figure 3.2: Parameter Restriction: Incomplete Specialization
Figure 3.3 depicts the net aggregate profits in country F and country H. As predicted by
the analytical analysis of the model, nonexporters in the relatively low institutional quality
country (here country F ) enjoy higher domestic profits, whereas exporters in country H
are larger and more profitable than exporters in country F . Moreover, the export cutoff
in country H is lower than its counterpart in country F , whereas the zero-profit cutoff in
country F is lower (not shown in the figure). Exporting is more prevalent in country H
with a larger number of exporters and a higher average sales per exporter.
Next, the influence of institutional reforms on firms’ profitability is demonstrated. The
exercise is done for a fixed level of trade variable cost τ = 1.3. In this experiment, con-
22Also notice that ΘHH > 0 if and only if
(
Z(µi)
Z(µj)
)κ
τ
−κβ
1−β
(
fx
f
)−κ+1
< 1. However, this condition
is implied by the conditions for incomplete specialization.
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tracting institution in country H is constant and given by µF = .8. The level of contracting
institutions in country F is in the interval [.3, 1]. As institutional quality advances in country
F , it turns from a country with relatively low institutions to the country with superior insti-
tutions. Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 show country F a nonexporter’s profits and an exporter’s
profits as a function of contracting institutions in country F . As contracting institutions
improve in country F , an always nonexporter’s profits decline and an always exporter’s
profits increase. Indeed, the relationship between profits and contracting institutions is not
affected by a country’s relative contracting institutions.
The impact of trade liberalization on the distributional consequences of institutional
reforms is depicted in Figure 3.6. The figure shows the impact of institutional reforms
in country F (institutional quality has increased from 0.4 to 0.5, whereas the institutions
level in country H is constant at 0.8) for different levels of trade openness (measured by
τ). The top left figure shows an always nonexporter’s profits in response to institutional
reforms. The net profits for this particular nonexporters decline as institutional quality
improves for any level of openness (the green line that represents the profits under new
institutional quality is always below the blue line, which represents profits under pre-reforms
institutional quality). Interestingly, the decline in a nonexporter’s profits is increasing with
trade openness. For instance, a nonexporter’s profits fall by almost 1.2% when τ = 1.2 and
by .5% when τ = 1.5. Likewise, an exporter’s profits increase by almost 4% when τ = 1.2
and almost by 2% for τ = 1.4 (bottom figures). That is, the distributional consequences of
institutional reforms are magnified in the open economy when institutions are a source of
comparative advantage across countries.
The experiment in Figure 3.6 is repeated in Figure 3.7, but for different levels of the
country H’s institutional qualities (µH = 0.3, 0.5, and 1.0). The goal of this example is to
explore the impact of the trade partner’s institutional quality on the distributional effects
of domestic institutional reforms. Indeed, qualitatively, all results in the previous example
hold here. Nonetheless, improving the country F ’s institutional quality from 0.4 to 0.5
has a stronger impact on firms’ profits as contracting institutions in county H decrease.
The intuition is the following: country F ’s real consumption QF is decreasing in country
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H’s institutional quality; meanwhile, the impact of country F ’s institutional change on
QF decreases as QF increases. As a result, the decrease in domestic profits resulting from
domestic institutional reforms is more severe when the trade partner’s institutional quality
is low since a small improvement in domestic institutions has a sizable impact on the real
consumption index QF and thus the domestic profits. The same logic applies to export
profits.
3.6 Political Economy of Endogenous Institutions
Institutional reforms in the open economy generate salient distributional consequences;
therefore, firms, as discussed above, possess strong preferences over these reforms. Firms
who might lose or gain from these reforms will naturally engage in some sort of political
actions to influence the level of institutional quality in the economy. As in the standard
endogenous trade policy literature, this section demonstrates how the current framework
can be combined with the lobbying model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) to endogenize
contracting institutions in the global economy.
The original paper of Grossman and Helpman (1994) studies the endogenous trade policy
(tariff) in the global economy. Nevertheless, Grossman and Helpman (2001) demonstrate
the generality of the framework by using it in other contexts. Levchenko (2013) uses the
lobbying game of Grossman and Helpman to study contracting institutions in the open
economy under the H-O trade framework.23
3.6.1 Lobbying Game
As in Grossman and Helpman (1994), a policy maker is subject to special interest groups’
pressure. Domestic firms are divided into two groups: nonexporters and exporters: o ∈ O =
{NE,EX}. Each lobbyist group proposes a menu of offers C(µ) that relates prospective
monetary contribution to the level of contracting institutions chosen by the incumbent
government. The government chooses the level of institutions µ ∈ [0, 1] to maximize a
23See also Abel-Koch (2013).
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weighted sum of aggregate social welfare and total contributions.
G(µ) = λW (µ) +
∑
o∈O
1oCo(µ) (3.25)
0 ≤ λ < ∞ denotes the social welfare weight. The higher λ is, the more benevolent the
incumbent government is. The indicator function 1o takes a value of one if a subset of the
firms belonging to that particular group has overcome the collective action problem and
formed a lobbyist group and zero otherwise.24 W (µ) is the aggregate welfare and given
by25
W (µ) = L (1 + S(Q(µ))) (3.26)
S(Q(µ)) ≡ 1−ηη Qη represents the consumer surplus in the economy, which is increasing in Q
and µ. The objective function of each lobby is to maximize the joint welfare of its members
net of political contribution,
Go(µ) = Wo(µ)− Co(µ) (3.27)
Wo(µ) = γoL(1 + S(Q(µ))) + Πo(µ)
Firms are owned by workers with γo ≡ HoL representing the fraction of labor force that owns
firms in group o. The aggregate profits of firms in group o are denoted by Πo.
3.6.2 Lobbying Firms and Endogenous Entry
The potential number of entrants is a function of institutional quality in the economy
and the anticipated pre-entry partition of firms varies with µ. Whether firms are allowed
to lobby pre-entry or whether firms that expect to move from one group to another, as
the level of institutional quality changes, engage in lobbying will impact the equilibrium
24Here, we assume that lobbyist groups and the participant firms are exogenously given. For
endogenous formulation of lobbyist firms, see Bombardini (2008).
25In this section, I changed the model setup slightly. In particular, I assume that each country is
endowed with L measure of workers with each worker inelastically supplies one unite of labor.
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outcome of the political economy game and greatly complicate the analysis both analytically
and numerically. Instead, strong conditions are imposed on firms that participate in the
lobbying game. First, firms engage in lobbying only after they pay the sunk entry cost.
Second, given trade costs τ and trade partner’s institutions, only firms with a productivity
level such that they choose never to export and never to exit the market at any level of
domestic contracting institutions µ ∈ [0, 1] (always survival and nonexporters) are allowed
to lobby in the nonexporters’ group. It is important to mention that this subset of firms is
not representing and lobbying for the aggregate nonexporters’ welfare taking into account
the impact of their political actions on the number of potential nonexporting firms in the
economy. Rather, their concern is only about the joint profits of lobbying firms, where, at
the lobbying stage of the game, the set of lobbying firms is given and unaffected by the level
of contracting institutions. Likewise, only firms that export for any level of µ are allowed
to lobby in the exporters’ group.
The first condition is not very restrictive. Realistically, only established firms engage in
political activities. The second condition is mainly for tractability and simplicity. Without
it, it might be almost impossible to characterize all possible equilibrium outcomes. The
implication of these conditions, in contrast to the scenario where lobbying firms maximize
the joint profits of all firms in that group taking into account the impact of institutions on
the measure of firms in the group, is that aggregate nonexporters’ profits might increase
with institutions, whears average profits per nonexporter is always decreasing. As a re-
sult, lobbying firms end up lobbying for a suboptimal institutional quality level from each
lobbyist’s perspective (see formal analysis below).
3.6.3 Timing and Political Equilibrium of the Lobbying
Game
I modify the timing of the events slightly by adding lobbying to the economy. That is, after
a firm pays fE and discovers its productivity Θ, it engages in lobbying for group o ∈ O if and
only if Θ satisfies the conditions for lobbying in the previous subsection: for nonexporters’
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group Θ ∈ [Θii(µ = 1),Θji(µ = 1)], and Θ ∈ [Θji(µ = 0),∞) for exporters. The remaining
events are exactly the same as before. The timing of the lobbying game is as follows.
lobbying firms in groups o ∈ O simultaneously and noncoopperatively offer a contribution
for each feasible level of µ ∈ [0, 1], Co(µ), to maximize its welfare net of contribution Go(µ).
The incumbent government takes the contribution schedule as given and chooses the level
of µ that maximizes it objective function G(µ). The government implements the chosen
level of µ and receives the corresponding contribution with probability of one.
Definition III.1. (Grossman and Helpman, 1994). An equilibrium is a set of contribution
functions {C∗o (µ)} one for each group o ∈ O such that each one maximizes the joint welfare
of the group’s member (lobbying members) net of contribution given the schedules set
by the other groups and the anticipated political optimization by the government, and
an institutional quality level µ∗ that maximizes the government’s objective, taking the
contribution schedules as given.
Proposition III.7. (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986). {C∗o (µ), µ∗} for o ∈ O is a Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the lobbying game if and only if
(i) C∗o (µ) is feasible for all o ∈ O
(ii) µ∗ maximizes λW (µ) +
∑
o∈O 1oC
∗
o (µ) on µ ∈ [0, 1]
(iii) µ∗ maximizes λW (µ)+
∑
o∈O 1oC
∗
o (µ)+Wo(µ)−C∗o (µ) for every o ∈ O and µ ∈ [0, 1]
(iv) for every o ∈ O, there exists an µ∗o ∈ [0, 1] that maximizes λW (µ) +
∑
o∈O 1oC
∗
o (µ)
on µ ∈ [0, 1] such that C∗o (µo) = 0
Condition (i) restricts the contribution of any lobby to be nonnegative and no greater
than the aggregate income available to the lobby’s members. Condition (ii) is straightfor-
ward; a government maximizes its weighted sum of aggregate welfare and total contribu-
tions. Condition (iii) implies that for every lobby o, the equilibrium level of contracting
institutions µ∗ maximizes the joint welfare of that lobby and the government, given the
contribution schedules offered by other lobbies. The last condition states that the contribu-
tion of lobby o is just enough such that the government is indifferent between implementing
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the equilibrium institutions level µ∗ and the policy it would have chosen without lobby o
contribution.26
Since many contribution schedules might satisfy Proposition III.7, we restrict our at-
tention to the equilibrium under a truthful contribution schedule, which reflects the true
preferences of the lobby everywhere. Formally, the truthful contribution schedule of lobby
o takes the form of
CTo (µ,Bo) = max [0,Wo(z)−Bo] (3.28)
For some, Bo ≥ 0. The equilibrium level of contracting institutions µ∗ under a truthful
contribution schedule, Truthful Nash Equilibria (TNE), has a compelling property. The
equilibrium contracting institutions µ∗ satisfies
µ∗ = arg max
µ∈[0,1]
[
λW (µ) +
∑
o∈O
1oWo(µ)
]
(3.29)
The incumbent government ends up maximizing a social welfare function that places larger
weights on lobbies. Specifically, a lobbyist group gets a weight of 1+λ, while a non-lobbyist
group gets a weight of λ.27 If only exporters lobby (i.e., 1EX = 1,1NX = 0), the political
equilibrium is to set institutional quality at the highest possible level, which is one in our
context. To see this, notice that when only exporters lobby, the government chooses µ
to maximize L(λ + γEX)(1 + S(Q(µ))) + ΠEX . It is straightforward to verify that both
the consumer surplus and the exporters’ aggregate profits are increasing in µ ∈ [0, 1].28
Another trivial case is when no group lobbies (i.e., 1NX = 1EX = 0). Here, again µ
∗ =
26For a detailed discussion of the proposition and its conditions, please see Grossman and Helpman
(1994).
27As shown in Grossman and Helpman (1994), the amount of contribution of lobby o is large
enough to make the government indifference between choosing µ−o and choosing µ∗, where µ−o =
argmax
∑
o′∈O
o′ 6=o
CTo′(µ,Bo′) + λW (µ) denotes the equilibrium institutions level that would emerge
from political maximization of the government if lobby o contributions were zero. Hence, the truthful
contributions of lobby o can be found from the following equation∑
o′∈O
o′ 6=o
1o′C
T
o′(µ
−o, Bo′) + λW (µ−o) =
∑
o∈O
1oC
T
o (µ,Bo) + λW (µ) for all o ∈ O
28Notice that ΠEX =
´
Θ∈EX(Θ)(piii(Θ) +piji(Θ))dΘ, which is increasing in µ in order for the free
entry condition to be satisfied.
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argmaxµ∈[0,1] (λW (µ)) = 1.
Result III.1. Trade liberalization bolsters domestic contracting institutions if exporters,
who export institutions-intensive goods, are the political dominant group in the economy.
It is useful at this point to contrast this result with the historical studies investigating the
17th and 19th century Atlantic three-corner trade, which emphasized the importance of the
initial conditions manifested in a country’s initial comparative advantage in understanding
the impact of trade on domestic institutions. Trade is institutions-enhancing if a country
specializes in highly institutions-dependent goods, but it hinders domestic institutions if a
country’s comparative advantage is based on non institutional factors. In the current model
with two sectors (homogenous and differentiated), trade advances domestic institutions,
conditional on exporters being the dominant group, since institutions are the only source
of comparative advantage.
However, the model can be extended to incorporate these historical observations by
introducing a second differentiated sector that is less dependent on contracting institutions
than the original sector. In effect, trade might deteriorate domestic institutions if a country’s
initial comparative advantage is in the less institutions-dependent sector.29 The mechanism
that links trade to domestic institutional change in the current model is different from those
in the historical studies, underscoring the impact of trade on the distribution of political
and economic power across special interest groups. Here trade reinforces the distributional
consequence of trade and, as a result, impacts domestic institutions, even with the political
power of economic groups held constant.30
We are particularly interested in the case where only nonexporters engage in lobbying
activities. The main goal of this exercise is to demonstrate the impact of trade liberalization
29Levchenko (2013) finds similar results, emphasizing the role of a country’s initial comparative
advantage.
30In fact, both mechanisms are presented in the current model: trade reinforces the distributional
consequences of institutions and concentrates wealth in the hand of specific groups. Levchenko (2013)
proposes a contractual frictions framework embedded in H-O trade model where trade alters the rent-
seeking (generated from institutional frictions) group’s preferences from anti institutional reforms
to pro institutional reforms: In an open economy, rents can be captured only if a country continues
to produce the institutionally dependent sector, requiring higher institutional quality than the trade
partner’s institutional quality (conditional on sharing a relatively similar production technology with
the trade partner).
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on domestic institutions when some domestic economic losers from institutional reforms are
the ones who dominate the political economy. Consider an incumbent government who
chooses µ to maximize its objective function given by (3.25)
max
µ∈[0,1]
λL(1 + S(Q(µ))) + LγNX(1 + S(Q)) + ΠNX
= max
µ∈[0,1]
L(λ+ γNX)(1 +
1− η
η
Qη(µ)) + ΠNX
Our assumption about lobbying firms states that only firms with productivity in NE(Θ) ≡
[Θii(µ¯),Θji(µ¯)], with µ¯ ≤ 1 denoting the maximum feasible value of µ in country i, par-
ticipate in lobbying. Given this, we can write the lobbying firms’ aggregate profits as
ΠNX =
´
Θ∈NE(Θ) piii(Θ)dΘ. Since Θ is a random variable drawn from a Pareto dis-
tribution, then, equivalently, we can write the aggregate profits of the lobbying firms as
ΠNX = M(µ)
´ Θji(µ¯)
Θii(µ¯)
piii(Θ)dG(Θ). The problem of this last term is that the number of po-
tential entrants is endogenous to the level of contracting institutions µ, and problematically,
per-firm profits are not necessarily increasing with the aggregate profits ΠNX . Lobbying
and its outcome under this framework are, to some degree, meaningless. It is not clear why
existing firms would lobby to maximize the joint profits of all of its members, including the
potential entrants who might hurt the existing firms.
The first condition about lobbying firms is of great use here; specifically, only firms that
pay the sunk cost of entry and discover its productivity engage in political activities. At
the lobbying stage, the firm’s productivity is known. The boundaries of the set of lobbying
firms are predetermined, and the lobbying firms’ joint profits are the sum of the profits of
all firms who belong to the lobbying set NE(Θ), where the number of entrants M is taken
as given. That is, ΠNX =
´
Θ∈NE(Θ) piii(Θ)dΘ = M
´
Θ∈NE(Θ) piii(Θ)dG(Θ).
The country i government’s maximization problem, given country j’s institutional qual-
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ity and trade barriers (country subscript is omitted if no confusion is caused), is31
max
µ∈[0,1]
(λ+ γNX)(1 +
1− η
η
Qη(µ)) +M
ˆ
Θ∈NE(Θ)
(
(1− β)ΘZ(µ)Q−β−η1−β (µ)− f
)
dG(Θ)
(3.30)
Given the Pareto assumption,
max
µ∈[0,1]
(λ+ γNX)(1 +
1− η
η
Qη(µ)) +M
κ
κ− 1(1− β)Z((µ)Q
−β−η
1−β (µ)Ψ− fΨ1, (3.31)
where Ψ ≡ Θii(1)1−κ − Θji(1)1−κ > 0, Ψ1 = Θii(1)−κ − Θji(1)−κ > 0 and M are constant
and not a function of µ.
The first term of the equation above is increasing with µ, whereas the second term,
which represents a nonexporter’s expected profits, is decreasing with µ. As a result, for a
plausible range of parameters values (especially, λ and η), the optimal value of contracting
institutions µ∗ is indeed less than one. Trivially, the level of optimal institutional quality
under the lobbying game is increasing in the social welfare weight, denoted by λ. If the
incumbent government places larger and larger weights on the aggregate social welfare
relative to the weight on lobbies monetary contribution (in extreme case λ → ∞), the
chosen institutional quality gets closer to one. The parameter η controls the elasticity of
substitution between the outside sector and the differentiated sector. The higher η the larger
the marginal change in social welfare (the first term in the equation above) in response to
the change in institutional quality µ and the lower the derivative of nonexporters’ profits
(the second term in the equation above) with respect to µ will be. As η gets closer to β,
the impact of institutional reforms on nonexporters’ profits gets smaller, while the social
welfare’s response to these reforms is magnified; as a result, the level of institutional quality
that maximizes (3.31) goes up. The next lemma summarizes the linkages between the
optimal chosen level of institutional quality and some of the major parameters in the model.
Lemma III.6. The institutional quality that emerges as the solution to the lobbying game
31Notice that since in this section each country is endowed with L workers and each worker in-
elastically supplies one unit of labor, the domestic and the export profits are L times its counterparts
in the previous sections: piii(Θ) = L times domestic profits given by (3.9).
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given by (3.31) is decreasing in the elasticity between the real consumption index Q and
institutional quality µ, ζQ,µ. Moreover, the government chooses a higher level of µ for
higher levels of the social welfare weight λ and for a higher fraction of consumers/voters
who own the lobbying firms αNX . However, The chosen institutional quality falls with the
size of the set that determines the lobbying firms, NE(Θ). Finally, µ∗ is decreasing with
M .
If lower institutional quality impacts nonexporter’s profits greatly (high ζQ,µ), the in-
stitutional quality that emerges from the lobbying game is lower relative to the case where
the contracting institutions have a small impact on the nonexporters’ profit. Indeed, for
higher ζQ,µ, the distortional effect of µ on the economic welfare is higher, with the owner of
firms (consumers) demanding higher µ. This last effect is outweighed by the impact of µ on
firms’ profits. The impacts of λ and αNX are straightforward and logical, as discussed in
Grossman and Helpman (2001). Nonetheless, the impact of the boundaries of the set that
determines the lobbying firms in our economy is unique to the current framework, which
features lobbying with free entry. Indeed, for a given measure of entrants M , the larger the
range of the lobbying set, the larger the ex-post lobbying firms’ profits and consequently
the lower the level of equilibrium µ.
Although the set of lobbying firms is exogenously given in the current framework, the
importance of the set of lobbying firms cannot be overemphasized. Realistically, the set
of lobbying firms is correlated with economic and political institutional arrangements (the
term here, unlike how it’s used in the previous sections and almost everywhere in the
paper, refers to the broader definition of institutional setting : legal institutions: rule of rule
and contracting institutions; political institutions: electoral system and political parties;
and informal institutions: culture, bureaucracy, and clientelism). In societies where bribes
and/or lobbying are conceived as the best way to do business, more firms get involved in
lobbying (legal or illegal), and as a result, the endogenous contacting institutional quality is
expected to be correlated with other aspects of formal and informal institutional settings.
This said, in the current framework, the main point is not to explain contracting institutions
differences across countries; rather I try to illuminate the channels and mechanisms in which
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trade liberalization and initial institutions impact domestic contracting institutions.
Obviously, M is an endogenous variable and depends on institutional quality. The
solution of the lobbying game (i.e., 3.31) yields an optimal institutional quality for every
M , µ∗(M). The mass of potential entrants M that clears the market, for any given µ, is
pinned down by Equation (3.24). Formally, the problem of finding M that is consistent
with market clearing and political economy solutions is equivalent to finding the fixed point
of M = g(µ∗(M)), where g represents the functional relationship between M and µ as in
equation (3.24). Precisely,
Mi = (1− β)φi(µ∗(M))κ− 1
κ
fΘjj(µ
∗(Mi))−κQi(µ∗(Mi))η − fxΘij(µ∗(Mi))−κQj(µ∗(Mi))η
f2Θii(µ∗(Mi))−κΘjj(µ∗(Mi))−κ − f2xΘij(µ∗(Mi))−κΘji(µ∗(Mi))−κ
(3.32)
µ∗(Mi) = argmax
µ
(λ+ γNX)(1 +
1− η
η
Qη(µ)) +Mi
κ
κ− 1(1− β)Z((µ)Q
−β−η
1−β (µ)Ψ− fΨ1
(3.33)
We need to show that the M that satisfies equation (3.32) exists and is unique. A trivial
case is when µ∗(M) ∈ {0, 1} ( i.e., there is no interior solution for the lobbying problem
and the chosen institutional quality is either 0 or 1 regardless of M). In this case, M ∈
{M(0),M(1)}. The existence of the political economy when µ∗(M) ∈ [0, 1] is described
below.
Claim III.1. Given the model’s parameters, trade partner institutions µj , and τ ∈ [τmin, τmax],
there exists a unique pair of {µ∗∗i ∈ [0, 1],M∗∗} that satisfies (3.32) and (3.33).
The formal proof is relegated to the Appendix. To give an idea about the proof and the
mechanism of the model, consider the political economy schedule µ∗(M), which according
to Lemma III.6 is strictly decreasing in M for µ∗(M) ∈ [0, 1]. Then there exists Mmax
and Mmin such that for any M > Mmax, µ∗(M) = 0, and µ∗(M) = 1 for M < Mmin.
Equation (3.24) delivers the mass of entrants M as a function of µ such that the markets
clear. Let call this relationship the economic schedule, µE(M) (i.e., for every M there is
µ that clears the markets). The analysis of the economic schedule is more involved and
complicated than the political economy schedule. In particular, it changes sign depending
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on the level of trade costs, τ . Fortunately, it exhibits consistent patterns: for low τ ,
M is strictly increasing in µ, decreasing when τ is high enough. The existence of the
equilibrium commands two sufficient conditions; (i) the political economy schedule starts
above the economy schedule (e.g., M∗(0) > ME(0)), and (ii) the economic schedule ends
above the political economy schedule as µ approaches 1. When the economic schedule is
strictly increasing or decreasing and the equilibrium exists, it is also unique. Theoretically,
multiple equilibria are only possible in the medium ranges of τ . Our simulation shows that
for wide range of the model’s parameters, the equilibrium is always unique. Figure 3.8
provides examples of the political economy schedule and the economic schedule under our
preferred parameter values32 when trade partner institutions µj = .5 and τ ∈ {1.31, 1.53}.
Figure 3.8: Political Economy Equilibrium
Result III.2. Let µ∗∗ be the political economy equilibrium where both schedules intersect.
Then µ∗∗ is increasing in λ, αNX , and η but decreasing in NE(Θ).
Relying on Lemma III.6, the political economy schedule shifts up as λ and/or αNX
increase, whereas the economic schedule is invariant to these parameters. As a result,
µ∗∗ increases. On the other hand, an increase in the size of NE(Θ) shifts the political
economy schedule down but leaves the economic schedule unchanged, causing µ∗∗ to fall.
The impact of η on µ∗∗ is more complicated: a fall in η shifts both the political economy and
the economic schedules up, with the magnitude of the economic schedule shift dominating
the shift in the political economy schedule, leading to higher µ∗∗.
32η = .5, α = .9, β = .75, κ = 2.1, fx/f = 2.1, f
E = .5, λ = .025, andαNX = .01.
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Our primary interest is, given the trade partner institutions, the impact of trade liber-
alization (lower τ) on the political economy equilibrium of domestic institutions. Unfortu-
nately, a closed form solution of the political equilibrium institutions µ∗∗ that solves (3.32)
and (3.33) is not applicable. I resort to numerical analysis to recover µ∗∗. I start with
an initial guess of the potential mass of entrants M{0} > 0 and find µ∗(M{0}) by solving
equation (3.31) numerically. Second, µ∗(M{0}) is used to find ME(µ∗(M{0}), which clears
the market (i.e., equation (3.24)). Third, if |ME(µ∗(M{0})−M{0}| < , stop; otherwise it-
erate until convergence. Finally, given our equilibrium domestic institutions, I calculate the
mass of potential entrants in the other country Mj . If Mj ≤ 0, then µ∗∗ leads to complete
specialization, and the incomplete specialization equilibrium does not exist.
The political economy equilibrium of institutional quality µ∗∗ versus trade impediments
τ is depicted in Figure 3.9. Evidently, µ∗∗ is increasing in τ . If contracting institutions
are a source of comparative advantage and if losers from institutional reforms dominate
the political institutions, the incumbent government, who maximizes the weighted sum of
aggregate social welfare and political contribution, chooses a lower level of institutional
quality as trade impediments fall. The result could simply be comprehended from the fact
that lowering τ reinforces the role of contracting institutions as a source of comparative
advantage and therefor amplifies the distributional consequences of institutional reforms.
Nonexporters, the only lobby group and the losers from institutional reforms, are more
devoted to preventing or mitigating institutional reforms in the more open economy since
they are severely inflicted by institutional reforms. Technically, higher trade costs τ lead
to upward shift in the political economy schedule. The economic schedule is also affected
by changes in τ . Starting from low τ , the schedule is upward sloping. As τ increases, the
economic schedule rotates clockwise, becoming flatter, and, as τ continues to increase, it
becomes downward sloping.33 Overall, the upward shift in political economy as τ increases
dominates the clockwise rotation in the economic schedule.
33Trade costs impact the economic schedule only if µi 6= µj . This is a well known result; under
symmetric country and Pareto assumption, the mass of potential entrants is invariant to trade costs.
As τ increases, causing the economic schedule to rotate clockwise, all schedules intersect at the point
where µi = µj .
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In autarky, the role of contracting institutions as a source of comparative advantage and
their distributional consequences are ceased. Exporters and nonexporters are better off as
institutions advance. In fact, as shown in Figure 3.9, the equilibrium institutional quality
is set to the highest level when τ is high enough, but not autarky. By contrast, when trade
barriers are relatively low, the optimal chosen level of contracting institutions is the lowest.
Result III.3. The equilibrium institutional quality µ∗∗ is increasing in trade impediments
τ , ceteris paribus.
The impact of trade partner’s institutions on the political equilibrium of the lobbying
game in the domestic economy is shown in Figure 3.10. First, notice that the qualitative
impact of trade partner’s institutions on the equilibrium domestic institutions is similar for
different values of trade variable costs: the political equilibrium of domestic institutional
quality is increasing with the trade partner’s institutional quality for any level of τ . This
is a very interesting result, which basically interrelates domestic institutions to the trade
partner’s institutions. Not only do the domestic political and economic conditions matter
when it comes to domestic policies and institutional reforms, but trade partners’ character-
istics are also paramount as the domestic context. Simply put, global context does matter.
Important implications both empirically and theoretically emerge as a result. For instance,
an empirical model that tests the impact of trade openness on the domestic institutional
quality without controlling for trade partner’s relevant conditions might be misspecified.
Result III.4. Countries are interdependent. Trade with countries with superior institu-
tions foster domestic institutional quality.
But the question then is why commerces with countries that exhibit advanced institu-
tions spur the domestic institutions or, as in here, mitigate nonexporters’ oppositions to
domestic institutional reforms. Technically, the result emanates from the impact of trade
partner’s institutional quality on domestic real consumption index Q and from the dimin-
ishing effect of domestic institutions on domestic real consumption index Q. To be precise,
the impact of domestic institutional reforms on aggregate welfare relative to its impact on
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nonexporters’ profits increases as trade partners’ institutional quality increases. In effect,
the equilibrium domestic institutional quality rises with trade partner’s institutions.
3.6.4 Trade and the Relative Power of Special Interest
Groups
As noted by Nunn and Trefler (2013), institutional change is possible only if it is supported
by the powerful special interest groups. Existent literature on trade and domestic institu-
tional change emphasizes on the role of trade in enriching these powerful special interest
groups, which, in turn, leads to profound institutional changes. Here, I provide a brief
discussion to demonstrate how trade changes the relative power of special interest con-
tenders. Assuming that both exporters and nonexporters lobby, the incumbent government
maximization problem can be written as
max
µ∈[0,1]
(λ+ αNX + αEX)(1 + S(Q)) + ΠNX + ΠEX
= max
µ∈[0,1]
(λ+ αNX + αEX)(1 + S(Q)) +M
[ˆ
Θ∈NE(Θ)
piii(Θ)dG(Θ) +
ˆ
Θ∈EX(Θ)
pii(Θ)dG(Θ)
]
As before, piii(Θ) (domestic profits) are decreasing in µ, and pii(Θ) = piii(Θ) + piji(Θ)
(domestic and export profits) are increasing in µ. The sets of lobbying firms (NE(Θ) and
EX(Θ)) are also a function of trade costs. Specifically, lower trade costs enlarge the set of
lobbying firms in the exporters group and shrink the set of lobbying firms in the nonexporters
group. From Lemma III.6, we know that the chosen level of µ∗ is decreasing in NE(Θ), and
by the same reasoning, it is easy to show that µ∗ is increasing in EX(Θ). In effect, even
when the distributional consequences of institutions are held constant, trade liberalization
makes exporters more powerful, changing the equilibrium of the lobbying game.34
34One might be concerned that our results in the previous section are emanating from the impact
of trade on the set of lobbying firms. This is not the case, however. Our results in the previous
section are robust to the scenario where the set of lobbying firms is invariant to trade costs. Indeed,
both mechanisms are present in Figure 3.9.
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3.7 Conclusion
I embed contractual frictions (modeled as in Grossman and Hart, 1986) in a two-country
two-sector trade model that features monopolistic competition (MC), increasing returns to
scale (IRS) and heterogeneous firms (HF). The first sector produces homogenous products
under standard assumptions and complete contracts, whereas the second sector produces
differentiated products under MC, IRS, HF and is subject to contractual frictions. In this
environment, I show that institutions are a sources of comparative advantage; specifically,
a country with relatively better institutions exports the differentiated products in net and
imports the homogenous good. Both countries gain from trade, but a country with better
institutions gains more. Furthermore, similar countries (in terms of institutional quality)
have a larger volume of intraindustry trade.
Institutional reforms have stark distributional consequences in the global economy. The
nature of the redistributive consequences of institutions is novel and unexplored. Insti-
tutional reforms redistribute resources across sectors and across firms within sectors. I
carefully characterize firms’ preferences over institutional reforms in the open economy for
all operating firms. I show that there exists a productivity cutoff where all firms below
are reforms’ opponents, while firms above are proponents of institutional reforms. One of
the main contributions of the paper is the analysis of the impact of trade liberalization on
the distributional consequence of institutional reforms. Trade reinforces the redistributive
effects of institutions.
Domestic institutional quality is not necessarily positively associated with trade liber-
alization. The paper emphasizes contextual analysis to understand the responses of the
domestic institutional quality to lowering trade costs. Initial institutional arrangements,
political organizations, and the structure of political influences are crucial elements in the
analysis of endogenous contracting institutions in the global economy. The general result is
that trade, most likely, reinforces the predominant initial institutions. Moreover, countries
are interdependent, in a sense, institutional reform in one country improves its welfare,
but it decreases trade partner’s. Nevertheless, commerces with high institutional quality
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partner advance domestic institutions.
3.8 Appendix A: Incomplete Contracts and SSPE
In this appendix, I provide the derivation of the reduced-form profit (3.8). In order to find
the reduced-form profit function for a firm, we need to solve for the SSPE using backward
induction. The timing of the game is as mentioned in the text. First, notice that a firm’s
revenue function is given by (I drop firm identifier script for notational simplicity)35
R = qβQ¯1−β, q = ϕN1−
1
α
[ˆ N
0
X(j)αdj
] 1
α
X(j) = exp
(ˆ 1
0
lnx(i, j)di
)
, x(i, j) =

xc, for i ∈ [0, µ]
xn, for i ∈ (µ, 1]
Here, Q¯ ≡
[
Q
−β−η
1−β
i + 1ji(ϕ)τ
−β
1−βQ
−β−η
1−β
j
]
. Then, using the above equations we write the
revenue function in terms of xc and xn.
R = ϕβNβ
[
[xµc x
1−µ
n
]β
Q¯1−β (3.34)
This revenue is distributed among suppliers and the firm according to the Shapley value.
Let sx(xc, xn) denote the Shapley value of a representative supplier and sq(xc, xn) denote
the Shapley value of the firm. Then sq(xc, xn)+Nsx(xc, xn) = R. Rolling back to the stage
before bargaining, all suppliers know exactly the amount of investment in contractable ac-
tivities since these are specified explicitly in the contract (notice here that x(i, j) = xc,j for
i ≤ µ since these activities enter the intermediate production function symmetrically and
all have the same marginal cost). Since the investment level in noncontractible activities
cannot be specified in the contract, all supplier j chooses xn(j) simultaneously and nonco-
35The derivations, notations, and the description of the incomplete contracts follow closely Ace-
moglu et al. (2007). If fact, some definitions/sentences are taken without modification/slightly
modified from Acemoglu et al. (2007).
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operatively. Given the investment level in all noncontractible activities by all supplier other
than j, xn(−j), supplier j chooses xn(j) to maximize her Shapley value net of the costs asso-
ciated with investment in xn(j): xn(j) = argmaxxn(j) sx[xc, xn(−j), xn(j)]−(1−µ)cxxn(j).
As we deal with symmetric equilibrium, xn(−j) = xn = xn(j); thus the optimal value of
xn(j) is each supplier’s best response:
xn ∈ argmax
xn(j)
sx[xx, xn, xn(j)]− (1− µ)cxxn(j). (3.35)
This is the supplier incentive compatibility constraint with imposing symmetric equilibrium
(let B(xn) be the best response of player j to xn, then we need xn ∈ B(xn)).
Moving one step backward in the game tree, suppliers accept the offered contract if and
only if they expect to receive at least their outside option (normalized to zero here). Thus,
the participation constraint for a supplier is
sx(xc, xn) + d ≥ µcxxc + (1− µ)cxxn, xn satisfies (3.35) (3.36)
That is, every supplier is expecting her Shapley value and upfront payment d to cover the
cost of investment in contractible and noncontractible activities. If the firm were to choose a
contract (xc, d) such that the participation constraint does not satisfy, the pool of suppliers
who accepts to engage in a production relationship with the firm is simply empty. The firm
designs a contract (xc, d) to maximize its profit:
max
xc,xn,d
sq(xc, xn)−Nd (3.37)
s.t xn ∈ argmax
xn(j)
sx[xx, xn, xn(j)]− (1− µ)cxxn(j)
sx(xc, xn) + d ≥ µcxxc + (1− µ)cxxn
The participation constraint is satisfied with equality; otherwise, the firm could reduce d
without violating the incentive compatibility constraint and thus increases its profits. Sub-
stitute out d from the firm’s objective function, and by using the equality in the participation
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constraint, the firm’s problem is simplified to
max
xc,xn
=R︷ ︸︸ ︷
sq(xc, xn) +Nsx(xc, xn)−µcxxc + (1− µ)cxxn, subject to (3.35) (3.38)
To solve for xn one needs to fine the explicit formula of the supplier Shapley value, which
we turn to in the next subsection.
3.8.1 Shapley Value
In the above setting, the complication of calculating Shapley values arises because of the
continuum number of suppliers: i ∈ (0, N ]. When the number of players is finite, the Shapley
value of player j is the average of her marginal contributions to all feasible coalitions that
consist of players ordered below her for all feasible permutations. That is, with a firm
(player 0) and M suppliers, let g = {g(0), .......g(M)} be a permutation of 0, 1, . . .M , and
let zjg = {j′|g(j) > g(j′)} be the set of players ordered below j in the permutation g. Denote
the value of the coalition consisting of any subset of M+1 players by v, such that v : G→ R,
where G is the set of all feasible permutations. Then the Shapley value of a player j is given
by
sj =
1
(M + 1)!
∑
g∈G
[v(zjg ∪ j)− v(zjg)] (3.39)
Acemoglu et al. (2007) derive the asymptotic Shapley value, which is defined as the limit
of the solution of (3.39) as the number of player goes to infinity.36 I borrow the less formal
method to derive the Shapley value with continuum players from Acemoglu et al. (2007). In
particular, notice that the final producer is essential to have a positive output. Let, m(j, n)
denote the marginal contribution of supplier j with a coalition formed from the final good
producer and a measure of n suppliers all ordered below j. The Shapley value of j is the
average of her marginal contributions to coalitions that consist of players ordered below
here in all feasible orderings conditional of having the final good producer ordered below j.
That is, for any coalition size n < N , with probability 1 − nN , the final producer is not in
36Formal treatments, detailed derivations and proofs can be found in Acemoglu et al. (2007).
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the coalition, and therefore the marginal contribution of j ∈ n is zero. Averaging over all
possible equally-likely ordering of the players, the Shapley value can be written as
s¯x[N, xc, xn(−j), xn(j)] = 1
N
ˆ N
0
n
N
m(j, n)dn
m(i, j) = Q¯1−β
[
xn(j)
xn(−j)
](1−µ)α
xβµc xn(−j)β(1−µ)Nβ−1n(β−α)α
Solving the previous equations yields
sx[xc, xn(−j), xn(j)] = (1− γ)ϕβQ¯1−β
[
xn(j)
xn(−j)
](1−µ)α
xβµc xn(−j)β(1−µ)Nβ−1 (3.40)
Notice that under symmetric equilibrium xn(−j) = xn(j) = xn, the Shapley value produces
a simple division rule:
sx[xc, xn, xn] = (1− γ)ϕβNβ−1
[
xµc x
1−µ
n
]β
= (1− γ)R
N
. (3.41)
Hence,
sq[xc, xn, xn] = γR, γ ≡ α
α+ β
(3.42)
To obtain SSPE, we find xn that satisfies incentive compatibility constraint (3.35) using
(3.40):
xn = argmax
xn(j)
(1− γ)ϕβQ¯1−β
[
xn(j)
xn(−j)
](1−µ)α
xβµc xn(−j)β(1−µ)Nβ−1 = xn(xc)
The firm’s profit optimization problem is then given by
max
xc
R(xc, xn(xc))−N [µccxc + (1− µ)cxxn(xc)] (3.43)
The solution to the above problem delivers the reduced-form profit functions (3.9) and
(3.10).
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3.9 Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Lemma III.1
Proof. We show that log(Z) is increasing in µ.
∂ log(Z)
∂µ
=
β
1− β [log(β)− log(α(1− γ))] +
(1− β(1− µ))α(1− γ)− β[1− α(1− µ)(1− γ)]
(1− β)(1− α(1− µ)(1− γ))
+
β
1− β log
(
1− α(1− µ)(1− γ)
1− β(1− µ)
)
The second derivative is given by
∂2Z
∂µ2
= (α(1− γ)− β)β
[ −α
((1− β)(1− α(1− µ)(1− γ)))2 +
1
(1− β)(1− α(1− µ)(1− γ))
]
< 0
The inequality emerges since α(1−γ)−β) < 0. As a result, for µ ∈ [0, 1] the first derivative
of Z with respect to µ reaches its minimum at µ = 1, where ∂Z∂µ |µ=1 > 0. Hence, Z(µ) is
increasing in µ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof of Lemma III.2
Proof. By construction, we have Θii < Θji for i, j ∈ {H,F}. Hence,
δii
δji
=
f
fx
Θji
Θii
´∞
Θii
ΘdG(Θ)´∞
Θji
ΘdG(Θ)
>
f
fx
Θji
Θii
→ δii
δji
> τ
β
1−β Z(µj)
Z(µi)
by (3.15)
Thus,
δjj
δij
δii
δji
> τ
2β
1−β > 1→ ∆ ≡ (δiiδjj − δjiδij) > 0.
Assume that µi = µj (i.e., symmetric countries): Θii = Θjj and Θji = Θij . Now let
Ẑ(µi) > Ẑ(µj) → Z(µi) > Z(µj). From (3.16) and (3.17), and the fact that ∆ > 0, it is
direct to show Θii > Θjj and Θji < Θij .
Proof of Lemma III.3
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Lemma III.2, Lemma III.1, and the ZPC Equa-
tion (3.11): That is,
(
QH
QF
)β−η
1−β
= ΘHHZ(µH)ΘFFZ(µF ) > 1 ifµH > µF .
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Proof of Lemma III.5
Proof. The incomplete specialization condition is satisfied if and only if Mi > 0 i ∈ {H,F}.
Total expenditure in the differentiated sector in country i is equal to PQ = Qη, which is
also equal to the domestic firms’ total sales in the domestic market i and the aggregate
foreign firms’ sales in the domestic market:
Qηi = Rii +Rji = Mi
δii
(1− β)φi +Mj
δij
(1− β)φj i ∈ {H,F} (3.44)
Solving the two equations above yields
Mi = φi
1− β
∆
[
δjjQ
η
i − δijQηj
]
, (3.45)
here, φi =
[
1−α(1−µi)(1−γ)
1−β(1−µi)
]
.
The incomplete specialization condition is satisfied if and only if
(
QH
QF
)η
> δHFδFF and(
QF
QH
)η
> δFHδHH . Hence,
δHH
δFH
>
(
QH
QF
)η
> 1 → δHH > δFH . A similar argument applies
to country F , δFF > δHF . Lemma III.2 implies δHH < δFF and δFH > δHF since δij is
decreasing in Θij for i, j ∈ {H, F}
Proof of Lemma III.4
Proof. The proof follows immediately from (3.16), (3.17), ∆ > 0, and Lemma III.5.
Lemma III.7. The adjusted number of entrants M¯i ≡ Miφi is strictly increasing in µi
Proof of Lemma III.7
Proof. Consider the expenditure-revenue identity (3.44). Now, let µˆi > 0 and µˆj = 0. Then
from the analysis above, Qi increases, and δii and δij decrease. The identity is satisfied
if and only if (i) M¯i and M¯j increase, (ii) M¯i decreases while M¯j increases, and (iii) M¯i
increases and M¯j decreases. To prove the lemma, it is sufficient to show that M¯j increases in
µi only if M¯i is increasing in µi. Therefore, case (ii) is ruled out and M¯i is indeed increasing
in µi. By equation (3.45) and given that Qi, and δjj are increasing in µi, whereas Qj , δii,
and δij are decreasing in µi, the result follows.
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Proof of Proposition III.1
Proof. Let Xji = Mi
´∞
Θji
Rji(Θ)dG(Θ) be the value of aggregate exports in the differenti-
ated sector of country i to country j. Equivalently, Xji can be written as
Xji =
Mi
φi
δji
(1− β)
If µH > µF , then by Lemma III.5, Lemma III.3, and equation (3.45),
MH
φH
> MFφF and δFH >
δHF . Hence, XFH > XHF . Assuming balanced trade, the total volume of trade between
the two countries is 2XFH > XFH + XHF . That is, country F exports the homogenous
good. The share of intra-industry trade XHFXFH =
MF /φF
MH/φH
δHF
δFH
, by using (3.45) and (3.18), is
indeed decreasing inZ(µH)Z(µF ) .
Proof of Proposition III.2
Proof. Equation (3.18) and ∆ > 0.
Proof of Proposition III.3
Proof. The proposition is immediately implied by (3.18) and Lemma III.5.
Proof of Proposition III.4
Proof. If nonexporters only care about their profits, then the proof is derived in the text
(see equation (3.19)). In the case where the owners of the nonexporting firms are consumers;
hence, they take into consideration the impact of institutional reforms on both their real
income and their consumer surplus S(Q) a representative nonexporter’s welfare can by
written as W (µ) = (1 + S(Q(µ))) + pi(µ). This function is decreasing in µ for a plausible
range of parameters (see Political Economy section).
Proof of Proposition III.5
Proof. The marginal exporter (i.e., with productivity Θ = Θpostji ) is indeed worse off in the
post reform, while An exporter-exporter (i.e., with productivity Θ ≥ Θpreji ) is better off.
Since pi(Θ) is continuous and increasing in Θ, the existence of Θsupportji is guaranteed.
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Proof of Proposition III.6
Proof. : We need to show that
[
1− δjj(δii+δji)∆
]
is decreasing with τ . The proof follows
immediately by noting that δii (δji) increases (decreases) with τ (in order to satisfy the free
entry condition) and δii > δji.
Proof of Lemma III.6
Proof. First, let’s rewrite the maximization problem (3.31) such that the government is
choosing the level of derived efficiency Z instead of µ. This is completely legitimate since µ
enters the objective function only through Z and Z is strictly increasing in µ ∈ [0, 1]; thus
the equilibrium level of institutional quality µ∗ can be recovered by taking the inverse of
Z∗, that is, µ∗ = Z∗(µ)−1. From the fist-order condition,
1
Z∗
=
MB2
B1
Q
−β 1−η
1−β
[
β − η
1− β −
1
ζQ,Z
]
, (3.46)
where, B1 ≡ (λ + αNX)(1 − η) > 0, B2 ≡ (1 − β) κκ−1Ψ > 0, and ζQ,Z = ∂Q∂Z ZQ > 1−ββ−η
denotes the elasticity between Q and Z. The equilibrium derived efficiency Z∗ is increasing
in B1 and therefore in λ and αNX but is decreasing in B2, which is increasing in NE(Θ)
via Ψ ≡ Θii(1)1−κ −Θji(1)1−κ. Similarly, Z∗ falls with M¯ and ζQ,Z .37
Proof of Claim III.1
Proof. For technical easiness, instead of dealing with M , let’s define M¯ ≡ Mφ . Lobbying
firms take M¯ as given instead of M , and we replace M with M¯ in the economic schedule.38
Indeed, the political economy schedule µ∗(M¯) is still strictly decreasing in M¯ (see Lemma
III.6 and its proof above). Rewrite the political economy schedule as M¯PE(µ), which is
strictly decreasing in µ. The economic schedule M¯E(µ) is strictly increasing in µ. This can
easily be derived from equation (3.24) since Θjj , Qj , and Θji are decreasing in µi, whereas
Θii, Qi, and Θji are increasing. To complete the proof, we need to show that M¯
PE(µ = 0) >
37ζQ,Z =
1−β
β−η [1 + ϑ(τ)] >
1−β
β−η , and ϑ(τ) ≡
Zκτ
−κβ
1−β ( fxf )
1−κ
1−Zκτ
−κβ
1−β ( fxf )
1−κ .
38This trick buys us tractability without altering our basic analysis, results, and proofs.
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M¯E(µ = 0) and M¯PE(µ = 1) < M¯E(µ = 1). Heuristically, let’s assume that limµ→0 Z(µ) =
0,39 then with some tedious algebra it is shown that limµ→0 M¯PE(µ) → ∞. Moreover,
limµ→0 M¯E(µ) → 0. In fact, it goes to −∞ but we always assume M ≥ 0. Both schedules
and Z(µ) are continuous in µ and for the purpose of our proof in β. Thus, there exists β such
that limµ→0 Z(µ) =  > 0; hence, M¯ is slightly greater than zero (i.e., incomplete condition
is satisfied), and M¯PE(µ = 0) > M¯E(µ = 0). To show that M¯PE(µ = 1) < M¯E(µ = 1),
without loss of generality, let’s assume symmetric country (µi = µj = 1); then it can be
shown that M¯E = (1− β)Qηi [fE + κκ−1(fΘ1−κii −Θ1−κji )] and M¯PE is directly derived from
the first-order condition equation (3.46). As τ approaches infinity, M¯ goes to zero and is
strictly less than M¯E . Again, both schedules are continuous in τ ; therefore, there exists
τmin < ∞ such that for every τ > τmin, M¯E > M¯PE . Our numerical simulations show
that a wide range of the models’ parameters and trade costs satisfy the conditions under
which the political equilibrium exists. In fact, once incomplete specialization conditions are
satisfied, political equilibrium solutions always exist, including the corner solutions. Having
M¯∗∗ and µ∗∗(M¯∗∗) at hand, recovering M∗∗ and µ∗∗ is straightforward. Thus µ∗∗ and M∗∗
exist and are unique, since existence is a sufficient condition for uniqueness in the current
framework.
39This will be true if β is very close to one.
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Figure 3.3: Net Aggregate Profits
The red line is for country F , while the blue line is for country H. The following Parameter values
are used in this figure: µH = .8, µF = .6, τ = 1.3,
f
fx
= 3, κ = 2.1, β = .75 η = .5, fE = .5, and
α = .9.
Figure 3.4: A Nonexporter’s Profits
Figure 3.5: An exporter’s profits
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Figure 3.6: The Distributional Consequences of Inst. Reforms in the Global Economy
The figures are for country F . The institutional level of Country H is fixed at µH = .8.
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Figure 3.7: The Impact of Trade Partner Inst. on the Distributional Consequences
of Domestic Inst. Reforms
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Figure 3.9: Equilibrium Institutional Quality
The figure shows the political economy equilibrium of contracting institutions µ∗∗ as a function of
τ . The parameter values used to generate this figure are β = .75, α = .9, η = .5, fx/f = 2, f
E =
.5, κ = 2.1, µj = .5, λ = .025, andαNX = .01.
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Figure 3.10: Trade Partner’s Impact on Political Equilibrium Domestic Institutions
The parameters values used to generate this figure are: β = .75, α = .9, η = .5, fx/f = 2, f
E =
.5, κ = 2.1, λ = .025, andαNX = .01.
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CHAPTER IV
Multinational Production and
Intra-firm Trade
4.1 Introduction
The proximity-concentration tradeoff constitutes the basis of one of the most important the-
ories of multinational production.1 In a stark contrast with the prediction of the workhorse
monopolistic competition model of trade and foreign direct investment, several new empiri-
cal papers document that total foreign affiliates’ sales are subject to gravity-style forces akin
to those observed for aggregate exports (Yeaple, 2009; Keller and Yeaple, 2013; Irarrazabal
et al., 2013). That is, rather than overcome the transportation costs associated to exports,
1There are two main competing international trade theories that aim to explain the behav-
ior of multinational corporations. The first of these theories is based on the so call horizontal
multinational production, under which the primary motive for expanding operations overseas is
to satisfy foreign final consumers. Under this theoretical approach the multinational firm faces a
concentration-proximity tradeoff. On the one hand, firms that choose to produce at home market
and sell internationally through exports, while taking advantage of the economies of scale of concen-
trating operations in one location face higher marginal cost of selling to foreign markets because of
the associated transportation cost. On the other hand, the firm could take advantage of the proxim-
ity to foreign markets when it sets operations abroad and saves the transportation cost associated to
exports (Brainard, 1997; Markusen, 2004). The second theory is based on the vertical multinational
activity, under which the primary motive of setting operations abroad is to take advantage of price
differences of factors of production across countries, to produce intermediate inputs at a lower cost.
These inputs could be sell back to the parent company or to a third affiliate in another country to
advance further stages of the production process (Helpman, 1984).
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multinational sales also decrease with remoteness and other geographical variables.
A natural explanation for the observed patterns of bilateral foreign affiliate sales is
the existence of trade in intermediate inputs across countries within the boundaries of the
firmintra-firm trade. The usage of intermediate inputs produced by the parent introduces
a source of complementarities between trade and multinational production, given that in
order to produce overseas, foreign affiliates have to import intermediate inputs from their
home market.
Intra-firm trade is an important component of U.S. international trade. In particular,
exports of manufacturing goods from U.S. parents to their cross border network of affiliates
account for 20 percent of U.S. exports; and intra-firm imports by foreign controlled U.S.
affiliates from their foreign parent groups have generally accounted for 20-25 percent of
total U.S. imports. Thus, to bridge the theory of horizontal multinational activity with the
new empirical facts, new models have incorporated intra-firm transactions in the workhorse
framework of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) (Helpman et al., 2004. HMY,
henceforth).
A striking feature of intra-firm trade is its pronounced heterogeneity across firms; not
only at the aggregate level, but also at the sector-destination country level. In particular,
using a detailed data from the Bureau of Economics Analysis, Ramondo et al. (2014) have
documented that intra-firm trade is concentrated among a small number of large affiliates
and it only represents a very small fraction of their input and their total sales. For example,
in 2004, the median manufacturing affiliate received none of its inputs from their parent
firm,2 and sold 91 percent of its production to unrelated parties, mostly in the host country.3
2Of course, this does not rule out the possibility that an affiliate is importing intermediate inputs
from another affiliate who is part of the international production chain. Unfortunately, such flows
are not recorded in any of the available datasets. Nevertheless, the fact that the vast majority of
affiliates sell their output to unrelated parties, alleviate part of these concerns. We discuss these
issues in more details in a later section.
3Notice that the fraction of foreign affiliates that receive or not intermediate inputs from their
parents, and sell the vast majority of their output to unrelated parties (in the local market or in a
third market), are the observations that lie in this category of horizontal MP with vertical linkages.
This observation could be potentially important, because if there is circular intra-firm trade, the
parent could provide intermediate inputs to an affiliate that is part of an international production
chain, not to satisfy final consumers but to produce intermediate inputs to continue the production
process in other countries.
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The observed selection to engage in intra-firm trade, the skewness of intra-firm flows towards
large corporations and the bias of multinationals sales to local final consumers are robust
to the country of destination or the industry of operations.
These findings pose new challenges to existing FDI-intrafirm models. Firstly, existent
models take it for granted that all affiliates import from their parents and therefore are silent
about the selection and the skewness observed in intra-firm flows. Secondly, if importing
from parents is what derives the affiliate’s sales to be declining in trade frictions, then FDI-
gravity shall be present only for those firms in the upper tail of the firm’s size distribution
but not for the relatively small size firms.4,5 Using Orbis dataset, we present evidence
showing that the gravity of foreign sales could not solely be explained by intra-firm trade.
In fact, we show that even firms that likely do not engage in intra-firm trade exhibit a
significant resistance to geographical barriers. This is a finding that contrasts with the
predictions of new FDI-intrafrirm models, where the only source of gravity for MP sales is
the complementarity between trade and MP imposed by intra-firm flows. It has been well
established in the literature that multinational sales, on average, follow the law of gravity
that has very well characterized bilateral trade in the geographical space. Alternatively,
we divide the sample of firms by its likelihood of engaging in intra-firm transaction. This
is, we show that the standard gravity variables (i.e., distance, common border, common
language, and regional trade agreements) play a significant role in diminishing the observed
foreign affiliates sales, for the lower and the upper tails of the firm’s size distribution. As
expected, gravity forces diminish the sales of the very large affiliateswhich previews evidence
found often involve in intra-firm trade. Surprisingly, the gravity frictions also negatively
4Of course, the fact that intra-firm trade is concentrated among the largest multinational corpo-
rationsgranularity of intra-firm tradecould be enough to generate FDI-gravity on the entire sample
of multinational firms.
5The stylized facts about intra-firm trade and the gravity of multinational activity also impose
important challenges to the theory of multinational production based on vertical integration. In
contrast with horizontal intrafirm-FDI- models, where firms could engage or not in intra-firm flows
from parents to affiliates, in models of vertical multinational production, intra-firm transactions are
a necessary condition to the existence of foreign affiliates, whose main role is to provide cheaper
intermediate inputs to their parents and to other affiliates within the corporation. Therefore, con-
ditional on being a multinational, the vertical integration theory of multinational activity could not
rationalize the observed absence of intra-firm flows among firms within a corporation that instead
sell the majority of their output to unrelated parties in the host market.
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and significantly affect the sales of the relatively small foreign affiliates, which often do not
trade with their parents and sell the vast majority of their output to unrelated parties in
the host market. This results are very similar when the sample of firms is divided below and
above of the fifty percentile of the firm’s size distribution and when only the firms below
the twenty five percentile to represent small firms while those firms above the seventy five
percentile to represent larger affiliates. The results of the impact of gravity on multinational
activity are robust to different econometric specifications.
To capture the former stylized fact and to account for the extensive margin of intra-
firm trade flows, this paper develops a novel multi-country model of heterogeneous firms,
in which parent firms decide whether or not to supply foreign affiliates with intermediate
inputsinstead of let them produce those in the host marketand if so, optimally decide the
fraction of intermediate inputs that should be imported from the parent company. The
proposed theoretical framework matches the distribution of multinational sales as well as
the intra-firm trade patterns observed in the data: the less productive firms do not import
at all from their parent, whereas the most productive ones engage in intra-firm trade. In
the model, the selection is explained by the irreversible investment in which a multinational
corporation has to incur in order to establish an adequate platform to carry cross borders
transactions within the boundaries of the firm on regular bases. The high cost associated to
these important coordination efforts is a fact well explored in the international management
literature (Seuring and Goldbach, 2002).
This paper contributes to previous efforts to rationalize intra-firm trade patterns. Irar-
razabal et al. (2013) propose a HMY model of horizontal multinational production with
intra-firm trade from parents to affiliates. Their model assumes that the final good pro-
duced by affiliates is assembled in a Cobb Douglas fashion using local labor and intermediate
inputs produced and shipped by the parent. As a consequence, all firms engage in intra-firm
trade and the share of imported intermediate inputs from the parent in total cost is the
same for all firms regardless of their productivity level. Similarly, Ramondo and Rodriguez-
Clare (2013) develop a general equilibrium model of trade and multinational production
under perfect competition in which foreign affiliates use an international input bundle in
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production, where a fraction is obtained in the local market and the rest comes from the
parent firm. This paper differs from these approaches in that it endogenizes the existence
as well as the degree in which intra-firm trade occurs.
Following Keller and Yeaple (2013), we assume that when a firm produces overseas, ei-
ther requires to establish communication with the headquarters to receive the instructions
to produce the intermediates inputs—direct knowledge transfer or alternatively, the multi-
national can transfer knowledge across borders by exporting intermediate inputs embodying
the technology—indirect knowledge transfer. When the firm produces its intermediate in-
puts, it faces the costs of transfer knowledge across countries; but if instead, the firm buy
the intermediates from its parent, it faces the associated transportation costs. Therefore,
under this framework, multinational sales of more knowledge intensive firms will suffer more
strongly from gravity, precisely because these companies face relatively high costs of direct
knowledge transfer, reducing the elasticity of intra-firm trade to changes in transportation
cost. Notice that in Keller and Yeaple (2013) model, although affiliates differ in their share
of imported intermediate inputs from the parent, it assumes that all foreign affiliates buy at
least some inputs from their headquarters. Nonetheless, in the data, only a small fraction
of firms, often relatively large, buy from their parent while a vast majority of them report
zero intra-firm flows.6
Our paper improves the previous theoretical framework in several dimensions in oder to
reproduce several of the recent uncover stylized facts of intra-firm trade. First, knowledge
intensity is more heterogeneous across firms within an industry than it is across industries.
Based on this fact, we choose to model knowledge intensity as firm-specific rather than
sector-specific. A more knowledge-intensive affiliate is so because it requires relatively more
6In the appendix of the paper, Keller and Yeaple sketch an extension of the original model in
which firms have the option of paying a fixed cost of investing in information and communication
technology in order to lower the efficiency cost of knowledge transfers by reducing the efficiency
loss of remote production. An implication of this extension is that only the most productive firms
produce a larger fraction of their intermediates in the host market, reducing their reliance in imported
intermediate inputs, given that, only those affiliates are able to incur in the fixed cost. However,
this prediction is contrary to the patterns observed in the data in which only the most productive
firms engage in intra firm trade. Instead, our model proposes a very different type of fixed cost that
is able to deliver the observed selection. In our model to engage in intra-firm trade, the corporation
has to build a complex distribution network that allows frequent trade between related affiliates
operating in different countries.
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knowledge-intensive intermediate inputs than a less knowledge-intensive firm. Second, the
knowledge intensity of production affects not only the composition or degree of in-house
production versus imported intermediate inputs, but also the existence of intra-firm trade
itself. That is, in the current model some firms could find it optimal not to engage in
intra-firm trade because developing a distribution channel entails to incur in a fixed cost.7
Third, the share of imported intermediate inputs increases with firm’s productivity. Fourth,
communication costs are higher, the higher the knowledge intensity of the intermediate
inputs and the larger the distance between the parent and the affiliate firm.8
Notice that in this framework the usage of intermediate inputs has a meaning that dif-
fers from most trade models. In Keller and Yeaple (2013) as well as in the model developed
in this paper, intermediate inputs are a channel of technology transfer between parent and
affiliates to achieve the same productivity level. These intermediate inputs are firm-specific
and we assume that they should be produced inside the boundaries of the firm. In this envi-
ronment, the affiliate faces only two options: either it produces the intermediate inputs by
itself, in which case it requires indirect transfer of technology in the form of communication
to receive the necessary instruction from its parent firm; or it can import these intermedi-
ates from headquarters, saving the communication cost but facing the transportation cost
of exporting.9
From an empirical perspective, it has been a challenge for the literature of multinational
production and intra-firm trade to unveil its determinants. One of the reasons is the limited
information in the available datasets in order to distinguish vertical and horizontal FDI.
Given that there is no direct measures of the underlying motives of MP, researches have used
7It is possible to think that the need of the affiliate of receiving instructions from the parent firm
decreases with time, as the affiliate moves along in the learning curve. Nonetheless the multinational
firms develop innovation at a high rate and constantly those new techniques will be passed through
the affiliates in the form of direct technology transfer.
8For example, communications tend to be more cumbersome when firms are located in different
time zones, in countries with different languages, among others.
9In most models of trade and multinational production, subsidiaries adopt the same technology
level as their foreign market by construction; instead in this model, the firm buys or produces
intermediate inputs that allow it to reproduce the activity of the parent firm. Some of these models
incorporate a measure of productivity losses, to capture difference in productivity between the
headquarters and foreign affiliates and they often use ”standard” inputs—not firm-specific—which
can be outsourced from any market.
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intra-firm transactions to obtain some information about the nature of multinational firms.
Very often the existence of intra-firm trade has been interpreted as evidence for vertical
MP and against horizontal MP.10 This is because under vertical MP multinational firms
decide to produce cheaper intermediate inputs abroad within the boundaries of the firm in
order to internalize any product contractibility issue and potential spillovers of proprietary
knowledge that could emerge from outsourcing. Under vertical MP, foreign production
will always result in intra-firm flows because affiliates are meant to produce firm-specific
intermediate inputs, which will be exported to the parent firmor to another affiliatebut not
to satisfy the final foreign consumption. In fact, horizontal MP can rationalize intra-firm
transactions from the parent to the affiliate when the last one imports knowledge embedded
in the form of intermediate inputs. Nonetheless, the workhorse model of horizontal MP will
not require intra-firm trade in order to absorb the productivity of the parent, but rather it
assumes that the affiliate replicates the same organizational structure of the parent.
Therefore, the magnitude and direction of intra-firm flows could shed light to understand
the relative importance of these two alternative theories, given that horizontal MP will be
compatible with intra-firm transactions from the parent to the affiliate, while vertical MP
will be compatible with transactions in both direction; although more strongly with trade
of intermediates from the affiliates to the parent firms or to other affiliates within the
corporation.11 Even though we recognize the richness of intra-firm transactions, which
10For instance, Keane and Feinberg (2006) find that the reason of the dramatic growing in intra-
firm trade flows among U.S. and Canada over the 1984-1995 period were due to the intensive, rather
than the extensive margin. They attribute the low contribution of the extensive margin to the fact
that the modest tariff reductions were not sufficient to justify fixed costs of overhauling international
supply chains. This is, the extensive margin of intra-firm trade is often associated with the existence
of MP. This is a very narrow interpretation given that in fact the majority of foreign affiliates
establish operations abroad without establishing any kind of trade with the parent or any other
affiliate.
11For the U.S. there are two main sources of information. One of them is the U.S. Census Bureau
who administrates the information contained in the custom declaration that includes information
on ownership ties between the foreign and domestic parties involved in any transactions. The
other main source is U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economics Analysis, which conducts
extensive surveys to multinational firms that includes questions on the value of specific trade flows
between foreign and domestic units of the firm. The Census data is comprehensive in the detail
of the traded goods between U.S. parents and affiliates overseas and also between foreign parents
and their affiliates operating in the U.S. It allows to identify not only the type of relationship
between the parts involved in the international transaction, but also the nationality of the parts.
Unfortunately, the Census data does not collect further information of the activity of the foreign
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includes sales from affiliates to parents as well as from affiliates to affiliates, the model
developed in this paper adopts a horizontal perspective of multinational activity. Intra-firm
trade from the parent to their network of foreign affiliates is quantitatively important and
it is also consistent with a model of horizontal multinational production and gravity on
foreign affiliate sales.12
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the main source
of data in our analysis and it also describes the main characteristics of multinational sales at
the firm level. Section 4.3 presents the three main stylized fact that support our contribution
to the literature, both in term of our model and the evidence presented. Section 4.4 lays out
the theoretical framework and derives the analytical implications for intra-firm flows and
multinational sales. Section 4.5 discuses the parametrization, the functional forms and the
estimation strategy of some of the key model’s parameters. Section 4.6 presents the general
equilibrium and the gravity equation of affiliate sales for firms that do engage in intra-firm
trade and those that do not. Section 4.7 concludes. Proofs and detailed derivations can be
found in the Appendix.
4.2 Data
In this section, we explain in detail the source and characteristics of the dataset used in the
analysis. The primary source of information is Orbis, which gathers firm-level information
across a wide range of countries. In particular, it contains relevant information about
the ownership structure of the firm, with a detailed list of direct and indirect subsidiaries
and stockholders, the company’s degree of independence, its ultimate owner and other
part of the transaction, which is relevant to characterize the behavior of multinational corporations.
On the other hand, the BEA data offers in-depth information about affiliates operations, including
total assets, sales, net income, employment, R&D. It also has information about the international
transaction between and the affiliate and related and unrelated parties, with the parent company,
with the host market, or with third markets. Unfortunately, affiliates do not report the related
parties sales to third market disaggregated by countries. For this reason, even when it is possible to
track the intra-firm transaction between parents and affiliates, it is not the case for the trade among
foreign affiliate that are part of the same company.
12Zeile (2003) uses detailed data from the Census Bureau and find U.S. intra-firm exports mainly
consist of shipments from U.S. parent companies to their foreign affiliates, and U.S. intra-firm imports
mainly consist of shipments from foreign parent groups to U.S. affiliates.
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companies in the same family.13 Orbis does not have information about the transaction
between parents and affiliates firms, as the Census Bureau data does, instead it offers more
information about the foreign affiliates’ operations, including financial statements as well
as a comprehensive set of indicators of economic activity.14
For the purpose of this analysis we have constructed two samples. The first sample
is comprised of U.S. affiliate firms operating outside the United States, but whose ulti-
mate owners—or parents—are located in the United States. The second sample contains
information of foreign affiliates firms operating in the U.S., but whose parents are located
outside the U.S. Notice that in both samples we only account for those affiliates that have a
global ultimate owner (GUO), this is a company who exercises the greater degree of control
over the affiliate and that owns at least 50 percent of the shares; thus, a firm is considered
foreign owned if it is majorityor wholly owned by a foreign multinational firm.15 Regarding
the sample, it is important to mention that only those firms for which operating revenue is
known for at least one of the years in the sample period (2004-2013), are considered in the
analysis.
The analysis focuses on manufacturing industries. It covers more than 9 thousand
U.S. own affiliates operating in 35 developed countries, and it also covers the foreign own
affiliates operating in the U.S. from these 35 countries. Four categories of information are
used for each firm: (a) industry information including the 4-digit NACE code of the primary
industry in which the establishments operate, (b) location information; (c) non-consolidated
13Alfaro and Chen (2012) have assess the extent and coverage of this data set using more aggre-
gated information for alternative sources. Because we concentrate here on affiliates owned by U.S.
parent firms, as well as U.S. affiliates owned by foreign parents, we have used the aggregate values
in the BEA data to evaluate the accuracy of the information provided by Orbis.
14The best characterization of the intra-firm trade can be obtained from the Census Bureau, but
it lacks of information about the activity of the affiliates, including the type and destination of its
exports, which is contained in the BEA data.
15We also consider a company to be an ultimate owner (UO) if it has no identified shareholders
or if its shareholder’s percentages are not know. It is worthwhile to mention that we consider only
Global, rather than Domestic ultimate owners. The Domestic UO is the highest company in the
path between a foreign affiliate and its Global UO but that is located in the same country as the
affiliate firm. Thus, an affiliate will be considered domestic, rather than foreign, when the GUO and
the DUO are both in the same country. The definition of Global Ultimate Owner, with a minimum
of fifty percent ownership adopted in this paper, is also the one followed by international agencies
and by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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financial information including operating revenue, employment, assets, investment, wages,
material cost, among others; and (d) degree of ownership and detailed information about
the global ultimate owner, including a compressive set of financial information of the parents
firms which includes the industry of operation, revenue, employment, assets, research and
development expenditures, and number of patents among others.
In order to construct a useful sample, the data was subjected to an extensive cleaning
up process in which we eliminate firms whose operating revenue is below one million dollar
and with less than 15 employees. Furthermore, to alleviate the problem from potential
outliers, we eliminate firms below the 0.1th percentile and above the 99.9th percentile in
the distribution of sales. The final sample comprises 8,572 foreign affiliates and 2,210
parents, covering 261 manufacturing industries for the period 2004-2013.
4.3 Stylized Facts
In this section we introduce some key regularities about the foreign sales and the location
patterns of U.S. multinational firms. First, we show that the knowledge intensity of the U.S.
parent firms is very heterogeneous across firms, even within very narrow defined sectors.
Second, we show some evidence of the granularity of multinational activity from the parent
as well as from the affiliate perspective. Multinationals are a relatively rare type of firms.
Despite of the disproportionately contribution of U.S. multinationals to total output and
trade, they represent less than 1 percent of all U.S. companies. Moreover, the vast majority
of U.S. parents only operate in one foreign market regardless of the manufactured indus-
try; and also for any given market-sector pair the market share of U.S. foreign production
is concentrated in a very small set of affiliates. Third, we present some initial empirical
evidence that intra-firm trade alone is not enough to reconcile the underlying incentives in
horizontal FDI models and the observed strong dampening effect of distance on MP. Over-
all, this section gives the grounds of our motivation and provides support for the building
blocks of the model proposed in section 4.
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Fact 1: Research and Development intensity is highly heterogeneous across multina-
tional firms within a narrow defined industry. The average research intensity varies sig-
nificantly across parent firms, even in considerable narrow defined industries. Borga and
Zeile (2004) find that foreign manufacturing affiliates have a greater propensity to source
intermediate goods from their U.S. parents is increasing in their parent R&D and capital
intensity. This suggest that the propensity of affiliates to source intermediate inputs from
their parents is related to the level of intangible assets embodied in the inputs traded within
the firm.
Figure 4.4 shows the density of the parent’s share of R&D expenditure for the pool of
U.S. parents in the sample regardless of the industry classification. As can be observed
the expenditure in research and development is remarkably higher among the most pro-
ductive U.S. parent firms. In fact, more than eighty percent of the R&D expenditures in
a given industry is in hands of few but very large firms. Figure 4.5 shows the density of
parent’s R&D expenditure share for four selected three-digit level NACE sector classifica-
tion: (1) manufacturing of parts and accessories for motor vehicles—NACE 293 (top-left
panel), (2) manufacture of other special-purpose machinery—NACE 289 (top-right panel),
(3) manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products—NACE 211 (bottom-left panel), and (4)
manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery—NACE 303 (bottom-right panel).
The share of R&D is calculated as the fraction of the research and development expendi-
tures of the firm relative to the total R&D expenditures of all U.S. parents firms operating
in the same three digit sectoral classification. It is clear, that the concentration of R&D
expenditures in few large parents is not being driven by sector- specific characteristics. The
results are qualitatively similar even when considering only those the firms belonging to a
given sector.
However, only one third of the U.S. ultimate owner with at least one foreign affiliate
in the sample (U.S. parent firms) have information about R&D expenditures. In order
to address how previous results can be affected for the lack of more complete information
on R&D expenditures, Figure 4.6 shows the density of the productivity for two groups of
parent firms: those for which Orbis data contains information regarding the expenditures
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in research and development activities; and those parent firms that contain missing val-
ues for the R&D variable. The productivity density is shown for both groups in the same
industries used in the analysis above. Firm’s productivity is measured by the output per
worker of the U.S. parent. Figure 4.6 highlights that those firms for which Orbis does not
record information about R&D expenditures are on average less productive than firms for
which it does. Therefore, we conclude from this evidence that even when multinationals
are responsible for the majority of the private R&D activities, the largest share of the R&D
expenditures in any given industry is being mainly carried on by few but very productive
U.S. parent firms.
Fact 2: The distribution of foreign affiliate sales is fat tailed, for each country and
sector pair.
A well documented fact is that firm sales follow a Zipf Law distribution (Gabaix, 2009
and di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2012). In addition, Ramondo et al. (2014) show that intra-
firm trade is concentrated among a small number of large affiliates. In particular, firms
below the mean of the size distribution do not trade with their parent firms at all. In this
section, we show that the distribution of sales of U.S. foreign affiliates—as well as the sales
of foreign affiliates in U.S.— is very fat tailed. Not just at overall, within an industry, or
within a country; but also for a given country-sector pair.
Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of the market share of each affiliate in each country-
sector pair. As can be observe, most of firms represent a very small share in each market,
and only a small fraction firms have remarkable large market share. Figure 4.3 evaluates
the participation of U.S. parents on foreign markets. Each parent produces on average in
two foreign economies, but fifty percent of the parents only produce in one market besides
United States. Strikingly, the mean coincide with the number of markets penetrated by a
firm in the 75 percentile of the distribution. Ten percent of the parent firms produce in
more than four markets and only five percent of all firms set operations in seven or more
foreign countries.
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Fact 3: Intra-firm trade alone cannot explain the observed gravity of multinational sales
Intra-firm trade from the parent to the cross border network of foreign affiliates has been
the approach used in the literature to rationalize the gravity of multinational production;
meaning that aggregate foreign affiliate sales fall with geographical barriers. Nevertheless,
only the most productive foreign affiliates buy intermediate inputs from their parent firms
in the U.S.; a fact that is robust across countries and also across industries (Ramondo
et al., 2014). From the perspective of the existing models, this implies that only sales of
foreign affiliates located at the upper-tail of the size distribution should suffer from gravity.
Conversely, in this subsection we present some evidence showing that the gravity of foreign
sales could not solely be explained by intra-firm trade. In fact, we show that even firms
that likely do not engage in intra-firm trade exhibit a significant resistance to geographical
barriers. Because most models of horizontal multinational production that feature intra-
firm trade fail to account for the observed selection of intra-firm trade—assuming that all
firms will require some fraction of the intermediate inputs from the parents— in section 4.4
we propose a model to account for the intensive and the extensive margin of intra-firm
trade.
Ideally, we would like to test the existence of gravity for two groups of firms: those
that participate in intra-firm trade transactions and those that do not. Unfortunately, for
this paper we do not have access to intra-firm trade data at the firm level.16 Instead, we
proceed to divide the U.S. affiliate firms by their size in two groups for any given host
country-sector pair. First, we split the whole sample of firms in two subsamples by the
50th percentile of the affiliates’ size distribution. This criteria is based on Ramondo et al.
(2014) that found that none of the affiliates below the median import intermediate inputs
from their parent firms.17,18 Second, we divide the sample of firms by those that belong
16In oder to overcome this limitation in the near future, we will merge Orbis firm level data with
the Census Bureau data, to get a perspective of the transaction between U.S. multinationals and
their foreign affiliates as well as of the economic activity of these affiliates overseas.
17Our criteria differs from Ramondo et al. (2014) in that they show that their finding is established
for the median firm in a given industry and for the median firm in a given region. Instead, we split
the sample based on the median firm in each country-sector pair.
18As discussed in the introduction of this paper, the fact that firms are not receiving intermediate
inputs from the parent firm, does not mean they are not engage in intra-firm trade with other affiliates
within the same corporation. Ramondo et al. (2014) find that regardless of its size, the majority of
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to the lower-tail (below 25th percentile) and the upper-tail (above 75th percentile) of the
firm size distribution, in each country-sector pair. Taking only the extremes of the firm size
distribution reduces the likelihood that the so called small firms could engage in intra-firm
trade, and increases the likelihood that the very large firms do.
Below we present the results of the gravity equation that comes from different specifi-
cations and samples. Table 4.1 presents the results of the regression for the intensive and
extensive margin of multinational activity (column 1 and 2) as well as for the extensive
margin only (column 3 and 4). It includes all U.S. multinational firms in our sample, and
the data has been aggregated up to the country-sector level. As a proxy of geographical
barriers we have included the log of physical distance (ln (disti,ua)), a set of dummy vari-
ables indicating whether countries share a common border (Borderi,us), common language
(Languagei,us), belong to a given regional trade agreement (RTAi,us) and whether they
had a colony relationship (Colonyi,us). In column 1 and 3 we also control for some key
characteristics of the host country that could determine the scale of foreign operations and
so directly affect the volume of local sales as well as the intra-firm trade. These controls
include the capital endowment relative to the U.S., a measure of the size of the market
(GDP per capita) as well as a proxy of institutional quality measured by the Rule of Law
variable from the Worldwide Governance Indicators database of the World Bank. In order
to account for other country characteristics that are potential determinants of FDI and
that are not included in our regression, such as relative technology differences and skill
endowments among others, in column 2 and 3, we include instead country fixed effects to
control for any country specific characteristic that could affect the gravity of multinational
production. Notice that in both specifications sector fixed effects are included to control
for the great observed heterogeneity of MP at the sectoral level that can affect the impact
of gravity variables on MP sales as well as on the number of firms that produce overseas.
Consistent with previous studies, both the total affiliates sales and the number of U.S.
parents are decreasing with trade barriers, and in particular, they are declining in distance
firms sell their output to unaffiliated parties in the host country, which although indirectly, could
partially alleviate concerns about trade among foreign affiliates. Unfortunately, intra-firm imports
from other than the U.S. parents is not captured by the available data sources.
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from the United Sates in both specifications. Having a common language positively af-
fect both margins as well; nevertheless, it loses statistically significance once we control for
country fixed effect. The existence of a trade agreement between the United States and the
host economy significantly increases the affiliates’ sales but negatively affects the number of
firms that engage in foreign production. A potential explanation is that trade agreements
increase the sales of the U.S. firms in the foreign market by facilitating intra-firm transac-
tions with the parent firm, but reduce the number of firms that find it profitable to engage
in MP given that exporting gets more attractive. Of the hots-country specific variables, the
size of the host country market (GDP) and the level of capital were significant and of the
expected sign. On the other hand, foreign affiliate sales fall in host country institutional
quality.19
To further explore whether the negative effect of geographical barriers on MP for the
whole sample are not only driven by those firms who engage in intra-firm trade, Table 4.2
and Table 4.3 present the results of gravity on number of firms and MP sales, respectively,
but this time dividing the sample on firms below and above the median of the firm size
distribution in each country-sector pair. Column 1 and 2 show that, for both groups,
the number of firms and the MP sales decrease with distance, showing a negative and
statistically significant coefficient for firms below and above the median. Notice that the
coefficient of the distance variable in Table 4.3 are very similar when country fixed effects
are included. But, in order to evaluate the aggregate effect of the variables associated with
gravity, we compute the bilateral MP costs based on the estimated coefficients to evaluate
the distribution of MP cost for both groups.20. Figure 4.7 shows the density of MP costs
for both groups. As can be observed the mean of both groups is similar but the variance of
19At a first glance, this seems a very surprisingly result but it is possible that it is driven by
the fact that U.S. has less room to exploit its institutional comparative advantage in countries with
high law enforcement level. In the light of the theory of the boundaries of the firm, this finding
could go with both of the leading theories in this vein: transaction costs theory and property rights
theory. According to transaction costs theory, better institutional setting reduces the need for ver-
tical integration-reducing the number of majority own affiliates. Incorporating this finding with
the property rights theory is more subtle: if contractibility is a more of issue on the investments
carried by the headquarter, then the result is consistent with the property rights theory; as institu-
tions advance, the need to provide more incentives to headquarter declines, leading to less vertical
integration.
20We calculate the following equation based on the gravity estimated coefficients for each country-
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MP cost is considerable higher for smaller firms, showing that some country-sector pairs of
this group are strongly affected by MP costs.
Given that we are relying on the size of the firm as a proxy of its participation in intra-
firm trade, we reproduce the above exercise but this time we only consider firms under the
25th percentile, which most likely do not to engage in intra-firm trade, as well as firms above
the 75th percentile of the distribution, which most likely conduct intra-firm transactions.21
Table 4.2 reproduces the gravity regression for the group of firms in the tails of the firms
size distribution. Consistent with previous results for both groups of firms, foreign sales
and number of firms are significantly lower in countries far from the U.S.
So far, the evidence shows that regardless of their size—and therefore on whether or
not firms do intra-firm trade—multinational sales are significant affected by gravity forces,
either measured by distance only or distance plus other gravity variables. Therefore the
collected evidence shows that the data rejects a model in which the only source of MP
gravity comes from intra-firm trade. The model presented in the next section attempts to
address two important aspects of the data. Fist, the observed selection in intra-firm trade:
only very few and large firms conduct intra-firm transaction across border within the firm.
Second, it proposes another source of gravity to capture the fact that also multinational
firms that do not trade with the affiliates are significantly affected by the gravity forces.
4.4 The Model
Our model is based on Helpman et al. (2004). Firms are heterogeneous in term of their
productivities. Goods are horizontally differentiated with each variety produced by a firm
that acts as a monopolist. A firm can enter the foreign market via exporting or by opening a
foreign affiliate in the destination market (FDI). As is well known, in choosing between either
sector pair:
τ̂mpi,us = β̂d × lndisti,us + β̂b × borderi,us + β̂language × lani,us + β̂RTA ×RTAi,us + β̂c × colonyi,us
21The fact that the firm size follows a Zipf law distribution, and also that the distribution of
foreign sales is very fat tailed, could induce that some firms above the median are not large enough
to trade within the firm.
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mode of entry, a firm faces a proximity-concentration trade off: establishing a foreign affiliate
is associated with lower variable trade costs but higher fixed cost of conducting multinational
production. The model predicts a definitive firms’ hierarchy: least productive firms do not
produce, low productive firms only sell to the domestic market, medium productive firms
export, and most productive firm turn into multinational corporations. Furthermore, as
in Irarrazabal et al. (2013) and Keller and Yeaple (2013), we introduce parent-to-affiliate
intra-firm trade to generate FDI-gravity akin to the standard trade-gravity.
The model contributes to the literature in many ways. First, in order to be consistent
with the stylized facts (i.e., intra-firm trade is concentrated among the very most produc-
tive multinational corporations, with the majority of FDI firms report zero intra-firm), we
introduce fixed cost of intra-firm trade. Second, in contrast to Irarrazabal et al. (2013),
the share of imported intermediate inputs to the total intermediate inputs costs is not con-
stant and varies with firm’s size. Unlike Keller and Yeaple (2013) and consistent with the
empirical fact that the share of intermediate inputs to total input costs is also increasing
with firm size, we tie firm’s productivity to firm’s knowledge intensity (R&D) to associate
intra-firm with firm’s size. Finally, we show that FDI-gravity style forces are presented in
the model even for the foreign affiliates that do not import from their parents.
4.4.1 Consumer Demand
The world economy consists of N countries (indexed by i, n). Each country is populated
by Ln utility-maximizer consumers, with each consumer inelastically supplying one unit of
labor (the only factor of production). A representative consumer in country n derives her
utility from the consumption of a homogenous good Q0 and a continuum of differentiated
goods that belong to the differentiated sector Qn. Consumer’s preferences between the
homogenous good and the differentiated goods sector are represented by the Cobb-Douglas
utility function with an income fraction µ spent on the differentiated goods
Un = Q
1−µ
0 Q
µ
n, µ ∈ (0, 1) (4.1)
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Preferences over the differentiated goods are CES with elasticity of substitution σ > 1.
The consumption of each variety ω in the set of all available varieties in country n, Ωn
(endogenously determined); qd(ω), enters the CES aggregation symmetrically
Qn =
[ˆ
ω∈Ωn
qd(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
] σ
σ−1
. (4.2)
As is well know, the demand for each variety in country n is given by: qd(ω) = Anpn(ω)
−σ.
Here, pn(ω) denotes the price of variety ω in country n. The index of market size in country
n, An is exogenous from the point of view of consumers and individual producers.
22
4.4.2 Production and Market Structure
The market for the homogenous good is perfectly competitive, and the production technol-
ogy of the homogenous product is linear in labor: wn units of labor are required to produce
one unit of the homogenous good in country n. The homogenous good is freely traded in
the world economy. So long as 1 − µ, Ln, and the variable trade costs are large enough,
the production of the homogenous good Q0 in country n ∈ {1, 2, . . . N} is strictly positive.
The price of the homogenous good is normalized to one; in effect, the wage in country n is
pinned down by the numeraire and is equal to wn.
23
Each country n is endowed with exogenously given potential number of firms (producers)
Jn. Each firm produces a unique variety using a variety-specific composite intermediate
input. Productivity ϕ ∈ R++ is a firm-specific that is drawn from a known cumulative
distribution G(ϕ) with probability density distribution g(ϕ). Since ϕ is firm-specific, and
each firm produces a unique variety we index goods with ϕ instead of ω. A firm with
productivity draw ϕ requires 1ϕ units of the firm-specific composite intermediate input Mϕ
to produce one unit of variety ω(ϕ). The composite intermediate input is produced under
a CES aggregation of a continuum of intermediate inputs with elasticity of substitution
22An ≡ µ XnP 1−σn . The aggregate price level of the differentiated goods sector in country n is denoted
by Pn, and Xn represents the total expenditures in country n.
23The incomplete specialization assumption has been used by many researches for tractability
and simplification purposes (for example, see Chaney, 2008). Proceeding without the outside sector
will not alter the results presented in the paper, however.
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η ≥ 1:24
Mϕ =
(ˆ ∞
0
β(z|ϕ) 1ηm(z) η−1η dz
) η
η−1
. (4.3)
A couple of notes warrant attention here: (i) m(z) is the quantity of an intermediate input
of knowledge intensity z, with higher z indicating higher knowledge intensity, (ii) β(z|ϕ) is
the cost share of intermediate input z to the total cost of intermediate input bundle specific
to ϕ-firm, and
´∞
0 β(z|ϕ)dz = 1 for any ϕ, (iii) β(z|ϕ) is log-supermodular in z and ϕ.
That is, while all firms employ the same CES aggregation and use the same continuum of
intermediate inputs, the share of each intermediate input z to the total cost of intermediate
composite is firm specific. To be precise, β(z|ϕ) is log-supermodular in z and ϕ if for
z
′
> z
′′
and ϕ1 > ϕ2, β(z
′ |ϕ1)β(z′′ |ϕ2) > β(z′ |ϕ2)β(z′′ |ϕ1). In words, firm ϕ1 is more
knowledge-intensive because it requires relatively more knowledge-intensive intermediate
inputs relative the low productivity firm ϕ2,25, and (iv) production technology of producing
intermediate inputs is common across all firms: one unit of labor is needed to produce one
unit of z.
4.4.3 Mode of Entry
A domestic firm gains access to the domestic market in country n after incurring a fixed
cost of production fnn units of labor. Country i 6= n exporters to country n are subject to
both fixed export cost fni
26 units of country i labor, and iceberg-type variable trade costs,
τni− 1 > 0. Country i firms can also serve country n via FDI: pay a fixed cost of FDI, ffdini
units of country i labor, and start serving n via its affiliates there. In so doing, a firm avoids
the transportation costs associated with shipping the final good, but conveys an additional
fixed cost of opening an affiliate in country n. Conditional on establishing a foreign affiliate
in country n, a parent firm in country i has an option to let its affiliate to produce all
24It can be shown that the limit of the CES aggregation as η approaches one is a Cobb-Douglas.
25The intermediate composite aggregation and the notion of log-supermodularity were outsourced
from Keller and Yeaple (2013). In contrast to Keller and Yeaple (2013), knowledge-intensity is
defined on the firm level, not the industry level; a propriety that enables us to generate firm-level
prediction regarding intra-firm trade. For a formal treatment of the log-supermodular assumption
and its usage in the international trade context, see Costinot (2009).
26First subscript refers to the destination market and the second one to the origin country.
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intermediate inputs composite M (standard HMY setting), or chooses to ship intermediate
inputs to its affiliate (intra-firm trade) where the fraction of inputs offshored and the volume
of the intrafirm trade are endogenous. If a parent in country i decides to engage in zero
intra-firm trade with its affiliate (i.e., let the affiliate produce all the intermediate inputs
and the final good), and since Mϕ is firm-specific, the affiliate is not as efficient as its parent;
consequently, an affiliate needs tni(z) > 1 units of labor to produce one unit of intermediate
input z.27 In the case of intra-firm trade, a parent firm incurs a fixed cost of initiating an
intrafrim trade, f intni units of country i labor; the shipped intermediate inputs are subject
to the standard iceberg-type trade costs τni, while the intermediate inputs produced by an
affiliate are subject to productivity loss that is intermediate input specific tni(z) ≥ 1 (we
call it t(z) for notational simplicity).28
4.4.3.1 Intra-firm Trade and Knowledge Transfer
The production of intermediate input with knowledge intensity z is firm-knowledge-specific.
Moving knowledge over geographic space is costly. Transferring the knowledge required
to produce intermediate input z to an affiliate entails, for example, communication cost,
mis-implementation and mis-interpretation. Differently put, knowledge is not perfectly
codified and therefore any knowledge transfer between a parent and its affiliate is subject
to errors. Intuitively, the higher the knowledge intensity of the intermediate input z, the
higher are the cost of transferring knowledge from a parent to the affiliate. Knowledge
transfer takes two forms (i) disembodied knowledge transfer : parent firms directly transfer
the necessary knowledge of producing input z to their affiliates who use the transmitted
knowledge to produce that particular intermediate input. If this is the case, as mentioned
above, the knowledge transfer costs are denoted by t(z). To capture the idea that the cost
of moving knowledge over space is increasing with knowledge intensity z, we assume that
27A very crucial assumption to our model is that tni(ϕ) is a function of trade frictions τni.
Nevertheless, the impact of the distance between the two countries, language, time zone and borders
on trade frictions τni is stronger in the case of physical shipping compared with its effect on the cost
of knowledge transfer. Formally, 0 < ∂tni∂τ < 1. We elaborate more in this point and the former one
below.
28Again, trade costs rise faster with distance and other trade frictions than does tni(z).
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t(0) = 0, limz→∞ t(z) > τni and t′(z) > 0,29, and (ii) embodied knowledge transfer : simply,
a parent produces intermediate input z and ships it to the affiliate in country n.
Finally, the production technology of the final good is invariant to the location of the
producer (parent vs affiliate): regardless who produces the final good (parent or affiliate),
1
ϕ units of Mϕ are needed to produce one unit of the final good. The decisions whether to
export, to open an affiliate, and to outsource intermediate inputs production impact the
production of final good only through its impact on the production of the composite of
intermediate input Mϕ.
4.4.4 Partial Equilibrium
First, we characterize the geography of input sourcing. The decision whether to outsource
the production of intermediate input z is simply pinned down by comparing the cost of
embodied knowledge transfer wiτni and disembodied knowledge transfer wnt(z). The cost of
obtaining input z of a foreign affiliate is c(z) = min{wnt(z), wiτni}. Given our assumption
on the function t(z), there exists an intermediate input with knowledge intensity z˜ such
that : for any z < z˜, t(z) < $τni, and for z > z˜, t(z) > $τni. Then, we define z˜(τni$) =
t−1(τni, $), where $ ≡ wiwn . Conditional on serving market n by FDI, we characterize the
cost of the composite intermediate input to an affiliate with productivity draw ϕ,30
CMni (τni, I(ϕ), ϕ,$) =
wnt¯ if I(ϕ) = 0,(´ z˜(τni,$)
0 β(z|ϕ)(t(z)wn)1−ηdz + (τniwi)1−η
´∞
z˜(τni,$)
β(z|ϕ)dz
) 1
1−η
if I(ϕ) = 1.
The indicator function I(ϕ) equals one if an affiliate outsources some of the intermediate
inputs from its parent and zero otherwise. As we show below, the indicator function depends
29Notice that the cost of knowledge transfer is not firm-specific; however, the aggregate cost of
disembodied knowledge transfer for a given fraction of the intermediate inputs varies across firms
because of the log-supermodulity assumption.
30t¯ ≡ ´∞
0
β(z|ϕ)t(z)1−ηdz.
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on firm’s productivity draw ϕ. Indeed, CMni (τni, I(ϕ) = 1, ϕ) < CMni (τni, I(ϕ) = 0, ϕ).31 The
elasticity of CMni (τni, I(ϕ) = 1, ϕ,$) with respect to trade costs τni, εMC(τni, ϕ,$) is given
by
εMC(τni, ϕ,$) =
(wiτni)
1−η ´∞
z˜(τni,$)
β(z|ϕ)dz´ z˜(τni,$)
0 β(z|ϕ)(t(z)wn)1−ηdz + (τniwi)1−η
´∞
z˜(τni,$)
β(z|ϕ)dz
. (4.4)
In order to show that within all firms that decide to enter country n by establishing a foreign
affiliate, only a subset of those firms (the most productive) choose to ship intermediate
inputs to its affiliates, we introduce the following lemmas,
Lemma IV.1. The elasticity of marginal cost of composite intermediate input with respect
to trade costs τni is increasing in firm’s productivity ϕ. For ϕ
1 > ϕ2, εMC(τni, $, ϕ
1) >
εMC(τni, $, ϕ
2) > 0.
Lemma IV.2. let θ(τni, ϕ,$) be the share of imported inputs M(τni, ϕ,$) in total compos-
ite intermediate input costs TC(τni, ϕ,$). Then, θ(τni, ϕ,$) =
M(τni,ϕ,$)
T (τni,ϕ,$)
= εMC(τni, ϕ,$)
is (i) increasing in ϕ, (ii) the import cost share is declining in trade costs for all firms, and
(iii) the rate of decline in the import cost share is slower in the more knowledge intensive
firms.
Despite the fact that all firms choose to import the same range of intermediate inputs
(notice that t(z) and τni are not firm-specific), the share of the imported intermediate inputs
to the total composite intermediate input costs varies across firms in a way consistent with
the log-supermodularity assumption. Accordingly, all the variations in the share of the
imported intermediate inputs to the total costs are on the intensive margin not the extensive
31The results emanates from firm’s optimization and the definition of z˜(τ,$). In fact, on might
even argue that t¯ ≤ (´∞
0
β(z|ϕ)(wnt(z))1−ηdz
) 1
1−η , since an affiliate that was assigned to produce
all the intermediate inputs will be on average more efficient in producing any intermediate input z
compared to an affiliate that produces a fraction of the intermediate inputs. This could be as a result
of external return to scale or knowledge spillover and learning by doing hypothesis. Regardless, t¯
is strictly higher than CMni (τ, ϕ, I). Moreover, an important assumption has to be made here:t
wnt¯ < wiτni. Otherwise no firm chooses FDI without intrafirm over exporting.
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margin.32 Lemma IV.1 is of great importance in the current setting: more knowledge
intensive firms are more vulnerable to trade costs because they are more dependent on
the imported intermediate inputs from their parents (Lemma IV.2). Reframing, the firm-
level gains from trade liberalization (savings in marginal cost) are positively related to
firm’s knowledge intensity, i.e., productivity. The second part of Lemma IV.2 is trivial and
intuitive. The third part of the same Lemma spawns from Lemma IV.1.
To sum up, the two lemmas above highlight the role of firm’s knowledge intensity
(productivity), trade impediments and the interaction between the two in shaping in-
trafirm trade on the firm level. More knowledge-intensive firms are so because they require
more knowledge-intensive intermediate inputs. A more knowledge-intensive affiliate imports
higher share of its intermediate inputs from its parent, and consequently an increase in trade
costs raises the marginal cost of composite intermediate input of more knowledge-intensive
affiliate proportionally more than less knowledge-intensive firms. Changes in trade costs
impact firms’ decision regarding embodied and disembodied knowledge transfer; yet the
degree of substitution between them is significantly less for more knowledge intensive firms.
An increase in trade costs, for example, leads to less decrease in the share of imported inputs
to aggregate composite intermediate input costs for high knowledge-intensive affiliate since
the more knowledge-intensive affiliate’s ability to substitute embodied with disembodied
knowledge transfer is constrained by the large demand for the highly knowledge-intensive
inputs.
Embodied vs Disembodied Knowledge Transfer: Given the isoelastic demand facing
each working firm in country n, profits for an affiliate in country n and a parent in country
32If we let t(z) be dependent on firm’s productivity, both the extensive and the intensive margin
of imported inputs will vary across firms. All the results presented in the paper will be reinforced.
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i can be written as,33
piaffni = ϕ
σ−1BnCMni (τni, I(ϕ), ϕ,$)1−σ − wi(ffdini + I(ϕ)f intni ), (4.5)
An affiliate chooses to outsource intermediate inputs from parent if and only if the increase
in its profits due to the decrease in the marginal cost of composite intermediate input is
large enough to cover the fixed cost of intrafirm;
ϕσ−1Bn
[
∆CMni (τni, I(ϕ), ϕ,$)
] ≥ wif intni , (4.6)
where ∆CMni (τni, I(ϕ), ϕ,$) ≡ CMni (τni, I(ϕ) = 1, ϕ)1−σ − CMni (τni, I(ϕ) = 0, ϕ)1−σ denotes
the gains in variable profits as a result of the decline in the marginal cost of composite
intermediate input once an affiliate starts intrafirm trade with its parent. In the Appendix,
we show that the left hand side of Equation (4.6) is continuos and strictly increasing in ϕ.
As a result, there exists a productivity cutoff ϕintni such that all affiliates with productivity
above it choose to import a fraction of its intermediate inputs from their parents, whereas,
conditional on FDI, firms with productivity below it do not import from parents.
Proposition IV.1. There exists a productivity cutoff ϕintni such that
I(ϕ) =

1 if ϕ ≥ ϕintni
0 otherwise
That is, only the most productive foreign affiliates in country n engage in intrafirm trade
with their parents (import intermediate inputs from their parents).
33Bn ≡ 1σ
(
σ
σ−1
)1−σ
An. Notice that the marginal cost of producing the final good is given by
CMni(ϕ,.)
ϕ , which we require to be strictly decreasing in ϕ. This can be done by imposing a specific
functional form on CMni (ϕ) such that the marginal cost of the final good is decreasing in ϕ or,
equivalently, we assume that firm’s draw ϕ is transformed to actual firm’s productivity via a strictly
increasing function f(ϕ) such that the marginal cost of the final good is decreasing in ϕ.
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The productivity cutoff ϕintni is simply pinned down from equation (4.6):
(ϕintni )
σ−1Bn
[
∆CMni (τni, I(ϕ), ϕintni , $)
]
= wif
int
ni . (4.7)
The FDI cutoff ϕfdini < ϕ
int
ni is found by the usual way: equating export profits pini(ϕ) with
FDI profits without intrafirm pifdini
(ϕfdini )
σ−1Bn
[
CMni (τni, I(ϕ) = 0, ϕfdini , $)1−σ − (wiτni)1−σ
]
= wi(f
fdi
ni − fni). (4.8)
Exporting cutoff to country n is given by;,
ϕσ−1ni Bn(wiτni)
1−σ − wifni = 0 (4.9)
To complete the characterization of varieties produced and consumed in country n, the zero
profit cutoff (ZPC) is as usual,
ϕσ−1nn Bnw
1−σ
n − wnfnn = 0 (4.10)
Parameter Restrictions and Firms Hierarchy: Consistent with the literature we im-
pose the following restrictions on the model’s parameters to sustain firms’ hierarchy in the
HMY.
• Exporters are more productive than nonexporters: ϕii < ϕni; if, under symmetric
countries, fni > τ
1−σ
in fii.
• Exporters are less productive than multinational firms: ϕni < ϕfdini ; if ffdini > (τni$)σ−1t¯1−σfni,
and t¯ < $τni.
• Multinational firms with nonzero intrafirm are more productive than multinational
with zero intarfirm: ϕintni > ϕ
fdi
ni ; if f
int
ni > 0.
34
The geography of foreign affiliate sales: A country i foreign affiliate sales in country
34In fact, f intni has to be greater than f
fdi
ni − fni.
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n, raffni (ϕ) are given by
raffni (ϕ) = σϕ
σ−1Bn
[
CMni (τni, I(ϕ), ϕ,$)
]1−σ
(4.11)
Proposition IV.2. (Gravity): Country i foreign affiliate sales (conditional on opening an
affiliate) in country n, raffni (ϕ) are decreasing in trade costs τni. Let ε
r
ni(ϕ, τni) < 0 be the
elasticity of affiliate sales with respect to trade costs, then the absolute value of εrni(ϕ, τni) is
increasing in ϕ. In words, the sales of more knowledge intensive firms (affiliates) are more
sensitive to trade costs. That is, FDI-Gravity is more pronounce for more knowledge
intensive parents-affiliates.
4.5 Parameterization, Functional Forms and
Estimation
First, we provide functional forms of the log-supermodular function β(z|ϕ), the cost of
disembodied knowledge transfer, and the distribution of productivity draw. Before pro-
ceeding further, we set η = 1, and therefore Mϕ is a Cobb-Douglas composite intermediate
input: Mϕ = C.exp
{´∞
0 β(z|ϕ)lnm(z)dz
}
.35 The correspondent cost function of the inter-
mediate input composite: C = exp
{´∞
0 β(z|ϕ)lnwzdz
}
. In our context, assuming wi = 1
for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, domestic producers composite intermediate input cost is given by
CMnn = 1, while
CMni (τni, ϕ, I) =

t¯ if I = 0,
exp
{´ z˜
0 β(z|ϕ)ln t(z)dz +
´∞
z˜ β(z|ϕ)ln τnidz
}
if I = 1
Following Keller and Yeaple (2013), we set the knowledge transfer function t(z) = exp {z}.
Let φ(ϕ) denote ϕ-firm’s knowledge intensity where φ(ϕ) is weakly increasing in ϕ. In order
to simplify the analysis, we assume that φ(ϕ) takes two values low and high: φ(ϕ) ∈ {φl, φh}.
35C ≡ ´∞
0
β(z|ϕ)lnβ(z|ϕ)dz is constant.
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We adopted a very simple reduced form to connect the well documented relationship between
firm’s size (productivity) and knowledge intensity; specifically, for any ϕ(φ) > ϕintni , φ = φ
h
and φ = φl otherwise. This greatly simplifies the analysis without altering our results
regarding the correlation between intrafirm trade and firm’s knowledge-intensity. We still
able to use this simple functional form to compare intrafirm trade across firms with different
knowledge intensity. Accordingly, we change the notation slightly: we use β(z|φ) instead
of β(z|ϕ). The cost share function β(z|φ) is log-supermodular in z and φ; therefore, we let
β(z|φ) be an exponential with parameter 1φ .36
We additionally assume that the costs of disembodied technology transfer also vary
with destination-original pair characteristics. Broadly, the factors that are widely used in
estimating trade costs between countries are also expected to affect the costs of disembodied
technology transfer but with less order of magnitude: tni(z) = gnit(z). Hence, t¯ni =
gniexp
{´∞
0 β(z|φ)ln t(z)dz
}
.37 To operationalize the model we let gni = τ
α
ni, where α ∈
(0, 1). With the functional forms at hand, the marginal cost of obtaining the composite
intermediate input for an affiliate with knowledge intensity φ ∈ {φl, φh} is
CMni (τni, I, φ) =

t¯ = ταniexp{φ} if I = 0,
exp
{
φ
(
1− τ
α−1
φ
ni
)
+ αlnτni
}
if I = 1
(4.12)
Providing that τni > gniexp{φl}.38
4.5.1 Foreign affiliate’s sales: firm-level gravity
Foreign affiliate’s sales are given by equation (4.11). Given the functional forms provided
in this section, we have:
rfdini = σϕ
σ−1Bn (ταniexp(φ))
1−σ , (4.13)
36β(z|φ) = 1φexp
{
−z
φ
}
. It is straightforward to check that logβ(z|φ) is supermodular and´∞
0
β(z|φ)dz = 1.
371 < gni < τni. Akin to τni, gni denotes the costs of disembodied knowledge transfer as a
function of distance, common border and language, the time zone of n, i, colonial origins,...
38This assumption is needed in order for the FDI cutoff to be well defined. φl is very small such
that exp(φl) ≈ 1.
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and
rintni = σϕ
σ−1Bn
(
exp
{
φ(1− τ
α−1
φ
ni ) + αlnτni
})1−σ
. (4.14)
Accordingly, the elasticity of foreign affiliate’s sales with respect to trade costs is given by;
εrni(φ, τni, I) =

(1− σ)α < 0, if I = 0,
(1− σ)
(
(1− α)τ
α−1
φ
ni + α
)
< 0, if I = 1
(4.15)
It is straightforward to verify that the sales of affiliates who import from their parents
respond relatively more than the sales of affiliates who do do important from parents. Fur-
thermore, for affiliates who import from their parents, their sales are more responsive to
change in trade costs the higher the knowledge intensity:
∂εrni(φ,τni)
∂φ < 0.
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Figure 4.1: Profit from domestic sales, exports, FDI and intra-firm trade
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Notes: This figure shows the different productivity cutoff for different firms, where (ϕD)
1−σ
represents the cutoff for domestic producers, (ϕX)
1−σ
represents the cutoff for exporters, (ϕfdi)
1−σ
represents the cutoff for firms engaging in multinational production, and (ϕintra)
1−σ
represents the
cutoff for foreign affiliates that also engage in intra-firm trade
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4.6 General Equilibrium
Using the functional forms in the previous section, here we solve the economy general equilib-
rium aggregate variables. Consistent with the literature, we assume that firm’s productivity
is distributed Pareto with shape parameter κ,39
G(ϕ) = 1− ϕ−κ, for ϕ > 1, and κ > σ − 1.
The relevant cutoffs for country-pair (n, i) are given as follows40
Zero profit cutoff ZPC : ϕσ−1nn =
fnn
Bn
Export cuttoff : ϕσ−1ni =
fni
Bn
τσ−1ni
FDI cutoff : (ϕfdini )
σ−1 =
ffdini − fni
BnC1ni
Intrafirm cutoff : (ϕintni )
σ−1 =
f intni
BnC2ni
As we show in Figure 4.1, the logic of the standard HMY model is strongly presented in our
framework. At the heart of it is the proximity-concentration trade-off (in figure proximity
is represented by the slope of each profit’s line, while concentration is represented by y-axis
intersection). However, in HMY model, the line representing the profits for affiliates who
import piint does not exist, and the line denoted by pifdi is parallel to the domestic profits
line. In a model with FDI and Intra-firm Irarrazabal et al. (2013), the line representing
the profits for affiliates who do not import from parents pifdi is missing since by default all
39The assumption that κ > σ − 1 ensures the the distribution of firm’s size has a finite mean.
In general, G(ϕ) = 1 −
(
ϕmin
ϕ
)κ
, and κ > 2. We work with ϕmin = 1. In this section we assume
that all firms in a given sector share the same knowledge-intensity given by the mean of knowledge-
intensity of all firms operating in that particular sector. Our main goal in this sectionderiving
sectoral aggregate affiliates’ sales (sectoral aggregate gravity) is preserved under this simplification.
In this vein, our model becomes very similar to Keller and Yeaple (2013) with an exception of
affiliates’ endogenous selection into importers and non-importers from their parents.
40C1ni ≡ τα(1−σ)ni exp {φ(1− σ)} − τ1−σni > 0.
C2ni ≡ exp{φ(1− τ
α−1
φ
ni ) + αlnτni}1−σ − τα(1−σ)ni exp {φ(1− σ)} > 0.
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affiliates import from parents.
Aggregate price index: The aggregate price index in country n is given by;
P 1−σn = Jn
ˆ ∞
ϕnn
pnn(ϕ)
1−σdG(ϕ) +
N∑
i 6=n
Ji
ˆ ∞
ϕni
pni(ϕ)
1−σdG(ϕ), (4.16)
pni(ϕ) =

σ
σ−1
τni
ϕ if ϕni < ϕ < ϕ
fdi
ni
σ
σ−1
ταniexp(φ)
ϕ if ϕ
fdi
ni < ϕ < ϕ
int
ni
σ
σ−1
exp(φ(1−τ
α−1
φ
ni )+αlnτni)
ϕ if ϕ
int
ni < ϕ
Evaluating the integration and using the Pareto distribution assumption,41
P−κn =
κ
κ− (σ − 1)
(
σ
σ − 1
)−κ(µXn
σ
)κ−(σ−1)
σ−1
Ξn (4.17)
Indeed, Xn is an endogenous variable. Since the mass of firms is exogenously given, the
aggregate profits of country n firms, including affiliates’ profits, are strictly positive. Ac-
cordingly, total income/expenditure in country n is the sum of labor income and aggregate
profits of all country n firms: Xn = wnLn + Πn. As in Chaney (2008), we assume that each
consumer in country n holds wn shares in a completely diversified mutual global fund with s
dividends per share in terms of the numeriare. Additionally, as in Eaton and Kortum (2002)
and Chaney (2008), Ji is proportional to the size of labor force in country n; Jn = wnLn.
Therefore, Xn = wnLn(1+s), and Jn =
Xn
1+s . In the Appendix, we show that s is a function
of the model’s exogenous parameters: s = σ−1σ(κ−1)+1 .
The aggregate equilibrium price level in country n is the solution of Equation (4.17)
in terms of the model’s exogenous parameters. Once Pn obtained, we can retrieve all the
relevant cutoffs, trade flows, foreign affiliates’ sales, and economic welfare.
41Ξn ≡
∑N
i=1 Ji
(
τ−κni f
σ−1−κ
σ−1
ni + Ii6=n
{
(ffdini − fni)
σ−1−κ
σ−1 C
κ
σ−1
1ni + (f
int
ni )
σ−1−κ
σ−1 C
κ
σ−1
2ni
})
. The indi-
cator function Ii 6=n = 1 if i 6= n and zero otherwise.
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4.6.1 Aggregate Sales: Gravity Equations
The model delivers three gravity equations: (i) Aggregate export sales from country i
to country n: Xni, (ii) Country i foreign affiliates’ sales in country n, with no intrafirm
between parents and affiliates; Xfdini , and (iii) Country i foreign affiliates’ sales in country
n, for affiliates that import from parents; Xintni .
42
Xni =
µXnXiτ
−κ
ni δni
Ξn
(4.18)
Xfdini =
µXnXi {ταniexp(φ)}−κ λni
Ξn
(4.19)
Xintni =
µXnXiexp
{
φ
(
1− τ
α−1
φ
ni
)
+ α(lnτni)
}−κ
ϑni
Ξn
(4.20)
Ξn is a reminiscent of the multilateral resistance term in Eaton and Kortum (2002). It is a
measure of country n attractiveness (remoteness) taking into account all trading countries.
The bilateral terms δni, λni, and ϑni depend only on country i and country n parameters.
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Relative to the standard gravity equation (e.g., Melitz-Chaney style model with no FDI),
the impact of variable trade costs on country i exporters to country n is more involved.
Without FDI sales, country i aggregate exports to country n can be decomposed into the
intensive and the extensive margins, with the average exporter’s sales being invariant to
variable trade costs and the mass of exporting firms negatively associated with trade costs.
In the presence of FDI sales, variable trade costs impact both the mass of exporters and the
average export sales per firm. In Chaney (2008), for instance, δni is a function of fixed costs
of export fni, and does not depend on τni. Here, λni is a function of τni, and therefore the
42With a slight abuse of notation, we redefine Ξn ≡
∑N
i=1 Li(1 +
s)
(
τ−κni f
σ−1−κ
σ−1
ni + Ii6=n
{
(ffdini − fni)
σ−1−κ
σ−1 C
κ
σ−1
1ni + (f
int
ni )
σ−1−κ
σ−1 C
κ
σ−1
2ni
})
.
43δni ≡ f
σ−1−κ
σ−1
ni −
[
ffdini −fni
τ
(1−σ)(α−1)
ni exp(φ(1−σ))−1
]σ−1−κ
σ−1
, λni ≡
[
ffdini −fni
1−τ(1−σ)(1−α)ni exp(φ(σ−1))
]σ−1−κ
σ−1
−
[
fintni
(ταniexp(φ))
σ−1C2ni
]σ−1−κ
σ−1
, and ϑni ≡
 fintni(
exp((φ(1−τ
α−1
φ
ni )+αlnτni)
)σ−1
C2ni

σ−1−κ
σ−1
. Our assumptions
about firms hierarchy and the necessary parameter restrictions to maintain it are sufficient for both
δni and ϑni to be positive. On the other hand λni is positive if f
int
ni > (f
fdi
ni − fni)C2niC1ni .
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response of Xni to changes in τni depends on changes in δni and τ
−κ
ni . Formally, let ξX,τ be
the elasticity of aggregate exports sales between countries i and n with respect to variable
trade costs τni, and ξδ,τ is the elasticity of δ with respect to τ , then
44
ξX,τ = −κ− |ξδ,τ | < 0, (4.21)
Likewise, the elasticity of of aggregate foreign affiliate sales for affiliates that do not import
from their parents with respect to variable trade costs, and the elasticity of aggregate foreign
affiliates’ sales for affiliates the import from their parents are, respectively, given by45
ξXfdi,τ = −ακ+ ξλ,τ < 0 (4.22)
ξXint,τ = −
[
τ
α−1
φ
ni (1− α) + α
]
κ+ ξϑ,τ < 0 (4.23)
Aggregate affiliates’ sales (for importer affiliates) decrease as trade costs increase. It is
straightforward to show this since the second term of Equation (4.23) is negative for any
α ∈ (0, 1). The finding that foreign affiliates’ sales are negatively correlated with trade
costs for the affiliates who import from their parents is not surprising and consistent with
the models that introduce intrafirm trade between affiliates and parents Irarrazabal et al.
(2013) and Keller and Yeaple (2013). We are mainly interested in the gravity equation for
affiliates who report zero intrafirm with their parents. The intrafirm trade mechanism that
puts gravity forces in play is ceased in the case of small affiliates who never import from
parents. Nonetheless, as we show in equation (4.22), the sales of non-importer affiliates are
still suffering from gravity forces (see the Appendix for formal derivations and the conditions
for DI gravity to hold). In our context, affiliates need the knowledge-specific to produce
the final good, which it can obtain through importing intermediate inputs from parents-
embodying knowledge- or through direct knowledge transfer, which is not observed in the
44ξδ,τ = −κ−(σ−1)σ−1
[
ffdini −fni
τσ−1C1ni
]σ−1−κ
σ−1 −1 [ (1−σ)(α−1)τ(1−σ)(α−1)−1exp(φ(1−σ)
(τσ−1C1ni)2
]
τ
δ < 0.
45ξϑ,τ = (κ− (σ − 1))
[
τα(1−σ) exp(φ(1−σ))C2ni
(
(α− 1)τ α−1φ
)]
< 0. Deriving the sign of ξλ,τ involves
a tremendous algebra and is not trivial. In general, ξλ,τ is negative if α and f
int
ni are large enough
(see the Appendix for details). Nonetheless, ξXfdi,τ is negative as long as α is not very close to zero.
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data. Since trade frictions impact the cost of knowledge transfer, affiliates’ marginal cost
and sales are negatively affected by the distance from headquarter and other common trade
frictions.
In order to comment on the role of intensive and extensive margins in the gravity
equations above, in a line with Chaney (2008), we formally introduce the impact of changing
variable trade costs on the intensive margin (sales of existing firms) and the extensive margin
(sales of new entrants). By differentiating the expression for aggregate exports from country
i to country n Xni = Ji
´ ϕfdini
ϕni
rni(ϕ)dG(ϕ), the following expression for the elasticity of Xni
with respect to τni is obtained,
46
ξX,τ =
Intensive margin︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− σ) +
Extensive margin︷ ︸︸ ︷
κ− (σ − 1)
ϕσ−1−κni − (ϕfdini )σ−1−κ
[
ξϕfdi,τ (ϕ
fdi
ni )
σ−1−κ − ϕσ−1−κni
]
, (4.24)
where, ξϕfdi,τ denotes the elasticity of FDI cutoff with respect to variable trade costs. If
ξϕfdi,τ is negative then both the sales of existing exporters and the sales of new exporters
decrease with trade costs. By contrast, if α is large enough, ξϕfdi,τ is positive; yet it is still
small enough such that the extensive margin continues to be negative. In fact, ξϕfdi,τ < 1 for
any value of α ∈ (0, 1).47 Consistent with our finding that the number of foreign affiliates in
the lower tail of firm’s size distribution decreases as the distance from headquarter increases,
we proceed with positive elasticity of FDI cutoff with respect to trade costs, 0 < ξϕfdi,τ < 1
(i,e., α is large enough). Interestingly, even if the FDI cutoff is increasing in τ , as in HMY,
the ratio of the number of multinational firms to the number of exporters increases as trade
costs increase. Clearly, if FDI cutoff is ∞, the model collapses to Chaney’s model and
ξX,τ = −κ.
The same analysis for the aggregate sales of affiliates who do not import from parents,
46We use Leibniz integral rule to differentiate the aggregate exports expression.
47Specifically, ξϕfdi,τ =
αexp(φ(1−σ))−τ(1−σ)(1−α)ni
exp(φ(1−σ))−τ(1−σ)(1−α)ni
< 1.
164
Xfdini is executed,
ξXfdi,τ =
Intensive margin︷ ︸︸ ︷
α(1− σ) +
Extensive margin︷ ︸︸ ︷
κ− (σ − 1)
(ϕfdini )
σ−1−κ − (ϕintni )σ−1−κ
[
ξϕint,τ (ϕ
int
ni )
σ−1−κ − ξϕfdi,τ (ϕfdini )σ−1−κ
]
(4.25)
The elasticity of intra-firm cutoff with respect to variable trade costs is denoted by
ξϕint,τ .
48 In the Appendix we show that if the fixed cost of intrafirm trade is sufficiently
hight, the impact of trade costs on the extensive margin is negative as well.49
The impact of variable trade costs on the intensive and the extensive margins for affiliates
who import from their parents is as follows
ξXint,τ =
Intensive margin︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− σ)
[
(1− α)τ
α−1
φ
ni + α
]
−
Extensive margin︷ ︸︸ ︷
(κ− (σ − 1))ξϕint,τ . (4.26)
Both sales per existing affiliates and the sales of new importer affiliates decline as trade
costs increase. An intriguing result here is that although the impact of trade costs on the
intensive margin unambiguously larger for importer-affiliates than non-importer affiliates,
the relative impact on the extensive margin for non-importer affiliates relative to importer
affiliates is ambiguous: the sales of new entrants/existing non-importer affiliates might
decline more than its counterpart for importer-affiliates as trade costs increase. In effect,
the overall impact of trade costs on the aggregate sales of non-importer affiliates might
even be stronger than its impact on the overall sales of importer affiliates because of the
extensive margin responses to increasing trade costs. In other word, gravity forces could
be stronger for affiliates who do not report intrafirm relative to affiliates who import from
parents.
48ξϕint,τ =
1
1−σ
∂lnC2ni
∂lnτ > 0.
49In fact, we also show the conditions under which FDI gravity equation holds even with positive
extensive margin. In general this will be the case for a wide range of parameter values.
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4.7 Conclusion
This paper starts by documenting an empirical regularity that cannot be fully taken into
account by existing theoretical frameworks: foreign affiliates’ sales are decreasing in trade
costs even for those affiliates who do not engage in intra-firm transactions. In order to
close this gap, we propose a new theoretical framework to rationalize this finding together
with another stylize fact: the majority of firms do not engage in intra-firm transactions and
even among those that do, intra-firm trade is highly concentrated in a small set of large
multinational firms. Internalizing these regularities into an unified model improves our
understanding of the nature and structure of multinational firms and the complex network
connections between parents and affiliates. In addition, it provides a guide to further develop
a quantitative framework that allows us to measure the welfare gains associated to reduction
in trade barriers in a granular economy, where not only exports and multinational activity
are subject to selection and are concentrated in a few big firms, but also the intra-firm
transaction across borders.
This paper is part of a larger research agenda which attempts to quantify the potentially
large gains from trade as well as the gains from multinational production that take place in
an economy where trade liberalization will not only impact physical trade but also transfer
of knowledge across countries. This could affect the employment in the host and the home
country, and consequently could have sizable implications in the skilled composition of
workers in both economies. Moreover, the interaction between trade costs and knowledge
transfer across firms might be an useful tool to advance the theory of the boundaries of
multinational firms.
Finally, relying on the quantitative extension of the presented theoretical framework, we
will proceed to evaluate the impact of idiosyncratic firms’ shocks on aggregate outcomes, in
an economy in which production and trade—both arm’s length and intra-firm—are concen-
trated among a small number of large multinational corporations. In particular, compared
with a counterfactual scenario in which producing overseas is prohibitively costly for all
firms, the observed aggregated volatility is expected to be significantly lower. This can be
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explained by the fact that in granular economies a large fraction of the small set of firms
that dominate the market are indeed foreign affiliate firms rather than solely local exporters.
The empirical analysis will use firm-level data to track the transactions of U.S. parents with
their foreign multinationals and to explore the heterogeneity of intra-firm trade in the upper
tail of the distribution and the persistence of gravity along firms of all sizes.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 4.2: Density of U.S Foreign Affiliate Sales
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This figure represents the density of U.S Foreign Affiliate Sales as a fraction of parent’s sales. As
can be observe the distribution of foreign affiliate sales is dominated by small affiliates, with the
presence of only few but large affiliates firms that account for the majority of the U.S.
multinational production.
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Figure 4.3: Market Penetration
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This figure represents the density of the number of markets in which U.S. parent firms produce.
The vertical lines represent the cutoff the the 50, 75, 95 and 99 percentile, respectively. Half of the
firms only have operations in only two or one foreign country. Only few parents engage in
multinational activity in more than seven foreign markets.
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Figure 4.4: Research and Development Share
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This figure shows the density of the parent’s R&D expenditure share in each of the 104
manufactured sectors of the NACE classification at three digit level of disaggregation. The share of
R&D is calculated as the fraction of the total Research and Development expenditure of the firm
relative to the total R&D expenditure of all U.S parents firms operating the the same NACE3
sectoral classification. The density is showed for the pool of firms-sectors in the sample
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Figure 4.5: Density of Firms’ R&D shares for selected industries
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This figure shows the density of the parent’s share of R&D expenditure share for four selected
three-digit level of NACE sector classification: 1) manufacturing of parts and accessories for motor
vehicles—NACE 293 (top-left panel); 2) manufacture of other special-purpose machinery—NACE
289 (top-right panel); 3) manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products—NACE 211 (bottom-left
panel), and 4) manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery—NACE 303 (bottom-right
panel). The share of R&D is calculated as the fraction of the total Research and Development
expenditure of the firm relative to the total R&D expenditure of all U.S parents firms operating
the the same 3 digit sectoral classification.
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Figure 4.6: Density of Fimrs’ Producivity by R&D group
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This figure shows the density of the productivity for two groups of parent firms: those for which
Orbis data contains information regarding the expenditure in research and development activities
(Known R&D); and those parent firms that contain missing values for R&D (Unknown R&D). The
productivity density is show for both groups in four selected industries at three-digit level of
NACE sector classification: 1) manufacturing of parts and accessories for motor vehicles—NACE
293 (top-left panel); 2) manufacture of other special-purpose machinery—NACE 289 (top-right
panel); 3) manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products—NACE 211 (bottom-left panel), and 4)
manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery—NACE 303 (bottom-right panel). Firms
productivity is measured by the output per worker of the U.S parent. Only one third of the U.S
parent firms (that at least have one affiliate overseas) show positive values of R&D expenditures.
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Table 4.1: Gravity Equation of MP (country-sector level)
Dep. Variable MP sales N. of firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln Dist –0.6999*** –0.7044*** –0.5525*** –0.0893**
(0.2165) (0.1190) (0.0687) (0.0427)
Border –2.8115*** –0.6675 –0.0831 1.7173***
(0.6920) (0.6752) (0.2231) (0.2990)
Language 0.3939* 1.0690 0.3643** 0.3681
(0.2069) (0.9952) (0.0711) (0.3664)
Colony –0.0449 1.1371*** 0.5632** 1.9199***
(0.1822) (0.3812) (0.0648) (0.1366)
RTA 1.5951*** 1.5730** –0.1314 –0.3411*
(0.3972) (0.7277) (0.1237) (0.1896)
Capital (relative US) 2.1510*** 2.1014***
(0.6134) (0.2844)
ln GDPperc 0.5664* 0.7646***
(0.3928) (0.1184)
Rule of Law –0.0198** –0.0196**
(0.0094) (0.0028)
Country FE No Yes No Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.Observations 1111 1111 1194 1194
Notes: Dependent variables: foreign affiliates sales relative to parent’s sales operating in each host
country-sector pair in column (1) and (2); Number of US parents with at least one affiliates in each
host country-sector pair in column (3) and (4). The regressors include the natural log of the
distance between U.S and the host market (ln Dist); a dummy for the participation of the host
market in a regional trade agreement (RTA), a dummy of common border (border), common
language (language) and whether or not the host market and U.S. had a colonial relationship
(colony). Other controls includes the level of capital endowment (Capital), the natural log of GDP
per capita and a measure of the institutional quality of the host country (Rule of Law). Robust
standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 ***
p < 0.01.
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Table 4.2: Gravity Equation of MP (country-sector level)
Dep. Variable Number of firms
(<50p) (>50p) (<50p) (>50p)
ln Dist –0.3536*** –0.5443*** –0.4954*** –0.4774***
(0.0573) (0.0819) (0.0743) (0.0672)
Border n/a n/a –0.3300 -0.1060
(0.2440) (0.2142)
Language 0.1747 0.7719*** 0.2371*** 0.3315***
(0.1282) (0.1938) (0.0790) (0.0738)
Colony 1.3362*** 0.7263** 0.4838*** 0.3913***
(0.1330) (0.2360) (0.0651) (0.0608)
RTA 0.5152*** –0.2478 0.0628 –0.1443
(0.1543) (0.2291) (0.1388) (0.1243)
Capital (relative US) 1.8563*** 1.6531***
(0.2701) (0.2720)
ln GDPperc 0.5076*** 0.4968***
(0.1232) (0.1153)
Rule of Law –0.0129*** –0.0136***
(0.0031) (0.0029)
Country FE Yes Yes No No
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.Observations 938 942 938 942
Notes: Dependent variables: Number of US parents with at least one affiliates in each host
country-sector pair. The regressors include the natural log of the distance between U.S and the
host market (ln Dist); a dummy for the participation of the host market in a regional trade
agreement (RTA), a dummy of common border (border), common language (language) and
whether or not the host market and U.S. had a colonial relationship (colony). Other controls
includes the level of capital endowment (Capital), the natural log of GDP per capita and a
measure of the institutional quality of the host country (Rule of Law). Robust standard errors
reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. n/a mean
not available, because a variable is collinear with country fixed effects
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Table 4.3: Gravity Equation of MP (country-sector level)
Dep. Variable MP Sales
(<50p) (>50p) (<50p) (>50p)
ln Dist –0.8568*** –0.8399*** –0.2594 –0.4007*
(0.1601) (0.1235) (0.0687) (0.2660)
Border –0.9984** –0.3156 –1.4844 –2.3741***
(0.4678) (0.7528) (0.2231) (0.8410)
Language 1.6716 1.1554 0.3216** 0.3004
(1.4587) (0.9505) (0.0711) (0.2294)
Colony 0.3474 1.2135** 0.5915** –0.0531
(1.3918) (0.4905) (0.0648) (0.1904)
RTA 0.8893 1.5286** –0.7275 1.7651*
(1.3877) (0.6900) (0.1237) (0.1896)
Capital (relative US) 1.4399*** 1.8031***
(0.2844) (0.6635)
ln GDPperc 0.7646*** 0.9009**
(0.1184) (0.4539)
Rule of Law –0.0196** -0.0197*
(0.0028) (0.0102)
Country FE Yes Yes No No
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.Observations 875 904 875 904
Notes: Dependent variables: foreign affiliates sales relative to parent’s sales operating in each host
country-sector pair. The regressors include the natural log of the distance between U.S and the
host market (ln Dist); a dummy for the participation of the host market in a regional trade
agreement (RTA), a dummy of common border (border), common language (language) and
whether or not the host market and U.S. had a colonial relationship (colony). Other controls
includes the level of capital endowment (Capital), the natural log of GDP per capita and a
measure of the institutional quality of the host country (Rule of Law). Robust standard errors
reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4.4: Gravity Equation of MP (country-sector level)
Dep. Variable Number of firms
(<25p) (>75p) (<25p) (>75p)
ln Dist –0.2780*** –0.4082*** –0.3604*** –0.2499***
(0.0289) (0.0479) (0.0674) (0.0600)
Border n/a n/a –0.1449 0.1369
(0.2123) (0.1782)
Language 0.0830 0.3979*** 0.2649*** 0.3179***
(0.2251) (0.0976) (0.0732) (0.0662)
Colony 0.2217 0.4821*** 0.3449*** 0.2496***
(0.2114) (0.1272) (0.0616) (0.0534)
RTA 0.3339*** –0.4197*** –0.0920 –0.1666*
(0.1089) (0.1226) (0.1129) (0.1011)
Capital (relative US) 1.3084*** 1.2075***
(0.2844) (0.2343)
ln GDPperc 0.3277*** 0.2043**
(0.1117) (0.0926)
Rule of Law –0.0080** -0.0061***
(0.0029) (0.0023)
Country FE No Yes No Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.Observations 762 780 762 780
Notes: Dependent variables: Number of US parents with at least one affiliates in each host
country-sector pair. The regressors include the natural log of the distance between U.S and the
host market (ln Dist); a dummy for the participation of the host market in a regional trade
agreement (RTA), a dummy of common border (border), common language (language) and
whether or not the host market and U.S. had a colonial relationship (colony). Other controls
includes the level of capital endowment (Capital), the natural log of GDP per capita and a
measure of the institutional quality of the host country (Rule of Law). Robust standard errors
reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. n/a mean
not available, because a variable is collinear with country fixed effects
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Table 4.5: Gravity Equation of MP (country-sector level)
Dep. Variable MP Sales
(<25p) (>75p) (<25p) (>75p)
ln Dist –1.0994*** –0.7857*** –0.6170* –0.8584***
(0.1897) (0.1464) (0.3553) (0.2971)
Border –5.0072** –0.2373 –1.8248 –3.4116***
(0.2.1279) (0.7628) (1.2137) (0.9378)
Language 3.8818* 1.7033 0.5525** 0.6566**
(1.1.7287) (1.1007) (0.2874) (0.2631)
Colony 2.1475 1.8609 –1.0250*** –0.0164
(1.7119) (1.2184) (0.2286) (0.2220)
RTA 2.1991 2.1108** 0.3802 1.8904***
(1.6473) (0.9123) (0.6421) (0.4956)
Capital (relative US) 1.0083*** 2.5191***
(0.9921) (0.7881)
ln GDPperc –0.4518 1.1348**
(0.5731) (0.5132)
Rule of Law 0.0083** –0.0318***
(0.0146) (0.0114)
Country FE No Yes No No
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.Observations 703 753 703 753
Notes: Dependent variables: foreign affiliates sales relative to parent’s sales operating in each host
country-sector pair. The regressors include the natural log of the distance between U.S and the
host market (ln Dist); a dummy for the participation of the host market in a regional trade
agreement (RTA), a dummy of common border (border), common language (language) and
whether or not the host market and U.S. had a colonial relationship (colony). Other controls
includes the level of capital endowment (Capital), the natural log of GDP per capita and a
measure of the institutional quality of the host country (Rule of Law). Robust standard errors
reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01..
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Figure 4.7: Distribution of Estimated MP Cost
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Notes: This figures shows the combined effect of gravity variables on MP sales for firms below and
above the median in each country-sector pair. For each country sector-pair and firm group in the
sample we compute the following equation:
τ̂mpi,us = β̂d × lndisti,us + β̂b × borderi,us + β̂language × lani,us + β̂RTA ×RTAi,us + β̂c × colonyi,us
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Figure 4.8: Distribution of Estimated MP Cost
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Notes: This figures shows the combined effect of gravity variables on MP sales for firms below the
25th percentile and those firms above the 75th percentile in each country-sector pair. For each
country sector-pair and firm group in the sample we compute the following equation:
τ̂mpi,us = β̂d × lndisti,us + β̂b × borderi,us + β̂language × lani,us + β̂RTA ×RTAi,us + β̂c × colonyi,us
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4.8 Appendix A: Proofs
Lemma IV.1: The elasticity of marginal cost of composite intermediate input with respect
to trade costs τni is increasing in firm’s productivity ϕ. For ϕ
1 > ϕ2, εMC(τni, $, ϕ
1) >
εMC(τni, $, ϕ
2) > 0.
Proof. The proof is based on Keller and Yeaple (2013). By contradiction method, assume
that εMC(τni, $, ϕ
1) < εMC(τni, $, ϕ
2). Then,
ˆ ∞
z˜
β(z|ϕ1)dz
ˆ z˜
0
β(z|ϕ2)t(z)1−ηdz <
ˆ ∞
z˜
β(z|ϕ2)dz
ˆ z˜
0
β(z|ϕ1)t(z)1−ηdz. (4.27)
Without loss of generality we set $ = 1. By definition, if β(z|ϕ) is log-supermodular in z
and α, then for z′ > z′′,
β(z′|ϕ1)β(z′′|ϕ2)t(z)1−η > β(z′|ϕ2)β(z′′|ϕ1)t(z)1−η. (4.28)
Integrate with respect to z′′ over [0, z′) and with respect to z′ over [z′,∞), and replace z′
with z˜ we get
ˆ ∞
z˜
β(z|ϕ1)dz
ˆ z˜
0
β(z|ϕ2)t(z)1−ηdz >
ˆ ∞
z˜
β(z|ϕ2)dx
ˆ z˜
0
β(z|ϕ1)t(z)1−ηdz (4.29)
Contradiction
Lemma IV.2: let θ(τni, ϕ,$) be the share of imported inputs M(τni, ϕ,$) in total com-
posite intermediate input costs TC(τni, ϕ,$). Then, θ(τni, ϕ,$) =
M(τni,ϕ,$)
T (τni,ϕ,$)
= εMC(τni, ϕ,$)
is i) increasing in ϕ, ii) the import cost share is declining in trade costs for all firms, and
iii) the rate of decline in the import cost share is slower in the more knowledge intensive
firms.
Proof. Part i) follows immediately Lemma IV.1. For part two, the elasticity of θ(τni, ϕ)
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with respect to τni is given by (w.l.o. ∂t(z)/∂τ = 1)
ξθ,τ = −(η − 1)(1− θ(τ, ϕ))− ∂z˜(τ)
∂τ
β(z|ϕ)τ´∞
z˜(τ) b(z|ϕ)dz
< 0. (4.30)
The third part is implied by the monotone likelihood ratio property: β(z|ϕ
i)´∞
z˜ β(z|ϕ1)dx
< β(z|ϕ
2)´∞
z˜ β(z|ϕ2)dz
,
and θ(τ, ϕ1) > θ(τ, ϕ2)
Proposition IV.1: There exists a productivity cutoff ϕintni such that
I(ϕ) =

1 if ϕ ≥ ϕintni
0 otherwise
That is, only the most productive foreign affiliates in country n engage in intrafirm trade
with their parents (import intermediate inputs form their parents).
Proof. An affiliate chooses to import from its parent if,
ϕσ−1Bn
[
∆CMni (τni, I(ϕ), ϕ,$)
] ≥ wif intni , (4.31)
The first term in the left hand side of the equation above ϕσ−1 is increasing in ϕ. The
second term ∆CMni (τni, I(ϕ), ϕ,$) ≡ CMni (τni, I(ϕ) = 1, ϕ)1−σ − CMni (τni, I(ϕ) = 0, ϕ)1−σ
is also increasing in ϕ. Notice that C(I = 0, ϕ1) > C(I = 0, ϕ2),50 whereas C(τ = 1, I =
1, ϕ1) = C(τ = 1, I = 1, ϕ2). By Lemma IV.1, εMC(., ϕ1) > εMC(., ϕ2), then moving
from no intra-firm trade to importing any fraction of intermediate inputs from parents
yields larger saving in the cost of producing the intermediate composite input for the higher
knowledge-intensive firm (more productive).
Proposition IV.2: Country i foreign affiliate sales (conditional on opening an affiliate)
in country n, raffni (ϕ) are decreasing in trade costs τni. Let ε
r
ni(ϕ, τni) < 0 be the elasticity of
50Notice that C(I = 0, ϕ) = t¯ = ´∞
0
β(z|ϕ)t(z)1−ηdz, which is indeed increasing in ϕ under the
assumptions about β(z|ϕ) and t(z).
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affiliate sales with respect to trade costs, then the absolute value of εrni(ϕ, τni) is increasing
in ϕ. In words, the sales of more knowledge intensive firms (affiliates) are more sensitive
to trade costs. That is, FDI-Gravity is more pronounce for more knowledge intensive
parents-affiliates.
Proof. Notice that
εrni(ϕ, τni, I) = (1− σ)εMCni (ϕ, τni, I) (4.32)
The proof then follows immediately from the properties of εMCni (ϕ, τni, I). Moreover, when
I = 0, as explained in the text t¯ is increasing with τni. Thus the proof is complete.
4.9 Appendix B: Detail Derivations
Dividends per share s: In the text we claim that s = σ−1σ(κ−1)+1 . Let Πn be the aggregate
profits of all firms in country n, including foreign affiliates profits,
Πn =
N∑
i=1
Jn
{ˆ ϕfdiin
ϕin
piin(ϕ)dG(ϕ) +
ˆ ϕintin
ϕfdiin
pifdiin (ϕ)dG(ϕ) +
ˆ ∞
ϕintin
piintin (ϕ)dG(ϕ)
}
, (4.33)
and ϕfdinn = ϕintnn = ∞. The domestic/export profits, non-importer foreign affiliates profits
and importer affiliates profits are denoted by piin(ϕ), pi
fdi
in (ϕ), and pi
int
in (ϕ), respectively.
Using the functional forms of the profits, the Pareto distribution, the cutoffs’ equations and
integrating, we get
Πn =
σ − 1
σκ
N∑
i=1
Rin +R
fdi
in +R
int
in (4.34)
Rin, R
fdi
in and R
int
in denote the values of the aggregate sales of exporting to country i, the
aggregate foreign affiliates sales-who do not import-, and the importer aggregate affiliate
sales, respectively. Indeed, Rfdinn = Rintnn = 0. Let Π denote the world aggregate profits:
182
Π =
∑
n∈N Πn, then
Π =
σ − 1
σκ
∑
n∈N
∑
i∈N
Rin +R
fdi
in +R
int
in (4.35)
=
σ − 1
σκ
Y (4.36)
Here, Y is the world total sales/expenditures. World’s total profits Π is also given by the
dividends per share times the total number of shares. Thus, Π =
∑
n∈N sLn =
σ−1
σκ Y =
σ−1
σκ
∑
n∈N Ln(1 + s), where the last equality follows from balanced trade and the fact that
Xn = Ln + Πn = Ln + sLn. Then,
s =
Π∑
n∈N Ln
=
σ − 1
σκ
(1 + s)
→ s = σ − 1
σ(κ− 1) + 1
Derivation of Gravity Equations
Aggregate exports from country i to country n is given by51
Xni = Ji
ˆ ϕfdini
ϕni
σϕσ−1
(
µXn/P
1−σ
n
)
τ1−σni dG(ϕ) (4.37)
Evaluating the integration, using the formula for the aggregate price level, and substituting
out the cutoffs and Ji = Xi/(1 + s), we obtain the gravity equation derived in the text.
Similarly, non-importer affiliates’ aggregate sales and importer affiliates’ aggregate sales can
by expressed by
Xfdini = Ji
ˆ ϕintni
ϕfdini
σϕσ−1
(
Xn/P
1−σ
n
)
[ταniexp(φ)]
1−σ dG(ϕ) (4.38)
Xintni = Ji
ˆ ∞
ϕintni
σϕσ−1
(
Xn/P
1−σ
n
)(
exp(φ(1− τ
α−1
φ
ni ) + αln)
)1−σ
dG(ϕ) (4.39)
51Notice that we do not include the intrafirm export in the total exports. It is easy to show that
total intrafirm exports is constant share of the importer total affiliates sales.
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Using the same steps as before, we get the gravity equations for non-importer affiliates’
sales and importer affiliates’ sales.
FDI- Gravity: Affiliates who do not import from parents:
In the text we claimed that the sales of non-importer decrease in trade frictions; equation
(4.22). In order to prove this formally we use our analysis of the intensive/extensive margin.
Remember that we can disentangle the impact of trade costs on affiliates’ sales into the
intensive and the extensive margins;
ξXfdi,τ =
Intensive margin︷ ︸︸ ︷
α(1− σ) +
Extensive margin︷ ︸︸ ︷
κ− (σ − 1)
(ϕfdini )
σ−1−κ − (ϕintni )σ−1−κ
[
ξϕint,τ (ϕ
int
ni )
σ−1−κ − ξϕfdi,τ (ϕfdini )σ−1−κ
]
(4.40)
The extensive margin is negative if and only if, ξϕfdi,τ (ϕ
fdi)σ−1−κ > ξϕint,τ (ϕint)σ−1−κ. This
will be the case if, αC
M (.,I=0)1−σ−τ1−σ
εMCCM (.,I=1)1−σ−αCM (.,I=0)1−σ >
(
ffdini −fni
f intni
)(1−σ)(σ−1−κ) (
C2ni
C1ni
)(1−σ)(σ−1−κ)
.
For FDI cutoff be well defined, we require f intni > (f
fdi
ni − fni)C2niC1ni . If f intni is way larger than
the last term then the last term of the previous inequality becomes very small and ap-
proaches zero as f intni → ∞. Therefore, there exists f intni < ∞ such that the extensive
margin is negative. If this condition does not hold, all what we need to have FDI-gravity
is − ξϕint,τ (ϕ
int
ni )
σ−1−κ−ξ
ϕfdi,τ
(ϕfdini )
σ−1−κ
ϕfdini )
σ−1−κ−(ϕintni )σ−1−κ
< α(σ−1)κ−(σ−1) , which is easily satisfied for reasonable pa-
rameter values. If either of these two conditions is satisfied, FDI sales must be negatively
correlated with trade frictions.
Derivation of the marginal cost of intermediate input composite: equation (4.12)
CMni (τ, φ, I) =

ταexp
{´∞
0
1
φexp(−z/φ)zdz
}
if I = 0
exp
{´ z˜
0
1
φexp(−z/φ)(αlnτ + z)dz + lnτ
´∞
z˜
1
φexp(−z/φ)dz
}
if I = 1
(4.41)
Integrating by parts and substituting out z˜ = (1−α)lnτni, the required results are obtained.
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